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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - October 29, 2007

Q's are on the foiled Palestinian assassination attempt against PM Olmert, and Minister Ami Ayalon's call to engage with "moderate" Hamas activists...

Q. What do you make of the Israeli allegations regarding a foiled Palestinian assassination attempt against PM Olmert in Jericho last June and the ensuing renewal of the Palestinian "revolving door" policy regarding terrorist prisoners?

A. I believe the media misunderstood the primary ramification of this incident, in part due to slip ups on the part of both Israeli and Palestinian politicians and officials.

Now that the smoke has settled it emerges that the potential assassins, Fateh combatants associated with the Palestinian Authority security forces, had been overheard by Israeli intelligence discussing in general terms the possibility of exploiting a planned Olmert meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Jericho in order to assassinate the Israeli prime minister. Their motive was apparently generalized opposition to the content of Olmert's peace discussions with Abbas; why they didn't seek to assassinate Abbas instead or in addition is not clear. Israel alerted Palestinian security, and between the two services all five culprits were arrested.

Then, between June and early October, the three plotters in Palestinian hands were released on the grounds that interrogation had revealed their "plot" to be little more than idle talk, not backed up by either genuine intentions or capabilities. Israel objected to the release, and two of the culprits were rearrested in Palestine while the third was apprehended by Israeli security forces at a checkpoint. Last week, by the time head of the General Security Service Yuval Diskin told the Cabinet about the plot, the arrests and the releases and accused the Palestinians of letting the plotters go, they were already back in Palestinian jail; yet Palestinian security had failed to inform Israel of this.

There are two important issues here. One, the "revolving door" accusation, was played up by the press at least in part because the GSS emphasized it, even though at the end of the day Palestinian security made amends for the slip-up. The other issue, relatively ignored in the commotion over the revolving door, is the fact of an intention, however vague, among Fateh stalwarts--not Hamas, nor even Fateh dissidents--to assassinate the Israeli prime minister and thereby torpedo the current peace process.

Much has been made over the allegation that the PA/Fateh in the West Bank has made little progress in rebuilding its security institutions and remains dependent for its survival, as we head toward Annapolis, on the IDF. Even Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad acknowledges that this is the situation. The Jericho assassination incident and the PA's problems in keeping the perpetrators in jail offer a graphic illustration of Palestinian failure in this regard. In a worst case scenario of continued failure and ongoing dependence on Israel to provide security, Fateh will soon be widely compared by Palestinians and other Arabs to the Southern Lebanese Army that, under IDF tutelage, patrolled southern Lebanon prior to the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. And we all know how that ended.

The Jericho incident apparently projected little if any real danger to Olmert. Still, when the prime minister did finally visit Jericho a couple of months later, he reportedly wore protective body armor and a steel helmet during the short drive from the last Israeli checkpoint to the meeting place inside Jericho. Obviously, Olmert has resolved not to allow the incident to impede peace talks, which in past years have produced far worse threats and incidents. Nevertheless, Abbas and Fayyad's apparent inability to build up a viable and loyal security force, and Abbas' failure to reform his own corrupt, inefficient and disloyal movement, Fateh, must give pause for serious concern on the part of everyone interested in the success of this process.

Q. Minister without portfolio Ami Ayalon has called upon the Olmert government to invite "moderate" Hamas activists to the Annapolis conference on condition that they undertake to abide by any agreement signed by Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas. He argues that such a move would help fragment Hamas. Is this a realistic proposition?

A. Almost certainly not. True, there are competing factions within Hamas of more and less extreme persuasion. The moderates won the day when a Palestinian unity government was formed earlier this year; the extremists won out when they attacked and defeated Fateh contingents in Gaza and scuttled that government a few months later.

But there is no indication whatsoever that more moderate Hamas leaders would agree to come to Annapolis, not to mention accepting Ayalon's precondition. Nor did Ayalon receive any overt encouragement from the West Bank-based Fateh regime with which Olmert is negotiating. Indeed, Ayalon's proposal seems naive insofar as a Hamas presence at Annapolis that has not been coordinated with Abbas would undermine what little authority the Palestinian president is still able to project.

Ayalon is undoubtedly making an important point in suggesting that there are elements within Hamas with whom Israel should at some point try to talk. Thus far, these same Hamas moderates have by and large refused to talk to Israel. Nor does Ayalon's suggestion buttress Olmert's effort to arrive in Annapolis with a united Israeli coalition behind him. Still, following Annapolis it is likely that Abbas' Fateh faction and Hamas leaders will once again agree to discuss renewing political contact and a unity government. At that point, Ayalon's suggestion might become more relevant.

Q. Against the backdrop of Turkey's threats to invade Iraqi Kurdistan and Ankara's anger over the American Jewish community's involvement in the recent House of Representatives Armenian Genocide resolution, how do you view recent allegations regarding Israeli aid to the Kurds of northern Iraq?

A. This is an extremely complicated situation with a lot of interlocking pieces, not all of which are mentioned in the question. One issue seems fairly clear-cut: apparently, Israeli companies and individuals have in recent years quietly entered Iraqi Kurdistan from Turkey and worked there on security-related projects like an airport. The government of Israel has credibly denied any official involvement and is investigating. This is hardly the first instance of laxness on the part of Israel Ministry of Defense officials in charge of licensing the sale of arms and know-how by Israelis to problematic end-users. In this particular case the involvement of Israelis takes place against a backdrop of decades of contacts between Israelis and Iraqi Kurds and Israeli support for Iraqi Kurdish autonomy vis-a-vis Baghdad.

Nevertheless, Jerusalem can in good faith reassure Ankara that Israeli-Turkish relations are of far greater strategic importance to Israel than links with the Kurds. The same goes for the Armenian Genocide issue, where realpolitik has consistently prevailed over moral sentiment in Israel and the House committee resolution may not even be brought to a vote before the plenary.

Both the Kurdish and Armenian issues involve US policy far more than they do Israel. Not only is the Armenian issue before Congress, not the Knesset, but US involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan complicates American relations with Turkey far more than has the presence of a few dozen Israelis.

First, despite its occupier status throughout Iraq, the US has done nothing over the years to rein in the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorists who have found refuge in a mountainous part of Kurdistan, from where they launch attacks against Turkish civilians and soldiers. Nor does Washington own up to its responsibility in this regard. US occupying forces have not even seriously pressured the autonomous Kurdish government of northern Iraq, a key US ally, to subdue fellow Kurds from Turkey with whom they sympathize. Last Friday, the American military commander in northern Iraq, Major General Benjamin Mixon, declared the US had no responsibility to act. He was seemingly contradicted the next day by his boss, General David Petraeus, who indicated that US armed forces were "doing things" regarding the PKK.

Second, Turkey and Iran allege that Washington has links with a PKK sister organization that attacks Iran from the same mountainous redoubt, PJAK (Party of Free Life in Kurdistan)--an accusation the US, given its hostility to the Tehran regime, has not convincingly denied. Nor has Washington placed PJAK on its list of terrorist groups. (It has placed the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization on that list, though this does not appear to hinder American protection for the remains of that anti-Iranian organization camped on Iraqi soil.) If the US, in its effort to undermine the Islamic regime in Iran by inciting its opponents and non-Shi'ite minorities, allows arms to reach the anti-Iranian PJAK, there is nothing to prevent their transfer to the anti-Turkish PKK.

American-Turkish relations have been in serious decline since 2003, when the Turkish parliament refused to allow the US to invade Iraq by traversing Turkish territory. Polls indicate a huge majority of Turks adopting anti-American positions. Further decline in these relations could easily influence aspects of the Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship as well.