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Naomi Chazan: "Israel, Palestine, and Bush II: Continuity, Change, and the Urgency of Rescuing a Two-State Peace"

Read the former Deputy Speaker of the Knesset's speech given at the January 21, 2005 program sponsored byAPN, the Foundation for Middle East Peace, and the Middle East Institute

Naomi Chazan is a distinguished former Israeli legislator who served for close to eleven years in the Knesset, ultimately becoming the deputy speaker. She was a leading member of the former Meretz Party, and is professor of political science at the Hebrew University. She is currently on sabbatical at MIT. The following is an edited transcript of a talk by Professor Chazan in Washington on January 21, 2005, sponsored by the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Americans for Peace Now, and the Middle East Institute.


NEXT EIGHTEEN MONTHS CRITICAL

I'll get right down to business. I see this as an attempt to analyze the situation today.

We are now at an extraordinary convergence in Israeli-Palestinian relations, unlike anything I can recall since 1967, because we have three new ? or rather old/new ? governments.

The first to be sworn in as a new government was Sharon's last Monday, his third in the past four years. Last Saturday, Mahmoud Abbas was sworn in as the second democratically elected president of the Palestinian Authority. Yesterday you celebrated the inauguration of the second Bush Administration.

There are signs of continuity and change in each of these governments. What are these elements and what can be done to achieve a constructive result for Israel and Palestine?

First let me offer two very clear theses.

First, there is a window of opportunity that is very small and extremely brief. If nothing is done within the next eighteen months to two years, the two-state option will close down entirely. In other words, this is the last chance for a viable two-state option to be negotiated. I don't see it continuing for much longer.

Second, in order to achieve a viable two-state solution, what we need is a very complicated, concerted effort on the part of Israel, Palestine and the international community, primarily Washington. But not all these components are in place at the moment.

I don't have to hide my political affiliations. I have been a very vigorous supporter of a two-state solution for over two decades.

So let's look at areas of continuity and change in each one of the component parts of the puzzle, starting with the Palestinian Authority.

PALESTINIANS WANT NON-VIOLENCE, TALKS, AND A TWO-STATE PEACE

Mahmoud Abbas, or as he is known, Abu Mazen is definitely a harbinger of change on the Palestinian side in three very important respects. First, his policy is to reach the negotiating table in order to conclude a permanent agreement with Israel. He is very clear in seeking negotiations now with the goal of a permanent settlement based on two states.

Mr. Abbas also ran on a nonviolent platform. We must not underestimate the courage needed in the Palestinian community today to speak out against violent resistance. He did so unequivocally. More and more, I am impressed that he means it as well. He is emphasizing nonviolence, diplomacy and internal reform.

The third reason why there is real change is that Abbas is willing to crack down on extremists, which is a very complicated task. But in the last twenty-four hours, 8,000 Palestinian policemen have started patrolling the border between Gaza and Israel. Abbas deserves credit for this, notwithstanding all the skepticism.

I was in Israel and the Palestinian territories about a week before the elections, and I kept seeing a poster, every hundred meters on the road ? a very bad road, with many checkpoints, between Jerusalem and Ramallah. The poster says, "Raise your voice, vote for peace."

So there is a real change on the Palestinian side. There is also continuity in three key respects.

First, there is no change and will not be in the demand for a viable Palestinian state along the '67 boundaries with a capital in East Jerusalem, dismantlement of settlements, and the right of return. Abbas has repeated that. It's Arafat's formula, and it will not change.

There is continuity in that Abbas is a perfect embodiment of the old-guard Palestinian leadership. He is one of the founders of the PLO. He fought along with Arafat, and was with Arafat at every twist and turn in the history of the PLO in the last forty years. He is under constant, continuing pressure to prove himself to that part of the Palestinian ?young-guard?, whose representative, Marwan Barghouti, is in jail in Israel, and facilitated the election of Abbas by throwing his support to him. This could suggest that over the long term Mr. Abbas is an interim, transitional president.

The third factor of continuity is that the Palestinians will not for one moment change their demand that Israel end the daily oppression of the Palestinian people and end the occupation.

So there's a mixture of change and continuity. I believe that the commitment to change on the Palestinian side has gotten short shrift, not only in the Israeli press but possibly in the West as well. On balance, Mahmoud Abbas is pragmatic. He's not necessarily moderate, but he's pragmatic. He has a vested interest in delivering substantive results, through negotiations and a resolution of the conflict as soon as possible.

ISRAEL: COALITION INSTABILITY, FOCUS ON DISENGAGEMENT

The Palestinians are the easiest side of our equation. So let's move to Israel, to the third Sharon government, and look at the elements of change. First, this is a ?disengagement government?, and nothing else. The only thing its members agree on is disengagement. And it is a shaky government, because it was voted into office with the support of people from my party and even one Arab party in Israel, and because Sharon cannot command the support of one-third of his own Likud parliamentary faction. So this government won't last one minute if it doesn't proceed with disengagement.

Second, under these circumstances we are beginning to see in Israel something that we have not seen for quite some time, and that is a crackdown on right-wing extremists within Israel. This is not just talk, it is very serious. The right-wing, which has been extremely powerful in the past, wants to derail the entire disengagement process. The government, therefore is cracking down on the extreme right so that it will not undermine the authority of the state. The extreme right is no longer an opposition. It is somewhere between a rebellion and an insurgency. That's a change.

There's also a subtle change, brought about by the participation of Shimon Peres in Sharon's new coalition. In the past four years the key axis of continuity was Jerusalem-Washington. But now Mr. Peres is taking responsibility for relations with Europe and the Arab world. Mr. Peres, despite his age, is absolutely tireless. He will work very hard on the European and Egyptian-Jordanian angle more than one can imagine, and I think that's a healthy development. So these are elements of change.

SHARON WANTS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, THE WALL, AND PARTIAL ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK

What are the elements of continuity? First there is Sharon. Sharon is Sharon is Sharon. He is committed to one thing and one thing only, and that is the disengagement plan which means withdrawal from Gaza, dismantling of settlements in Gaza and four settlements in the West Bank, and the continued construction of the ?wall?, the ?fence? or the ?barrier?, whatever you want to call it, in the West Bank. I can tell where you're coming from politically by the term you use.

Now, the disengagement plan is very problematic. It's encouraging in terms of at least a partial withdrawal and a partial evacuation of settlements. But it's very problematic because it is unilateral and therefore coercive by definition and because it is an exercise in conflict management and not in conflict resolution. It is also problematic because it raises the specter of annexation of large portions of the West Bank and therefore the perpetuation of the conflict.

So disengagement is important, though problematic by itself. It's an element of continuity, not change. It's the starting point for Peres and the end point for Sharon.

A second element of continuity is that policy on the ground hasn't changed. Seventy-two hours after the elections, the checkpoints were up again. Military action was in place again.

So on balance, what is the commitment to progress on the part of the new Israeli government? I would argue that it's real, although qualified. It's the raison d'ĂȘtre of this government, and although not as significant as change on the Palestinian side, it nevertheless exists.

THE U.S.: MORE CONTINUITY THAN CHANGE

This brings me to the problem of the second Bush Administration. I see three sources of change. One is the new appointments. I assume they will not be the same people, by and large, as those who have been responsible for policy for the last four years.

The second area of change, and a lot of what I'm saying now depends upon a very extensive briefing that took place on the Bush-Blair meeting immediately after the elections here in November, is that Bush has assured his European partners, and primarily Blair, that he is committed again to the Roadmap.

The third area of change, and the one I'm most fascinated by, is the connection between winning the war on terrorism on the one hand and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict on the other. I think that that connection is beginning to appear. At least it was asserted in important conversations.

But factors for continuity in U.S. Policy seem to outweigh the factors of change. There is chemistry between Mr. Sharon and Mr. Bush, and it is reflected in a written exchange between them on April 14.

What's more worrisome is that unlike many observers and pundits, I do not discern in the second Bush administration an understanding that there is a connection between the conflict and the situation in Iraq or Iran. That is worrisome.

The third point that concerns me is that while Mr. Bush gave Mr. Blair his blessing for the donor conference at the end of next month, it was quite lukewarm. Mr. Bush didn't say anything more than, ?I won't undermine you.?

Let me very quickly go through a few more elements. There are some very clear features that are emerging that are providing the parameters that we must work with in the coming months.

PALESTINIAN OPTIMISM, ISRAELI SKEPTICISM, U.S. UNDERESTIMATES URGENCY

There is a real discrepancy in the discourse and the mood in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Washington. The most optimistic, verging on the euphoric, is what we're hearing from the Palestinians. The Palestinians are talking about negotiating while Israelis are talking about conflict management. In Palestine, you find the optimists, in Israel, the skeptics ? including in the peace camp. In Washington, there seems to be a lack of understanding that this is the last opportunity to make peace and that it probably will not recur.

ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION CONVERGING ON ?GENEVA-LIKE? SOLUTION, BUT ISRAELI LEADERSHIP ISN'T THERE

Also, there's a divergence between the leadership and public opinion. One of the most fascinating things of the last week is that for the first time in five years, but maybe even longer, a public opinion poll showed that the majority of Israelis and the majority of Palestinians support a full two-state solution, including all the components of the Geneva initiative, as long as you don't call it ?Geneva?. Yet leadership, at least on the Israeli side, isn't there.

Also, one of the most elusive yet important factors is the lack of confidence and trust today. This lack is a basic part of the conflict. Emotion-driven policy is part of the conflict. There is too little use of the word "reconciliation" and no one is discussing reconciliation.

THREE SCENARIOS

Finally, there is no minimal agreement on how we are to move forward. Without such an understanding, there is a danger that if there is a major new act of violence we may revert automatically to the same reactions that have guided the cycle of violence in the last four and a half years. If there is a suicide bomb or a major rocket attack, Israel may counter attack. We need to replace this knee-jerk pattern with something else. So where do we go? The options are crystal clear. There are three, in inverse relationship between likelihood and desirability.

The worst-case scenario is that nothing happens, and that notwithstanding all this opportunity, the window closes. That means even disengagement from Gaza will fail. If so, the two-state option will fail, and there will be horrendous and continuous violence between Palestinians and Israelis that will make the past four and a half years look like a picnic. In our area there's no stable status quo. Without progress there is deterioration. If we end up with the default, worst-case option, things are going to get worse. Therefore, we are obliged not to let it happen. But that requires hard work.

The second option is that disengagement does take place by this summer, and our timeframes here are very clear. If disengagement takes place this summer alone, we will reduce the area of conflict but not eliminate the conflict.

The third scenario is that in one way or another, we get back to the negotiating table in the foreseeable future, with an agenda that is not based on just another phased, interim approach but on a vision of a permanent settlement. Such an approach would deal with all the outstanding issues. It would be based on the elements of a final status solution spelled out in the Clinton Parameters/Taba Agreement/Geneva Accord continuum. These plans offer an outline and a blueprint that is already in place.

What's the problem in making this third scenario work? I think too much energy is being placed today on making disengagement succeed before we get to negotiations. There is more logic linking disengagement with negotiations. It's the only way it's going to work, because it will get Palestinian leadership involved in the disengagement program.

So what has to be done? I'm going to just list the things that I see at this point, but preface them with a very clear statement. I said before and I will repeat constantly: nothing is going to happen unless Israel, the Palestinian leadership, the United States and the international community make it happen. There's a lot of hard work in a very complicated situation that must be done now. Therefore, what we can do is list what each side needs and what each side can give.

PALESTINIANS NEED HOPE, ENCOURAGEMENT, ECONOMIC RELIEF, BUT MUST INCREASE EFFORTS VS. VIOLENCE

The Palestinians need now three things. They need tangible evidence of some kind of movement that provides hope. They need the elimination of checkpoints, not one or two but many. They need mobility. They obviously need, economic rehabilitation, like they need air to breathe.

The economic distress in Gaza, more than in the West Bank but in all the territories, is unspeakable. It requires large injections of money, which are being negotiated now in Europe. We're talking about a first figure of about $1 billion in the next few months. We'll see if that's what actually emerges from the donor conference next month, but those are the figures that are being discussed.

Besides the tangible proof of the easing of daily life and economic injections, the Palestinians also need a pat on the back. I realize everybody is overusing, misusing and sometimes abusing the term democracy. But the Palestinians are in the midst of three sets of democratic elections, which might make them the most democratic state in the Arab world. We should appreciate and acknowledge this.

But the Palestinians also have to give. I think the most obvious thing they have to give is a lot of effort on reining in the extremists and the suicide bombers and the rocket makers. There is an effort in place, but it has to be encouraged, and must go much further. The second thing is that the interim reforms that Mahmoud Abbas has begun must be extended.

ISRAEL NEEDS CALM BUT MUST RECIPROCATE WITH EASED CONDITIONS, SETTLEMENT FREEZE

Israel needs two things right now, quiet, and a ceasefire. Both the Israeli public and the Israeli government need this. We're going to have a lot of violence internally over the Gaza withdrawal. Israel needs quiet. Israel also needs signs that by moving in the correct direction it is going to regain international legitimacy.

But on the other hand, Israel has to deliver as well. Israel can deliver now in two directions. It can ease the daily life of Palestinians. It should bring about a further prisoner release, which is being negotiated. And it can deliver by showing its goodwill and doing a few more things on phase one of the Roadmap, like real removal of more of these outposts, and a total freeze on settlements.

MONEY, INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN GAZA, AND STRONGER U.S. LEADERSHIP NEEDED

What can the international community can do? It can provide a lot of money. It can also help meet a critical need for some forces on the ground to help monitor security after the Gaza disengagement. I realize that the last thing the U.S. wants is to send troops to Gaza. So the onus for this will be on other countries, with support from the United States.

The needs of the international community are less distinct than those of Israel and of the Palestinians. But the U.S., especially, and the EU also need stability in our region.

We're in a curious situation today where to make things work, the impetus must come from the U.S.. Unfortunately at the moment the signs of that happening are not as encouraging as I would like.

PEACE IS POSSIBLE, BUT FAILURE MEANS THE END OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

So let me summarize. We're in a very small, brief window for the first time in a long time. But intentions in politics are nothing. The only thing that matters is results. The results require this very careful coordination and a much greater American and international commitment. If this happens, the results could be stupendous.

We can make it work this time, because the ingredients for success do exist. But if we falter or fail, we're going to have to close shop on the two-state solution. So I think that's where we're at in the beginning of the second Bush Administration. Thank you very much.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q : You have asserted that there is a window that's open for eighteen months, and that unless things are done quickly, then the chance falls away and despair follows after.

Why will the window close so soon? Also, what would you have international forces do out there?

A : The timetable for the Gaza disengagement is this summer, but this means squeaking through in terms of the Israeli political scene today, which is very unstable. In order to get to disengagement and preserve the government, Sharon must also get Knesset approval for the budget by March 31, which will not be easy. So between April and July, Mr. Sharon and Mr. Peres will rely on opposition parties on the left to keep them in office to carry out the disengagement. That's a very brief window. If there isn't some movement out of Gaza, it will make Israel's good intentions suspect in many quarters, but also among the Palestinians.

For disengagement really to work requires some kind of understanding. That means moving from a unilateral approach to negotiations. What's been going on the ground is fascinating from that perspective, because after boycotting Mahmoud Abbas for three days after the terrorist attack in Karni, there was a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian contacts on the security level, though not the diplomatic level.

If one makes disengagement a function of some kind of political discussion, that would get the ball rolling and help disengagement succeed. There are very powerful interests in Palestinian society and in Israeli society who do not want disengagement and movement toward peace to work. Unless there is a dynamic that develops, then these elements, who have controlled the agenda in Israel and Palestine for the past four years, will resume their control.

How long will that take? I was being generous with my eighteen months to two years. But I want to be generous, because if we have a dynamic in place, it can work.

If you put yourself into Mr. Sharon's place, and consider the opposition coming from his own voters, you will understand that he will not ask Israelis to rely on Palestinians to patrol the border between Israel and Gaza. There is no precedent in Israel-Arab history of a peace treaty or an armistice agreement without multinational forces. I assume, therefore, that such forces will be needed in Gaza. The Palestinians, by the way, want international forces, since this internationalizes the conflict.

Q : You said in the Middle East there is no status quo; it's progress or deterioration. Do you think that the Roadmap is still a valid term of reference for option three, or does it have to be reinvented to get the parties back together to the table?

A : If the Roadmap pushes you forward and if you're really thinking of phase three, which is negotiating the permanent settlement and the final boundaries, let's use the term Roadmap. It doesn't hurt, if it brings some people along.

Moreover, there's an element of the Roadmap, agreement on a Palestinian state, which is phase three, that fits into my analysis. Don't forget that the Quartet, which drafted the Roadmap are very important actors.

If you've got the Quartet, i.e. the EU, the UN, the U.S. and Russia, on board, it's a very elegant combination, and it's pretty much what I suggested is lacking now in terms of commitment. So I would start with the Roadmap and move to the endgame.

Q : You kept mentioning the term ?window of opportunity?. It's a term that I've heard quite frequently in the last sixty years, going all the way back to the Lausanne Conference in 1949, then the Geneva Conference, then the Madrid Conference, and perhaps the widest window of opportunity was the handshake on the White House lawn. Why do you think nothing happened as a result of that handshake and the events that followed? What happened to close that window of opportunity and why is this window of opportunity different than other windows?

A : The Oslo process was flawed in four major respects. It would be a tragedy to repeat those mistakes. The Roadmap only deals with some of those mistakes and not all of them.

The first mistake was Oslo doesn't have one word about a Palestinian state. The objective was unclear.

Number two, the phase by phase negotiating strategy was an invitation for violations on both sides. By the way, that step-by-step strategy was reinvented in the Roadmap, which is its weakest point.

Number three, there were no measures for implementation. None of the points were operationalized to the point that they could be verified, and it was unclear who was going to do the verifying because the international community's position was unclear.

Now, the obvious thing to do is to look at what worked in the past, for example in Camp David I, with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and with the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. Both had two clear characteristics. They were permanent settlement agreements, and both defined boundaries. That kind of clarity is the key to Israel's survival in the future. Israel is going to have to withdraw to the '67 boundaries by agreement, or will find itself in another fifty years in conflict. It can't afford to do that.

So when I'm talking to you about the mistakes, I'm talking to you also about what I perceive to be needed to allow Israel to survive into the future.

Q : If this disengagement from Gaza is so important, why is it so important to remove the settlers who are there now? Why could not the Sharon government simply tell the settlers, you are on your own? I don't see the urgency and the importance of stressing this business of removing them.

A : You're putting your finger on a very touchy policy question in Israel. We have to withdraw from Gaza, according to this plan, and we have to start the process of dismantling settlements. Dismantling settlements in Gaza is an important precedent.

There are two ways to do that. First, and we are now doing this, is to say ?we care about you, we want to match your standard of living within Israel with the same standard of living you've had before. We will compensate you. We will even pay for psychologists for your children.? If all it costs is money, it's cheap.

In reaction to calls for violent resistance to settler evacuation, some Israelis advocate that we simply announce that we're leaving and pulling out everything: the IDF, the national insurance, the social security, and the school system. ?If you come with us, you get the compensation. If not, it's your problem.?

I think that if you can do something like this by consensus, it's better, especially since it's the start of a process. If we can't, the government may have to issue an ultimatum.

Q : What can the Arab states contribute?

A : The Egyptians are already very heavily involved. Israel has tried to get Egypt to come up with much more stringent patrolling along the Egyptian-Gaza border, but there's a real problem there because an element of the Gaza disengagement plan does not call for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian-Gaza boundary. The Egyptians, probably justifiably, are saying, wait a minute, if you plan full withdrawal, we'll talk, since then there will be an international boundary. Nevertheless, the Egyptians are involved in training Palestinian soldiers.

Unifying the Palestinian security forces is crucial, not only for order but also you cannot have centralized power without a monopoly over the use of force. That's one of the essential definitions of a state. The Egyptians are very involved on the ground and behind the scenes. I would not be surprised if we see a revival not only of the Roadmap but also of the Saudi plan, or what became the Arab League plan. At least there would be more serious discussion of it. It is important for Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and North African states to be involved.

The king of Morocco just cosponsored, with the king of Belgium, a meeting between rabbis and imams, which is amazing. Small indicators of Arab support are beginning to resurface. But there's also a resumption of flights from Israel to Morocco in certain periods.

Q : If the administration were actually to go forward with their policy of democratization among the Arab states and popular voices were raised against their authoritarian rulers, how would this impact on Arab state support for Israeli-Palestinian peace?

A : Democracy is the best-known form of government. But democracy is not imposed. Palestinian democracy is coming from within. Very little has been nurtured from outside. The more democratic the Middle East, the better it is, I think, for the neighborhood in its entirety.

I think the democratic movement in the Palestinian community is a result of a real effort to improve themselves. I think for Israel's democracy, we need an end to the conflict. Our democracy is also at risk.

So if you ask me why I'm fighting, it's not only for peace, for survival and security, and justice. It's also because I believe deep inside that without democracy, Israel will not survive. Ending the conflict is our struggle for Israel's democratic survival.