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February 20, 2006 - Vol. 7, Issue 28

Lack Of Peace Process Helped Drive Palestinians Into Hamas' Arms: The Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research (PSR) released its exit polling from the recent Palestinian elections, revealing that a lack of a peace process with Israel contributed significantly to Hamas' stunning victory over Fatah.

Lack Of Peace Process Helped Drive Palestinians Into Hamas' Arms: The Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research (PSR) released its exit polling from the recent Palestinian elections, revealing that a lack of a peace process with Israel contributed significantly to Hamas' stunning victory over Fatah. PSR acknowledged that the exit polling that it released immediately after the elections incorrectly predicted a Fatah win over Hamas. PSR stated that this error was the result of a large number of rejections on the day of elections, when a total of 3,560 voters in the sample, or 17%, refused to be interviewed. PSR believes these rejections were the result of deliberate incitement against pollsters. In order to overcome this problem, the Center re-weighted its data to reflect the actual outcome of the vote. PSR found that Hamas' victory was the result of three factors. First, the peace process is no longer at the top of people's priorities. Findings show that only a small minority of voters considered the peace process to be a leading concern for Palestinians. Voters saw the peace process deadlocked with little or no chance for revitalization. The only sign of hope was the Israeli unilateral disengagement, a step that voters saw as a victory for armed struggle and Hamas. A negotiated peace process was the centerpiece of Fatah's national agenda. Therefore, the collapse of diplomacy dealt a heavy blow to the national movement.

Second, widespread voter disillusionment with Palestinian Authority (PA) governance, particularly in the areas of fighting corruption and enforcing law and order, helped Hamas win. These two issues were the top priorities for Palestinians. Moreover, voters lost confidence in the ability of Fatah to lead state building in these two areas. Third, Hamas' success would have remained relatively small had it not been for Fatah's widespread fragmentation in the electoral districts. In fact, Hamas did not win the support of a majority of voters. To the contrary, the majority went to Fatah and other nationalist-secularist factions, which together won 56% of the popular vote versus 44% for Hamas. Fatah candidates gave Hamas an overwhelming victory despite the fact that its candidates won the district vote by an average not exceeding 41% to Fatah's 34%, with Fatah's "independents" and other candidates picking up an average of 25% in the districts. What insured Hamas' great victory in the electoral districts was the fact that for each Hamas candidate there were six opposing candidates, leading to a significant waste of nationalist votes. Had Fatah been able to discipline its people by convincing these "independents" to drop out of the race, its average district vote would have risen to 39% and its total district seats would have increased by 16 to a total of 33.

PSR also found strong Palestinian support for the peace process in its exit polling. Fatah's strength lies with those who support the peace process, while Hamas' lies with those opposed to it and among those who are uncertain about where they stand on the peace process. 69% of those who place the peace process at the top of their priorities voted for Fatah and just 19% of them voted for Hamas. But only 9% said the peace process was their number one priority, in contrast to 25% who listed the ability to fight corruption as their leading concern and 37% who said addressing lawlessness and chaos is the central issue that determines people's votes. The Palestinian vote for Hamas should not be interpreted as a vote against the peace process. About 60% of all voters identified themselves as supporters of the peace process, while only 17% saw themselves opposed to it and 23% saw themselves somewhere in between. Moreover, the vote doesn't mean that all those who voted for Hamas are opposed to the peace process. To the contrary, findings show that 40% of Hamas voters support the peace process and only 30% oppose it. Moreover, about one-third of Hamas voters support the collection of arms, the implementation of the Road Map, and the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in a two-state context.

50.5% of all voters said they want the new government to implement the Road Map, compared with 39.1% who do not want the Road Map to be implemented and 10.3% who had no answer. 48.6% of all voters want the new government to pass laws to collect arms from all armed groups so that the PA security services would be the only armed force in the PA areas. On the other hand, 26.2% want the government to pass laws to allow the armed factions to keep arms, 21.3% want it to not interfere with this issue, and 3.9% had no answer. Finally, 49.2% of Palestinians either definitely agree or agree that there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including refugees and Jerusalem issues. 47.8% either definitely disagree or disagree with this proposition, while 3.1% had no answer. (PSR Study, 2/15/06)

Tuning In To Back Channels? Senior Hamas officials in Gaza have been trying to open a secret channel of talks with Israel and the U.S. An initial message meant to examine the possibility of secret dialogue has already reached Israel, but a decision was made not to respond and to adhere to the policy of not talking with Hamas leaders and of taking action to force new elections on the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas' attempts at dialogue are the result of a clash between its leaders in the occupied territories and its leaders outside of the territories. While the outside leaders of Hamas take a very extremist line, there are some Hamas leaders in the territories calling for a certain degree of moderation, at least for tactical reasons. Hamas officials in the territories believe that the external Hamas leaders do not necessarily understand the full significance of the transition from being a movement to being the rulers of the PA, and they say that the outside leaders can allow themselves to stick to a hard line because there is no heavy pressure on them from Israel and Fatah.

Hamas leaders in the territories relayed the message by means of officials in Gaza who have ties with Israeli security officials. At this stage the message did not include any real content, but was only an attempt to examine the possibility of establishing a channel of dialogue. Hamas officials are also trying to break the political boycott declared by the U.S. It is clear to the leaders that Bush Administration officials will not talk to them directly, so they are trying to pave a boycott-bypass route by means of the Aspen Institute, which has offices in Washington, France, Germany, India, and Italy. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/15/06)

The Web They Weave: The Israeli Foreign Ministry has begun fighting Palestinian terrorism in cyberspace, setting itself the goal of shutting down dozens of websites that are operated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to a report from the International Law Department of the ministry, many of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas websites are run on servers owned by major international companies in gross violation of the commercial contracts signed with the hosting firms. The report notes that the Internet companies do not supervise the contents of the sites. Therefore, the report suggests that the Foreign Ministry should try to set off a wave of protests from surfers who will draw the attention of the companies to the contractual violations. The wave of complaints, which is mostly supposed to come from the Jewish Diaspora community, is geared to make Internet firms leery of continuing to extend their services to terrorist groups. (Ma'ariv, 2/14/06)

Settlements Given Funding Priority Over Poor Israeli Communities: A new study from the Adva Center found that West Bank and Gaza settlements enjoyed preferential treatment when it came to municipal budgets between 1995 and 2004. Despite the deep cuts during this period in municipal budgets earmarked by the government, settlements were favored when it came to construction and paving new roads. Meanwhile, Arab communities within Israel enjoyed the lowest municipal budgets. The Adva Center study found that municipal per capita income from Interior Ministry funds stood at $275 in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but residents in development towns inside the Green Line received only $180 on average and Arab communities in Israel received just $170 per person. Settlements were also on top when it came to municipal funds earmarked for providing various public services, like education, health, and welfare. Settlers in the West Bank and Golan received $433 per person, compared with $303 per person in development towns and $299 per person in Arab communities. The study also found that the level of government involvement in residential building projects in the West Bank was substantially higher than inside the Green Line. 25,714 apartments were built during the period that was studied at a cost of nearly $3 billion. The state initiated 57% of the construction projects in this period, funding around 40% of the total investment in residential property. Inside Israel proper, the state initiated around 27% of construction projects and funded only 16% of the total investment. (Ynet & Globes, 2/12/06)

Shas Rejects Settler Orthodoxy: In an interview with the Jerusalem Post, Shas Chairman Eli Yishai said retaining all the settlements in the West Bank is unrealistic. "The vast majority of settlers understand today that we will have to make territorial compromises," he said, just days after the National Union and the National Religious Party formed a joint election list with the understanding they would not be part of a government that supports territorial compromise. "Talk about holding onto all our settlements was relevant 20 years go," according to Yishai. "Today it is outdated." Yishai emphasized Shas' moderate diplomatic stance at a time when polls forecast Kadima and Labor, two parties that back territorial compromise, obtaining nearly half of the seats in the Knesset. "We and the Palestinians drink the same water, breathe the same air; we have to move ahead," he said. "Palestinians also understand that terrorism does not pay, and economic pressures will eventually force them to negotiate with us.[Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef] never changed his opinion in support of territorial compromise within the framework of a peace agreement." Nevertheless, Yishai reiterated Yosef's opposition to unilateral territorial concessions or negotiations with Hamas. "The rav foresaw the rise of Hamas after disengagement," he said. "It strengthened the radical elements. We could have signed a peace agreement with [Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas] and strengthened more moderate voices." (Jerusalem Post, 2/15/06)

Disengagement = More Security: A summary of security incidents in the Gaza region in the half-year that preceded disengagement and the half-year since then reveals a dramatic rise in security for Israelis. In the period before disengagement, 14 Israelis were killed. In the six months after disengagement, there were no Israeli fatalities. Before disengagement, 1,020 Kassam rockets and mortar shells fell on Israelis. In the subsequent period, this number dropped to 400. Prior to disengagement, 100 explosive devices were planted against Israelis targets. The total in the six months after the pullout was 30. But Israelis don't seem to have gotten the message. A recent survey from the Geocartographic Institute for Israel Army Radio found that the majority of Israelis think that disengagement was of no practical value. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/12/06 & Jerusalem Post, 2/13/06)

Settlers Council On The Verge Of A Nervous Breakdown: Both deputy chairs of the Settlers Council recently announced that they are quitting their posts. The first out the door was Shaul Goldstein, and he was later joined by Eliezer Hisdai. Goldstein, who heads the Etzion Bloc Regional Council, explained, "I moved aside to make room for others." Hisdai, the mayor of Alfei Menashe, spoke in harsher terms, saying, "We failed at our job, and I take responsibility." The Settlers Council is comprised of all the leaders of the local and regional councils in the West Bank. This council has a smaller, seven-person body of leaders (among whom both Goldstein and Hisdai were once counted) that is responsible for the decision-making process. "We made a lot of mistakes recently, and the bottom line is that we failed," says Hisdai, who is the only secular Jew in the council's leadership. "We failed to reach out to the tens of thousands of secular settlers in Maale Adumim, Ariel, and Givat Zeev. Today we've reached a situation in which we've also lost the religious settlers from Kiryat Arba and Elkana. I made a decision that I am not prepared to serve any longer as the token secular Jew, if my opinions are not heard and I am unable to influence." Hisdai admits that the violence at Amona played a role in his decision. "There was violence from both sides," he says. "But the settler leadership could have prevented all of that lunacy had they waged a just war over the integrity of the established settlements and not over illegal settlement outposts. We lost the support of the public inside the Green Line because of the violence at the illegal settlement outposts such as Havat Gilad and Mitzpe Yitzhar. The Settlers Council tried to win on all the fronts, but at the end of the day it's become evident that it lost." Neither Hisdai nor Goldstein went to Amona on the day of the evacuation and, by so doing, evinced that they were not prepared to take responsibility for the turn of events there. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/14/06)

Speaking Of Right-Wing Violence.Vandals torched and destroyed the car of the police commander of the evacuation of Amona, in an arson attack next to the commander's home last week. Brigadier General Meir Bukovza, deputy commander of the West Bank district police, was the on-site commander of the evacuation. Police suspect right-wing activists torched the car to avenge the outpost evacuation. Since Amona, Bukovza and other senior police officers have been subject to threats from right-wing activists. The Ben Gurion Airport police provided him with special security arrangements, including frequent patrols near his home, but an unknown person succeeded in attacking his car. Internal Security Minister Gideon Ezra noted that there were numerous cases of abuse and violence against security forces in recent weeks. For example, Ezra said that unknown attackers released dogs in the yard of a police officer who participated in the Amona evacuation. West Bank Police Chief Commander Yisrael Yitzak has received threatening calls on his office and cell phones. A mother of four policemen has received many hate letters since the Amona evacuation. One letter read, "You are the mother of murderers, a Nazi mother who raises Nazis. We will get you. We'll make sure you do not have a life."

Further, the IDF has had to post a permanent guard at the private home of OC Central Chief Commander Yair Naveh, an observant Jew who wears a kippa and graduated from the national religious Netiv Meir Yeshiva. Naveh has been subjected to harassment, insults, and numerous threats. Even his children have received threatening phone calls in the middle of the night. When Naveh came home one recent Friday, dozens of settlers were waiting outside his door and almost stopped him from entering. A source in the IDF General Staff said, "It's sad that we have reached situation in which the home of an IDF major general has to be guarded against Jews." Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz also said that it is unacceptable for a major general in the IDF to be unable to enter his house because of Jewish rioters. Still, the violence and intimidation tactics are having an impact. Plans for evacuating other illegal outposts in the West Bank-the Sakali Farm, the Arusi Farm, and south Yitzhar-are expected to be shelved until after the Israeli elections. (Ma'ariv, 2/13 & 15/05; Ha'aretz, 2/15/06; Jerusalem Post, 2/15/06; Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/16/06; & Ynet, 2/15/06)

Rift In Jordan Valley: Ha'aretz correspondent Amira Haas reported that Israel has managed to cut off the eastern sector of the West Bank from the rest of that occupied territory while no one was paying attention. As a result, some two million Palestinians, residents of the West Bank, are prohibited from entering the area, which constitutes one-third of the West Bank and includes the Jordan Valley, the area of the Dead Sea shoreline, and the eastern slopes of the West Bank mountains. Israeli military sources said that the moves have been "security measures," adopted by the IDF, and have no connection to any political intentions whatsoever. Honest. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley were imposed at the start of the Intifada and gradually expanded. But the sweeping prohibition regarding entry into the area by Palestinians was imposed after security responsibility in Jericho was given back to the Palestinians in March 2005.

In addition to affecting others, the prohibition also applies to thousands of residents of towns and villages in the northern West Bank, most of whose lands are in the Jordan Valley, and some of whose residents have been living there for many years. The ban also affects people who for years have earned a living by doing seasonal farm work for Palestinians in the Jordan Valley, as well as several thousand Bedouin and sheep-herders who live in the area permanently in tents and makeshift structures, but are registered as residents of communities a few kilometers to the east. Four permanent checkpoints ensure that passage is denied to Palestinians whose identity documents do not list them as residents of the Jordan Valley. Entry is allowed only to a few thousand holders of special permits from the Civil Administration and some 5,000 Palestinians who work in the settlements. Special, one-time entry permits are also granted for "humanitarian cases." To enforce the ban, the IDF conducts frequent nighttime raids in Jordan Valley villages. (Ha'aretz, 2/13/06)

A Week On The Hustings: According to last week's Dialog/Ha'aretz/Channel 10 survey of Israeli public opinion, if elections were held today for the 120-seat Knesset (with previous results in parentheses), Kadima would win 40 seats, Labor 19 (-2), Likud 13 (-2), Shas 10, National Union-National Religious Party (NRP) 10 (+2), Yisrael Beiteinu 7 (+2), United Torah Judaism (UTJ) 6 (-1), Meretz-Yahad 5, the Arab parties 10 (+1), Shinui 0, and Green Leaf 0. Twenty seats remain up for grabs because of undecided voters. The Dahaf/Yedioth Ahronoth poll found that Kadima would win 41 seats (-2), Labor 20, Likud 15, Shas 10, the Arab parties 9, National Union-NRP 8, Yisrael Beiteinu 7, UTJ 5, and Meretz-Yahad 5.

The SNT/Teleseker/Ma'ariv survey gave Kadima 39 seats (-1), Labor 20 (-1), Likud 15, Shas 10 (+1), the Arab parties 8, Yisrael Beiteinu 7, Meretz-Yahad 6, National Union-NRP 9, UTJ 6 (+1), and Shinui 0. The Smith/Globes poll gave Kadima 39 seats, Labor 17-18, and Likud 17. The Maagar Mohot/Israel Radio survey handed Kadima 38 seats, Labor 19, Likud 17, Shinui 0, Shas 9, the Arab parties 8, Meretz-Yahad 5, National Union-NRP 10, Yisrael Beiteinu 6, UTJ 6, and Green Leaf 2. Finally, a Geocartographic Institute/Army Radio poll indicates that there is a fair chance that none of the Arab parties will pass the threshold required to get into the Knesset. That poll found Balad would win three seats, while Hadash and Raam with Taal would win only two positions. (Ha'aretz, 2/15/06; Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/16/06; Ma'ariv, 2/16/06; Globes, 2/16/06; IMRA, 2/16/06; &Army Radio, 2/16/06)





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