To return to the new Peace Now website click here.

Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - March 5, 2007

Q. ...era of multilateralism in dealing with Middle East conflicts/crises? Q. ...where do key Labor figures stand with regard to peace process issues...?

Q. Are we entering an era of multilateralism in dealing with Middle East conflicts and crises?

A. There certainly appear to be a number of multilateral initiatives in which the Bush administration is either collaborating or acquiescing. Where, if anywhere, they will lead is not at all clear.

The chief protagonist in spearheading regional multilateralism is Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah. He appears to be motivated both by apprehensions regarding Iran and disappointment with American or American-led failures in Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon. Abdullah was behind the Fateh-Hamas Mecca agreement, and he and his emissaries have been meeting with senior Iranians in recent weeks and months to try to mediate solutions in Lebanon and Iraq where Sunni-Shi'ite tensions play a key role. The Saudis are convening an Arab League summit in Riyadh on March 28 to discuss both a solution for Lebanon and improvements on--or reaffirmation of--the Arab peace plan of 2002, which also originated in Riyadh.

As for the Bush administration, Washington has followed up a well-advertised attempt to beef up its regional profile vis-a-vis Iran (the "surge" in Iraq; naval reinforcements in the Gulf; the qualified early success of UN Security Council economic sanctions spearheaded by the US) with a new and seemingly revolutionary readiness to meet face-to-face with the Iranians, at least in multilateral conferences in Iraq. The change in approach to Iran (and Syria, which will also attend) is much in line with the Baker-Hamilton recommendations and appears to stem from a number of considerations.

One, pure and simple, is failure to achieve US goals in Iraq, Iran and the Israel-Arab conflict by other means, however poorly utilized by the Bush administration. In this regard, the administration appears hesitant to confront recent Saudi initiatives even though they do not correspond with Bush's policies. Saudi sponsorship of the Mecca accord, the Arab peace plan and compromise proposals in Lebanon have essentially gone unanswered by Washington, as was the Saudi threat to intervene militarily on behalf of the Sunnis in Iraq if the US pulls out.

Another US consideration is the perceived need to begin defusing the multiplicity of global crises Bush has gotten or kept the US involved in before his term is up--the "legacy" consideration. The recent nuclear agreement with North Korea, achieved through bilateral talks and without drawing too much flak from the still active neo-con camp, appears to have encouraged the administration to move forward.

Yet another concern to be factored into American Middle East policy is Russia's move to reestablish a major power presence in the region through weapons sales to Syria and Iran as well as coordination on energy issues with staunchly pro-western countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Apparently, the best way to forestall closer Russian strategic coordination with Damascus and Tehran is now deemed to be engaging the leaders of those countries. The March 10 conference in Baghdad may well be a harbinger of things to come.

Recent weeks have witnessed additional, lower key multilateral initiatives involving Washington. Secretary of State Rice met recently in Jordan with the chiefs of intelligence from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, now dubbed the "Arab Quartet". Shortly after Vice President Cheney ended a visit to Pakistan, that country's foreign minister convened his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey, presumably to discuss Afghanistan and the resurgence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The immediate focus of most of these efforts appears to be Iraq. There, as US allies like the UK and Denmark begin to remove their troops, Washington seemingly now appreciates that it needs local help in extricating itself and avoiding catastrophe.

All of Iraq's neighbors share these two American interests. But not all for the same reasons or with the same objectives in mind. The Saudis want to prevent a pro-Iranian Shi'ite triumph that endangers Sunni interests, whereas the Iranians seek precisely such an achievement. All of Iraq's neighbors--the Iranians, Turks, Saudis, Jordanians, Syrians and Kuwaitis--seek to avoid fragmentation of Iraq that could endanger their own ethnic and territorial composition. Will all of them show up in Baghdad on March 10, or will some fear lest deals be made there at their expense? Already, Syrian FM Muallem has indicated he is sending only a deputy to sit opposite Rice. Meanwhile, a brief Ahmedinezhad-Abdullah summit in Riyadh on Saturday appears to have done little to thaw tense Saudi-Iranian relations in anticipation of the Baghdad summit.

Nor is there consensus in the Arab world as to the significance of what is happening. The radical Arab press is billing American readiness to meet with Syrians and Iranians in Baghdad as "the beginning of a US acknowledgement of defeat" (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 2). More moderate media, like the Lebanese pro-government an-Nahar, opine (also on March 2) that "the US has all but forgotten democracy and has adopted 'moderation' as the key element in its Arab alliances"--a view reflected in the unbridled way the Mubarrak government in Egypt is currently suppressing opposition elements without fear of criticism from Washington.

Can Israel get into this act? Regarding Iraq and Lebanon, not a chance; these are seen as internal Arab issues. But both PM Olmert and FM Livni have recently signaled the Saudis that Israel would be happy to engage the Arab world on the issue of its peace plan, on condition that the Arabs agree to modifications on aspects like the refugees/right of return.

Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa went on record yesterday insisting that no changes will be made in the Arab peace plan in Riyadh in late March. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the Saudis could induce Syria, in its regional isolation, to agree to the sort of changes that might make it easier for Israel to adhere to the plan. If this is the case, and if a Palestinian unity government is formed within a week or two without showing some receptivity to the Quartet's demand that it recognize Israel, then it will be hard for all these initiatives to bring about a coordinated Israeli-Sunni Arab approach to Iran--a key Israeli and American strategic goal.

Still, ideally, all the current multilateral initiatives will at least get everyone talking and present the prospect of genuine progress in dealing with the Middle East region's many conflict situations. A lot appears to depend on the newly emergent and dynamic leadership of Saudi King Abdullah.


Q. With the Labor Party gearing up for leadership primaries in late May, where do the key figures stand with regard to peace process issues and how might this affect Labor's role in the coalition?

A. Labor just closed its membership lists in terms of eligibility to vote on May 28. This enabled all the major daily newspapers to carry out instant phone polls among the rank and file. To no one's surprise, Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon are virtually tied for the lead, with Amir Peretz far behind, followed closely by Ophir Pines and with Danny Yatom a distant fifth. As matters stand now, Barak and Ayalon would find themselves in a second round runoff with Ayalon winning, presumably because Pines and Peretz would throw their votes to him.

The upshot of these developments is that Peretz becomes even more of a lame duck, pending the interim report of the Winograd Commission. On the other hand Ayalon, whose views on Israeli-Palestinian issues are close to those of Peretz, has to be seen as the front runner and most probable candidate to replace Peretz as minister of defense.

The principal policy divide in Labor on the Palestinian issue now pits Barak against Ayalon and Peretz. Barak is close to PM Ehud Olmert in his views; hence Olmert's obvious preference for Barak as a coalition partner. The differences between Barak and Ayalon focus on two issues: the credibility of a Palestinian partner, and territory.

Ayalon, like Peretz, Deputy Minister of Defense Ephraim Sneh and Pines, would probably argue that PLO leader and PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is a viable partner and that Israel should enter into final status negotiations with him. Barak, on the other hand, backed by Yatom and former party leader and minister of defense Fuad (Binyamin) Ben Eliezer, would be more skeptical of Abu Mazen's capacity to reach agreement and "deliver" on controversial issues like Jerusalem and the right of return and would argue that in any event Israel could not for the time being give up the Jordan Valley in light of developments in Iran and Iraq. Hence Barak, like Olmert, would look for ways to discuss interim measures and/or additional limited unilateral redeployments on the West Bank.

In this sense, Barak's return to leadership of Labor might ensure a more harmonious coalition partnership between Labor and Kadima. But only if Olmert remains in command; by the time Labor holds its leadership primary, the Winograd Commission interim report could radically alter the leadership picture at the head of both Kadima and Labor.