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Hard Questions, Tough Answers - January 30, 2005

Q. Are the ideas of Israel joining NATO and/or the European Union realistic? Q. ...what third party support roles are beginning to emerge?

The views of Yossi Alpher, Israeli Security Expert, do not necessarily reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or
Peace Now.

Q. Some Israeli circles are promoting the idea of Israel eventually joining NATO and/or the European Union, at least in part in order to enhance its security. Are these ideas realistic?

A. Almost certainly not. Neither NATO nor the EU is interested in Israeli membership. In any case, if the issue were ever to be treated seriously these organizations' membership requirements would almost certainly dampen Israeli ardor to join.

Israeli advocates of joining NATO point to its value as a mutual security treaty, and the fact that it is led by the one world power that Israelis trust, the United States. They note that in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War NATO has been searching for new missions, including roles in such distant places as Afghanistan, and that a NATO role in assisting with disengagement from Gaza and/or policing a ceasefire has been broached, in effect bringing NATO to Israel's shores. They draw encouragement from NATO's interest in recent years in dialoguing with six Mediterranean Arab countries and Israel (the Mediterranean Dialogue) and its offer of dialogue with the Gulf states (the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative).

The NATO secretary general will visit Israel in February, and Israeli officials point to the advantages of even a junior partnership with NATO, in the form of joint maneuvers and reciprocal arms sales. At last December's Herzliya Conference, a forum for discussing ideas for new strategic departures, a session was held on Israeli membership in NATO with the participation of Britain's NATO ambassador. While many Arab states are suspicious of NATO's interest in the Middle East--which essentially reflects western fears of militant Islam and concern over energy security--Israel welcomes NATO as a potential ally.

Israeli interest in EU membership also stems from the likely economic advantages to be gained, and the general sentiment among many Israelis that they are culturally closest to Europe, particularly now that Eastern European countries and Mediterranean island states (Cyprus, Malta) are joining the EU. Indeed, the Union recently moved geographically closer to Israel with the adherence of Cyprus. Europe's readiness to discuss membership with Turkey points to the possibility that the EU could in ten years or so, by admitting Muslim Turkey, cease to be a "Christian club", thereby paving the way for a Jewish member. At present Israel is moving toward membership in the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, which is designed to give countries like Israel some of the economic advantages of EU membership without the political framework.

So much for the advantages. The drawbacks begin with the mere fact that neither NATO nor the EU could conceivably accept as a member a country that is in a state of war with its neighbors and occupies their land. Obviously, the Israeli advocates reply, we understand that none of this can happen until we are at peace with the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon. But membership--including for one or more of those neighbors besides Israel--could be a dynamic incentive for peace. Indeed, the European desire for a major role in the peace process could be satisfied in this way.

The next drawback is geographic. Israel is not in Europe, and the EU and NATO focus only on Europe or Atlantic countries: the United States and Canada. One of the key European objections to Turkish membership in the EU is that 95% of that country is in Asia, not Europe. Then come the more pragmatic rules and regulations. "Would Israel do an armaments striptease as all new members states are required, and show us its nuclear and missile capabilities?" snort senior NATO officials. "Israeli officers tell us they might bend their rules and reveal Israel's capabilities to the US, but never to the rest of us. That attitude is completely unacceptable."

Would Israel agree to abandon its free trade agreement with the US in favor of joining the EU, as that organization's regulations require? Israel was the first country in the world to achieve free trade agreements with both, and has benefited immensely from them at the economic level. Would Israel, the only Jewish state, agree--as all EU members must--that after a negotiated period of time the citizens of any other EU member states would be free to immigrate to it? EU membership could quickly dilute Israel's Jewish nature. If an independent Palestine were also to join the EU as part of a peace deal, its residents could eventually make "return" to Israel entirely legally under EU regulations.

Of course, some of these issues could be negotiated and compromises reached. And if nothing else, the NATO and/or EU membership discussion is a helpful vehicle for sharpening and defining Israel's needs and requirements in its relationship with Europe. Many Europeans and Israelis recognize that the EU's European Neighborhood Policy is probably the best of both worlds from Israel's standpoint.

But at the end of the day, and beyond all the other impediments, the Europeans simply are not interested. Israel is beyond their frame of reference--culturally, geographically and politically. It will be hard enough for Muslim Turkey, already a NATO member, to win adherence to the EU, much less Jewish Israel.


Q. As an Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire appears to be taking hold and preparations for disengagement continue apace, what third party support roles are beginning to emerge?

A. Phase I of the roadmap requires that the Quartet--the US, EU, UN and Russia--play an immediate role in monitoring a ceasefire. Interestingly, the Quartet members have been caught off guard by the speed and efficiency with which the ceasefire has begun to take hold. Now the CIA is reportedly planning to assume a role coordinating ceasefire monitoring contacts between Israeli and Palestinian security forces.

A somewhat more creative role has been played in the past year or so by the British. With Washington's blessings and Israel's concurrence (initially reluctantly, later more enthusiastically) the British have set up "situation rooms" in the Palestinian territories, where Palestinian security personnel can monitor security-related events and, hopefully, take action. This has required British training, equipment, and even the supply of vehicles for Palestinian security officers left without any infrastructure due to the ravages of the past four years' conflict. The ceasefire should now render these facilities particularly relevant.

A prospective third party role in disengagement is being considered for the Multinational Force and Observers, the US-led observer force that has policed the Israeli-Egyptian peace in Sinai for more than 20 years. In recent months the MFO has consulted with Israel, Egypt, and the international community with an eye to taking up some of the policing tasks on the Egyptian side of the philadelphi road that separates the Gaza Strip from Sinai. If this initiative works, the MFO would function side-by-side with the 750 troops that Egypt is preparing to deploy on its side of the border. If Palestinian security forces succeed in taking over on their side, this would enable the IDF to withdraw from philadelphi this summer. The MFO has already requested Canadian liaison officers for this purpose.

More third party roles are in the works. Jordan as well as Egypt have expressed a readiness to train Palestinian personnel. The World Bank will hopefully assist Israel in turning over to the Palestinians usable infrastructure that it abandons in Gaza. And perhaps most importantly, the World Bank is preparing a plan to bolster international aid for Gaza by 50%, to about $1.5 billion, after disengagement.

None of this will be possible without close Israeli-Palestinian security and economic cooperation. It got off to a good start in the past two weeks. Nor would these third party roles, or for that matter NATO and EU membership, even be discussed were Israel still adhering strictly to its "traditional" suspicions of the potential objectivity of most likely third parties. This is a significant development, particularly in light of the growing criticism of Israel in institutions like the UN and the EU during the past four years.