Q. What are the ramifications of the meeting last week in Istanbul between Pakistan's and Israel's foreign ministers? Q. If the new Iraqi constitution is approved by a referendum in October, Iraq will become a loose federation. How is this likely to affect Middle East stability and Israeli interests?
Q. What are the ramifications of the meeting last week in Istanbul between Pakistan's and Israel's foreign ministers?
Israeli and Pakistani officials have held occasional meetings for decades, and the two countries have maintained superficial commercial and other ties. The Pakistanis clarified that last week's meeting between foreign ministers Khurshid Kasuri and Sylvan Shalom was indeed an opening for regular contacts (Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf spoke of opening a "national dialogue"), but that diplomatic ties would have to wait for a full-fledged Israeli-Palestinian peace. So on the face of it, the only dramatic new message sent by this meeting is that Pakistan agreed to go public.
Still, there may be more to it. The Pakistani rationale for the meeting was obviously steeped in considerations of realpolitik: the need to develop even minimal leverage in Jerusalem as a counter to burgeoning Israeli-Indian strategic ties, and Musharraf's desire to bolster his image in the United States as a hedge against persistent allegations that his regime is not doing enough about al-Qaeda, its missing leaders, and Islamic terrorism. Not accidentally, later this month Musharraf will address a major American Jewish organization in New York. Cynics in Israel, invoking black humor, would say that the Istanbul meeting had more to do with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion--i.e., a Pakistani belief that Jewish influence in America and elsewhere is so strong that Islamabad has no choice but to pander to it--than with any dramatic Pakistani assessment that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza justifies a new departure in the Muslim world's relationship with the Jewish state.
But that's the way Israeli ties with the Shah of Iran and even Turkey were characterized in the past, and those relationships proved productive and important. In this regard the Gaza disengagement, which is the event the Pakistanis cited as justification for the meeting, is providing the impetus for a concerted effort by the Israel Foreign Ministry to expand Israel's relations with Arab and other Muslim countries. Unfortunately, Foreign Minister Shalom has a tendency to exaggerate the impact of these meetings or to reveal them prematurely--he has in the past year or so trumpeted renewed or initial relations with no fewer than a dozen Arab states, and an indiscretion regarding secret discussions with Libyan officials recently put a possible Libyan-Israeli breakthrough on ice. Publicity in Israel over a projected meeting in Jerusalem this week between Sharon and Jordan's King Abdallah may have scared off the monarch, too. Moreover, care must now be taken lest the mini-rapprochement with Pakistan negatively affect Israeli-Indian relations.
Pakistan and Israel were established almost simultaneously: both are the only states created specifically around their respective religions, Islam and Judaism. Pakistan, described by Jordanian columnist Saleh al-Qallab (al-Ra'i, Sept. 4) as "the closest Islamic state to the Arabs", has contributed here and there to Arab defense preparations, particularly in working and even flying with the Jordanian Air Force in earlier decades. But it never fought against Israel, and never pointed its nuclear potential threateningly in Israel's direction, as Iran has (although the Pakistani nuclear maverick, Abdul Qadeer Khan, gave nuclear know how to at least two self-declared enemies of Israel, Iran and Libya, almost certainly with his government's knowledge).
Bearing in mind Musharraf's current concerns with India and the US, there could be a basis for some further development of the Pakistani-Israeli relationship. Moreover, Sharon and Shalom hope to capitalize on the breakthrough with Pakistan this month at the UN General Assembly in New York, where they plan to hold additional high level meetings with leaders from countries that do not officially recognize Israel: there is talk of an impending meeting with the Indonesian leadership, and press leaks in Israel relate that an Israeli diplomatic representation manned by dual citizens using their non-Israeli passports has been established in Dubai. All of this is good for Sharon's campaign to show the Israeli right that there is a positive payoff for the "sacrifice" of disengagement.
But there are also three Israel-related reasons why little may come of this overall initiative to turn
disengagement into a lever for upgraded Israeli-Arab/Muslim relations. One is Shalom himself, who is, to put it
nicely, not considered to be an adroit, articulate, and sophisticated diplomat, and who has muffed previous
attempts to capitalize on positive developments with the Palestinians and expand Israel's international relations.
A second is the question mark hanging over Sharon's political future: if Binyamin Netanyahu succeeds in ousting
Sharon as Likud leader, Arab and other Muslim countries are likely to put Shalom's initiatives on ice very
quickly.
Finally, there is the delicate state of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The attempt to capitalize on disengagement
from Gaza in order to persuade Arab and Muslim leaders to upgrade their relations with Israel runs headlong into
heavy doubts about the sustainability of any new momentum created by disengagement. Those leaders are concerned
lest "rewarding" Israel for disengagement give Jerusalem the impression that genuine peace between Israelis and
Palestinians--something that really gets the Palestinian issue once and for all off the Arab public and inter-Arab
agenda--is not an urgent Arab and Muslim concern.
In this regard Musharraf, who faces concerted opposition to the thaw with Israel on the part of powerful Pakistani Islamists, made a smart move when (according to him) he "cleared" his move with Israel in advance with Egyptian President Husni Mubarrak. If this is indeed the case, it could reflect a positive development in Cairo's attitude. For years the Egyptians have spitefully pressured Arab, Muslim, and other third world countries to avoid normalizing relations with Israel until a comprehensive Middle East peace is established.
The fragility of progress in expanding Israel-Arab relations was illustrated upon the outbreak of the intifada in October 2000, when Morocco, Tunisia, and Qatar closed their low-level legations in Israel, and Egypt and Jordan withdrew their ambassadors. Five years later, only the Egyptians and Jordanians have returned, though here and there the others have made friendly gestures. It is questionable whether the message of Gaza disengagement alone, honed by the less than skillful hands of Shalom, will now prove sufficient to bring the others back or to bring additional countries into the fold. But there is no harm in trying, particularly when there are leaders out there like Musharraf who just may need Israel more than it needs them.
Q. If the new Iraqi constitution is approved by a referendum in October, Iraq will become a loose
federation. How is this likely to affect Middle East stability and Israeli interests?
A. Beyond the obvious concern that the federalization of Iraq will prolong and even exacerbate the civil strife there sparked by Sunni unrest, we must begin to assess the effects of a radical measure of Iraqi decentralization on the surrounding states, too. Some of the ramifications could have far-reaching importance for Israel.
First of all, if federalism is seen to work in Iraq, it could prove an attractive model for significant ethnic and religious sectors in additional Arab states like Morocco and Algeria with their large non-Arab Berber populations, Syria with its Sunni majority and Alawite and Kurd minorities, and of course Lebanon, which already uses a problematic system of political federalism. In deference to Iraq's Kurds, the new Iraqi constitution does not even define Iraq as an "Arab state"--a radical departure for the Arab world. A greater readiness on the part of Arabs to recognize and protect the religious, national, and linguistic rights of non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities in their midst might send a message of pluralism and tolerance that influences attitudes toward Israel, as the Jewish national homeland, as well. It could shatter or at least crack the destructive myth that the Middle East is uniformly "Arab". And it might conceivably give renewed impetus to the advocates of an eventual Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian confederation of sorts that would recognize the fact that the three countries occupy a shared geopolitical space.
On the other hand, a successful federal experiment in Iraq might also generate centrifugal forces in the region. The Iraqi Shi'ite south and center are likely to move politically closer to Iran, thereby strengthening Tehran's aspiration to achieve recognized regional power status. Iraqi Shi'ite autonomy would almost certainly encourage large but downtrodden Shi'ite communities in neighboring Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to demand more rights. With Iran's backing, such a campaign could negatively influence stability in these major oil-producing countries. To the extent that Tehran draws greater power and regional influence from these developments, it is bad for Israel and its neighbors alike, as well as for the US, particularly as Iran moves closer to military nuclear status.
And if, as many predict, the Iraqi experiment fails and dissolves into even worse civil strife? This could provoke an Iraqi Kurdish move toward independence, triggering a Turkish reaction and possibly placing Israel in the unfortunate position of having to choose between friends. Any military move by Turkey against the Iraqi Kurds would almost certainly reduce Turkey's chances of entering the European Union--another development detrimental to Israeli and American interests.
Worse, Iran would profit by allying itself with the Iraqi Shi'ites, who would be desperate for their Shi'ite neighbor's military backing against a possible Sunni Arab onslaught from several directions. The resultant unrest in the Gulf region might, here and there, provide inroads for Israeli security ties with moderate regimes, but by and large it would cause a new spiral in oil prices (beyond $100 a barrel?) and be bad for just about everyone.
Israel's neighbor, Jordan, was recently the target of infiltration by Sunni Arab al-Qaeda adherents from Iraq who
fired rockets from Aqaba at Israeli and American Navy targets. Many fear that if the security deterioration in Iraq
continues, the countries surrounding Iraq will witness further aggression by the forces of Islamic radical
terrorism from their new base in the Sunni triangle. The fate of Iraq's federalist constitution could be a prime
factor in determining whether, and to what extent, this regional terrorism scenario is realized.