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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - July 30, 2007

Q's re: Ahmadinezhad visit to Damascus and Darfur refugees coming to Israel

Q. In recent weeks you have discussed issues related to the relative likelihood of peace and war breaking out between Israel and Syria. Does the recent Ahmadinezhad visit to Damascus change anything?

A. The Iranian president's visit to Syria last week, where he also met with Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, was interpreted in many quarters as a move to ensure solidarity within the radical camp led by Tehran's Islamist regime. It was followed by Arab press reports to the effect that Ahmadinezhad had promised Syrian President Bashar Asad to finance large Syrian purchases of sophisticated arms from Russia in return for Asad's commitment not to enter into a peace process with Israel or effect a rapprochement with the United States.

But these reports were judged by some reputable analysts to be of dubious credibility, thereby leaving open the possibility that Asad still seeks some sort of accommodation with Israel and the West even as he maintains a close relationship with Iran. Of more concern are reports emanating from Damascus and Tehran that paint a threatening scenario of mukawama or "resistance" initiated by Syria on the Golan, possibly as early as September. They emanate from reliable sources with access to Syrian ruling circles. Because this constitutes a serious warning of impending war, I feel obligated to present the gist of these reports even if in part they too may be of problematic credibility.

According to this narrative, Ahmadinezhad's visit really reflected Iran's near total domination over Syria: this is no longer a "strategic alliance", as the late Hafez Asad used to describe it, but a patron-client relationship. Within Syria, the Iranians are linked up with militant intelligence circles dominated by Bashar Asad's brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat. They have virtually neutralized the influence of more moderate actors led by Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. Syria has even ceded to Iran the senior role of negotiating (with Saudi Arabia and in Beirut) over the fate of Lebanon--an unprecedented development.

These Iranian and Syrian circles are convinced that the United States has lost the war in Iraq, just as Israel lost last summer's war in Lebanon, and that both Washington and Jerusalem are thoroughly demoralized and defeatist. At the same time, they recognize the need to neutralize two threats: first, that an international tribunal will soon be established by the United Nations that could implicate Shawkat and other senior Syrians in the March 2005 murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri; and second, that the US or Israel will decide to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

September, when General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are expected to deliver a pessimistic report on prospects in Iraq (and when Israel celebrates extended Jewish holidays), is seen by these actors as the ideal time to launch a guerilla war on the Golan, featuring cross-border terrorist attacks and short range katyusha rocket fire carried out by some sort of "front for the liberation of the Golan", i.e., an "unofficial" and "civilian" body. This, they reason, would render it difficult for the international community to pursue the tribunal project; Syria would be able to call on Arab sympathy and support insofar as it would be "at war" with Israel. Iran, too, would be better able to rally support by arguing that an American attack against it would be "fighting Israel's war", while Israel itself would be too busy dealing with attacks from Syria to consider military action against Iran. In September, too, the Lebanese presidential race begins in earnest under extremely tense conditions. Syria would be interested in preventing moderate political forces from consolidating their power in Beirut by destabilizing the region.

At the political level, these Syrian circles argue that the Israeli response to relatively low-level attrition warfare from Syrian territory would be hesitant and confused--like last summer in Lebanon. Heavier Israeli retaliation would be absorbed by Syria just as Lebanon survived Israel's air attacks on its infrastructure; and Iran would pay for reconstruction. Moreover, Israel would hesitate to respond so intensely as to bring about the downfall of the Asad regime, for fear lest it be replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is widely considered the only effective opposition to Asad. Then, too, Israeli fear of Syrian missiles, possibly armed with chemical warheads, exploding in the heart of Israel would deter it from responding too aggressively, as would PM Olmert's image problems and his record of failure last summer. According to an alternative but not unrelated assessment, the Syrian attacks would spur a demoralized Israel to agree to peace talks along terms more advantageous to Damascus.

An additional factor supporting this assessment regarding Syria's hostile intentions in the near term is the perception that UNIFIL II in southern Lebanon has failed to prevent Hezbollah from rearming--meaning that the latter would be capable of joining the fray against Israel if it escalates. Interestingly, this scenario for violence on the Golan in September differs from Israeli Intelligence's "classic" scenario for Syrian aggression, which envisions an overnight attempt to "snatch" a small piece of territory in the Majdal Shams area to use as a bargaining chip. Rather, it fits into the resistance strategy demonstrated so effectively last summer by Hezbollah and praised abundantly by Asad: it emphasizes demoralizing the enemy by attacking its civilian rear without attempting to conquer Israeli territory, along with a readiness to drag Israel into occupying enemy territory where it would encounter a sustained guerilla campaign.

Of course, there are also still plenty of counter-indications that point to a different Syrian strategy toward Israel. For one, Syria recently opened barriers and checkpoints that prevented civilian access to the Golan border; today, anyone can drive there from Damascus and witness a sustained rebuilding campaign in Syrian border villages. (Some analysts see this, too, as a sign of impending violence, arguing that the government in Damascus has made it easy for guerillas and terrorists to approach the border.) Then too, Asad continues to talk about renewing peace negotiations with Israel. Interestingly, more Syrians are now allowed to participate in informal "track II" meetings with Israelis. And there are indications in Washington that the administration is not as opposed to Syrian-Israeli peace talks as its rhetoric might indicate.

One thing is clear: after nearly 30 years of quiet on the Golan the Syrian regime, in its North Korean-style isolation and penchant for Byzantine intrigue, has a poor sense of the real mood in Israel and the workings of Israeli democracy. The warnings of guerilla/terrorist aggression against Israel may sound bizarre. In the end, they may mean nothing. Certainly they can be affected by Israeli preventive and deterrent measures as well as political overtures. But they should be taken seriously.

Q. Since you last wrote about Darfur refugees reaching Israel via Egypt and the Sinai-Negev border, a trickle seems to have turned into a flow, sounding alarm bells in Israel. What are the broader strategic ramifications?

A. The original flow of Darfurian refugees into Israel comprised, in the course of some two years, a few hundred--almost all young men. Israel jailed many of them, based on their Sudanese citizenship: they are considered illegal aliens from an enemy country, whose stories of genocide in Darfur are impossible to corroborate and who could conceivably include an unknown number of terrorists. Nevertheless, they were not expelled back to Egypt, were treated humanely and in many cases were allowed to leave jail in the custody of kibbutzim and Eilat hotels that seek cheap labor and are prepared to house and feed them while their requests for refugee status are pending.

In recent months, this trickle of survivors from Darfur has turned into a stronger and stronger flow of beleaguered Africans crossing Sinai into Israel: no longer just Darfurians (now with their wives and children), but southern Sudanese Christians, Eritreans and West Africans as well. They now number a couple of thousand people and their minions are growing daily; most are in effect migrant laborers seeking a better economic future, like their counterpart "boat people" sailing daily by the hundreds from the coasts of Africa to Spain and Italy and like Mexicans seeking work in the United States. In Israel's case, reports of relatively humane treatment of the Darfurians have apparently encouraged others to try their luck with Sinai's Bedouin. The latter guide them for an exorbitant fee across the desert and dump them at the modest two-foot high wire fence that separates Egypt and Israel along most of their border.

At one level, Israel faces the by now routine dilemma of what prosperous "north" countries should do with unwanted "southern" migrant labor. The IDF, which apprehends the illegal entrants, the police, Beersheva municipal authorities and various government offices have been tossing responsibility for the Africans back and forth like a hot potato. But Israel also faces a number of special circumstances that could take on strategic proportions.

First, the Darfurians are fleeing from genocide, something Israelis are acutely sensitive to. Prime Minister Olmert's wife, Aliza, has undertaken a high-profile campaign to ensure they are well treated. A lot of Israelis have volunteered to help. But much remains to be done.

Secondly, Israel doesn't want the issue to complicate its border relations with Egypt. Israel desperately needs Egypt's cooperation in stopping arms smuggling into Gaza from Sinai. Recently, the two countries reached an agreement that illegal border-crossers caught red-handed in Israel at the moment of entry would be handed back to Egyptian border patrol forces. In the case of migrant laborers from Guinea this makes sense. But the Darfurians report bad treatment in Egypt and fear forcible repatriation by Egypt to Sudan, where they will certainly suffer a harsh fate. Egyptian officials have undertaken to ensure this won't happen. But Egypt is currently hosting hundreds of thousands of Darfurians in extremely difficult conditions that have at times deteriorated into violence.

Then too, the Sudanese government has become aware of the presence in Israel of a growing number of Darfurians. It argues that Israel is encouraging the flow. Inevitably, it links this phenomenon with the campaign in the US by "24 Jewish groups" against the genocide that it has been perpetrating or tolerating, and describes a broad Israeli/Jewish plot to castigate Sudan. Because other Arab countries have either supported Sudan's position that the Darfur issue is an internal one or, in the best case, turned a blind eye, this could potentially become another source of Arab-Israel tension.

A few weeks ago, Israelis were captivated by the story of a little Sudanese girl inadvertently left behind in Sinai when the rest of the family made the dash across the fence into Israel. Egyptian and Israeli soldiers, working together, brought her into Israel to join her family. That's the heartwarming part of this ongoing drama.