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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - April 2, 2007

Q. Between Condoleezza Rice's visit and the Arab summit in Riyadh, where is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process heading? Q. Is Shimon Peres running for president or for prime minister of Israel?

Q. Between Condoleezza Rice's visit and the Arab summit in Riyadh, where is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process heading?

A. Secretary of State Rice's latest visit, last week, produced virtually no concrete results other than a commitment by PM Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas to meet and talk every two weeks. Rice also stuck to her intention to hold "parallel talks", really proximity talks, between the two leaders, but it is not clear how often and to what end. Her desire to devote those talks to final status issues had to be toned down to accommodate the political constraints perceived by Olmert. With a public approval rating of three percent and the Winograd Commission recommendations looming, the Israeli prime minister can hardly claim to have a mandate to engage in such talks.

FM Tzipi Livni provided the nebulous compromise language: "Since a final settlement is not possible. . . it was agreed to hold a dialogue on the conditions for establishing a Palestinian state". Incidentally, one way that is again gaining credence with Olmert to begin to show some movement and "save face" without talking final status could be to revive his West Bank disengagement plan, beginning with the offer of financial incentives to settlers to leave on their own, while maintaining the IDF in place to ensure that terrorists don't take advantage of another withdrawal to endanger Israeli security.

Rice's idea of "parallel talks" is, to say the least, strange. Her predecessors Henry Kissinger and James Baker shuttled back and forth between Jerusalem and Arab capitals in the 1970s and early 1990s, respectively, but only because the relevant Arab leaders refused to meet face-to-face with their Israeli counterparts. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians this is hardly necessary, unless Rice believes she can somehow construct a final status negotiation that Olmert can deny he's engaged in. But Rice took pains to avoid an open confrontation with Olmert, who believes he can still rely on President Bush's support.

Incidentally, so anxious was Rice to present her visits to the region as a success story that she referred with pride to having brokered the Israeli-Palestinian Gaza passages agreement in late 2005--ignoring the fact that the agreement is now virtually defunct. So little attention did Rice's latest visit generate that only one Israeli TV channel and no international channels covered her closing remarks.

The Arab summit in Riyadh appeared to offer a more encouraging horizon. But only a horizon: nowhere do the Saudis, the Arab League or the Arab "Quartet" (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Emirates) aspire to negotiate with Israel instead of the PLO and Syria; only to consult. They can offer a clear vision of the "payoff" of regional normalization and security, and they can "market" their product, the Arab peace initiative, directly to Israelis. But at the end of the day they will tell Israel that it has to make peace with its neighbors before normalization and security can be provided openly.

Over the past three months I have participated in meetings with representatives from Israel's moderate, pro-western neighbors to discuss the increasingly important regional dimension of the Israel-Arab dispute. They understood the message from me and other Israelis that, at a minimum, the Arab peace initiative has to be rendered more Israel-friendly in terms of packaging. But they were not encouraging about changing the substance of the initiative (e.g., the demand that the refugee issue be resolved in accordance with UNGA Resolution 194 from 1949); indeed, the Riyadh summit reconfirmed the initiative as is.

Nor were these Arab neighbors interested in discussing the situation in Iraq with Israelis, signaling that this is a "normalization" issue that would have to await a comprehensive peace. They did not believe that Israel and the Sunni Arabs could collaborate openly against Iran prior to peace. Most perplexing, they had no ready answer to the paradox represented by an Israel-Syria peace process: the Saudis and Jordanians side with the Bush administration in advising Israel not to negotiate with Syria under present circumstances. Yet the Arab peace initiative that they subscribe to insists on comprehensive Israel-Arab peace as a condition for normalization. In Riyadh, Syria's President Bashar Asad asked to be included in future deliberations among the Arab and international quartets, Israel and the PLO. King Abdullah reportedly responded with a list of changes Asad would have to institute in his regional policies before that could happen.

Then, too, the Arab League is hardly a cohesive and powerful enough institution to "deliver" a detailed peace agreement with Israel. It is weakened by intra-Arab rivalries. It has proven impotent in Iraq and Lebanon. And the Saudis are prepared to tolerate rejection by Hamas--one half of the Palestinian delegation--of the recognition of Israel embodied in their peace initiative, as long as it does so quietly. Still, Saudi leadership does appear to represent a welcome Arab readiness to question failed American policies in the region.

In this context the Arab peace initiative, now again ratified by the Arab summit, provides the best opportunity for years to develop some positive momentum between Israelis and Arabs. Rice, and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, who also passed through Israel on his way to Riyadh, appeared to understand the need for an international initiative to follow the Riyadh summit and render the Arab peace initiative more effective. This idea is acceptable to the Arab side. Olmert and Abbas can hardly refuse. It's now up to Rice, Ban and the rest of the Quartet to make it happen.

Q. Is Shimon Peres running for president or for prime minister of Israel?

A. Officially, neither.

Peres doesn't want to commit to the presidential race (the vote is scheduled for mid-July) unless he is certain that this time victory won't be snatched from him by the last-minute political machinations of Shas and other parties. Nearly seven years ago, Moshe Katzav won a surprise victory over Peres this way. A Knesset initiative to change the presidential ballot from secret to open--thereby favoring Peres, on the assumption that "traitors" to his candidacy would be ashamed to vote against him openly--has failed to muster a 61 MK majority.

Nor does Peres dare present himself as a candidate to succeed Ehud Olmert as prime minister as long as Olmert remains in office, lest he risk being labeled a total opportunist. Only Tzipi Livni has more or less openly declared her candidacy. In any event, if Olmert remains in office through July--i.e., if he survives the upcoming Winograd interim report and, in the short term, a variety of corruption investigations--Peres will have to make a "sink or swim" decision regarding the presidency.

If only because of his age, Peres is a genuine dark horse candidate for the premiership. Nor, having recently switched parties from Labor to Kadima, does he necessarily command a large constituency (although Ami Ayalon, a leading candidate to lead Labor, has endorsed him). On the other hand if, next month, the Winograd Commission's report effectively forces Olmert to resign, only one thing is certain regarding the succession: Livni takes over as acting prime minister for three months. Beyond that, no one knows whether Kadima or the governing coalition will hold together or whether Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu will succeed in creating an alternative coalition of 61+ or there will be new elections. In such an atmosphere of great national uncertainty, Peres, who was twice prime minister, has served in every other major ministerial post and in terms of experience dwarfs all other candidates, could conceivably be seen as a default or interim candidate for the job, a "grownup" to mind the store pending new elections held at an agreed date somewhere down the line.

On the other hand, Peres' public image was definitely hurt by publication of his testimony to the Winograd Commission. The High Court of Justice has ordered publication of all testimony, after appropriate security censorship, in accordance with the public's right to know. Peres told the commission he opposed going to war in Lebanon last summer, yet supported PM Olmert's decision on July 12 out of solidarity. Needless to say, Olmert backs Peres' candidacy. But to some people, Peres does not sound like either prime ministerial or presidential material.

Israeli politics has never been more interesting than what we're liable to see in the coming months.