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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher- March 15, 2010

Alpher answers questions about US-Israel tensions following last week's announcement of construction of 1,600 housing units in an East Jerusalem. 

Yossi Alpher is an independent security analyst, co-founder and co-editor of the Israeli-Palestinian internet dialogue bitterlemons.org and Middle East roundtable bitterlemons-international.org. He is the former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a former senior official with the Mossad, Israel's national intelligence agency. His views do not necessarily reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or Peace Now.

Q. What is the strategic significance of US-Israel tensions following the announcement of construction of 1,600 housing units in an East Jerusalem ultra-orthodox neighborhood during the Biden visit?

A. The incident appears to have brought the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration to a genuine crisis in their relationship, one defined by Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren as "the worst in 35 years" (since Henry Kissinger's 1975 "reassessment"). The escalating tensions generated by the incident have revealed weaknesses and contradictions in the approach of all three sides: Israel, the US and the Palestinians.

Beginning with the contradictions embedded in the approach of the Netanyahu government: The prime minister and his coalition appear to believe that they can adhere to their refusal to contemplate any negotiating concessions whatsoever regarding the entirety of Jerusalem, including both Jewish and Arab neighborhoods beyond the 1967 green line, and reinforce that position by proceeding with construction of Jewish housing, while simultaneously entering into negotiations with the Palestinians and maintaining close relations with the administration. 

From Netanyahu's standpoint, the unpleasantness with Vice President Joe Biden was caused by the timing of the Ramat Shlomo construction announcement, not the intention to build there. Biden even seemingly agreed to buy into this concept when, in his Tel Aviv University speech last week, he acquiesced in Netanyahu's apology for the timing of the announcement and noted that since it would take several years to begin construction, the parties still had time to reach a two-state agreement. Even the administration's reported later demands on Netanyahu--that he cancel the Ramat Shlomo building plan, investigate the unfortunate timing of the announcement of the plan, make confidence-building gestures to the Palestinians and declare that negotiations would deal with all core issues (read: Jerusalem)--still do not call for a freeze on Israeli housing construction in East Jerusalem, thereby seemingly exonerating Netanyahu of any truly devious intention.

Most Israelis, familiar with their own convoluted bureaucracy, were in fact certain that Netanyahu had been caught by surprise by his Housing Ministry. According to Amir Cheshin, Mayor Teddy Kollek's Arab affairs adviser when the original plans were drawn up, Ramat Shlomo is built primarily on privately-owned Arab land originally seized by the municipality for the purpose of erecting a municipal stadium, which soon metamorphosed (typically and unethically if not illegally) into housing for the burgeoning Sephardic ultra-orthodox population represented by Shas, which now holds the Housing Ministry portfolio. So this has nothing to do with messianic settlers. Israelis who take a humorous approach to even the worst events suggested that Netanyahu simply explain that the construction was intended for Ramat HaSharon--where I live, near Tel Aviv--not Ramat Shlomo, and that the misunderstanding was over a misspelling.

What Netanyahu did not take into account was that, back in Washington, the incident appeared to crystallize a kind of critical mass in the administration's frustration with Israel. He should have been alerted by Biden's reported complaint behind closed doors in Jerusalem that "This is starting to get dangerous for us. . . .What you're doing here undermines the security of our troops who are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That endangers us, and it endangers regional peace." 

It was in the spirit of this comment that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton proceeded to take Netanyahu to task over the phone just as he thought he had survived the Biden visit fiasco. She focused among other things on the obvious incompatibility between Netanyahu's coalition and the demands of the hour. Her tongue-lashing prompted speculation that the administration might now contemplate some sort of sanctions against Israel due to Netanyahu's seeming inability to get into the spirit of a peace process.

Clinton's and Biden's complaints were reinforced over the weekend by senior presidential adviser David Alexrod's claim that the Ramat Shlomo slight was deliberate, by Tom Friedman's characterization of Netanyahu as a drunk driver and, most damaging of all, by revelations that the senior echelon of the US military in the Middle East were behind the contention, alluded to by Biden, that Israel's intransigence was endangering American troops by painting the administration as a lackey of Israel.

This latter argument will almost certainly be amplified in the weeks to come. Its significance cannot be over-estimated. It is liable to link, in the eyes of the American public, the death of US forces in Afghanistan to Netanyahu's double talk about a two-state solution. Its veracity is virtually impossible to verify. Certainly it is undermined by the refusal of moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, to contribute to the Israeli-Palestinian process by offering Israel low-level diplomatic gestures. 

Still, the new American argument about Israeli intransigence endangering US forces is potentially a far more powerful assertion than the old accusation that the absence of a Palestinian solution was responsible for everything else that's wrong in the Middle East. Apparently, even though it was delivered to IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi weeks ago, it failed to register with Netanyahu (though it may explain Defense Minister Ehud Barak's desperate calls of late for peace processes with the Palestinians and Syria).

Turning to the consistency of the American approach, Netanyahu and his aides believe they have a legitimate complaint. At the time the Ramat Shlomo incident occurred, the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government had agreed to a settlement freeze that was at best partial on the West Bank and did not apply at all to East Jerusalem. Even PLO leader and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas had conceded that proximity talks could commence on the basis of this understanding. Undoubtedly, there were quiet understandings regarding Israeli discretion over announcements of construction in Jewish neighborhoods across the Jerusalem green line at sensitive times. But that's all. 

So according to its own understanding of events, the Netanyahu government at most violated these quiet understandings by dint of the timing of the Ramat Shlomo incident. Its ongoing intention to build in East Jerusalem was tacitly approved by the administration back in October-November of last year when Washington welcomed the West Bank settlement-construction "freeze". 

Why, then, did Clinton declare last week that the Ramat Shlomo construction plans were an "insult" to the US and sent a "deeply negative signal"? Why did she demand that the Israelis "demonstrate not just through words but through specific actions that they are committed to the [US-Israel] relationship and to the peace process"? Netanyahu, who is well known for his presumed understanding of the American scene (at least compared to some of his predecessors), has clearly badly misread this administration. 

But the Obama administration also undoubtedly misread Netanyahu. Axelrod is almost certainly wrong about a conspiracy. More important, the US has to recognize that compromises like this with Netanyahu will never work. They only end up highlighting the contradictions within the prime minister's coalition and, indeed, those reflected in his ambiguous, halting and constrained commitment to a two-state solution. A "peace process" (now reduced to the proximity talks agreement) has to be based on far more stable foundations. As Clinton hinted, this Israeli coalition cannot deliver them. So what does the administration do now?

Finally, there are the contradictions within the Palestinian position. Abbas knew Netanyahu would keep building in East Jerusalem when he, backed by the Arab League, agreed to proximity talks. But his assent was so fragile, so unwilling, that he gladly latched onto the Ramat Shlomo incident to threaten to back out. He appears to believe that continued intransigence will ultimately compel the administration to pressure Netanyahu into more and more concessions. He may be right, though so far all we've seen from Obama is rhetorical pressure on Netanyahu. The PLO leadership seemingly deliberately fed the new tensions on Sunday and Monday by encouraging demonstrations in Jerusalem against the inauguration of the rebuilt Hurva synagogue in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. That Palestinian move was based on trumped-up accusations that the synagogue had something to do with Israeli intentions regarding the Temple Mount mosques.

Wouldn't it be simpler for Abbas to go willingly into negotiations and demonstrate for all to see just how little (or, surprise surprise, how much) Netanyahu is prepared to offer? But Abbas, like Netanyahu, is constrained by more extreme parties: Hamas, but also Fateh hardliners who believe the settlements are the heart of the problem and who don't even like PM Salam Fayyad's unilateral state-building program that is moving forward with Abbas' approval.

Q. What are Netanyahu's options for restoring greater trust to his relations with both Washington and Ramallah?

A. Biden's warm speech at Tel Aviv University last week leaves plenty to build on: solid US support for Israel, particularly regarding Iran and security issues. But Biden also touched on more controversial issues during his visit. As the remark attributed to him about problems the US encounters in Iraq and AfPak due to Israeli intransigence suggests, the Palestinian issue is linked in American eyes with US strategic interests to the east. Biden mentioned countries where American troops are deployed; Netanyahu is more interested in Iran. The Israeli prime minister, who has never hidden the priority he assigns to the Iran issue and whose closed discussions with Biden focused on it, now has to address Israel's security predicament regarding Iran alongside Jerusalem's absolute need for close coordination with the US in this regard. He has to look at these issues through the prism of international pressure to move ahead on the Palestinian issue, pro-settler pressures within his coalition, the new allegations that his intransigence could cost American lives in the Middle East, and his own inner ideological conflict regarding the substance of a Palestinian settlement and how to achieve it.

Netanyahu can easily comply with the four American demands. His first decision, already evident, is to investigate the Ramat Shlomo incident and take administrative steps to ensure that such settlement construction misunderstandings do not happen again. For a few weeks, we can expect the government to try to prevent any new and provocative construction in Jerusalem or the West Bank, reflecting Netanyahu's hope that the incident will blow over and administration pique will remain limited to rhetoric. Netanyahu will offer Senator George Mitchell, the US peace facilitator due to return this week, some new gesture to entice Abbas back to proximity talks and improve Israel's stock with the administration. And he should have no trouble committing to discuss all core issues with the Palestinians; he has already done so. The real question is whether he is prepared to offer concessions on those issues.

Further afield, as long as this Israeli government comprises elements who believe that settlement construction is God's will, someone will always build and "embarrass" the prime minister. This is particularly likely in East Jerusalem, which the government (in all fairness, to one degree or another like its predecessors) treats as no different than Ramat HaSharon, where it goes without saying that the prime minister does not have to be informed of housing construction.

Undoubtedly, too, the Israeli political scene will now enter a period of hyper-activity. The option of reshaping his coalition, virtually suggested by Clinton, will now get another look from Netanyahu. Labor dissidents will again pressure Defense Minister Ehud Barak to pull out. Kadima leader Tzipi Livni--Netanyahu's only option for a more moderate coalition--will be back in the spotlight. The extremists in the coalition will go out and "create facts".

And there is an option of alternatives that might distract everyone. Don't be surprised if we now hear more about a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas for Gilad Shalit. Or Israeli acceptance of the latest Turkish offer to mediate renewed proximity talks with Syria.

At the end of the day, this Israeli government's composition is incompatible with peace. That should have been clear from the start. Only an extremely forceful administration position can conceivably address this predicament. Thirty-five years ago, "reassessment" meant cancellation of vital US arms shipments to an Israel still licking its wounds after the Yom Kippur war. That led to the second redeployment from Sinai and ultimately to peace with Egypt.