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Readings re: Israeli Public Opinion and Hamas, Israel's Security Brass Weigh In, & Commentary

A robust discussion over the question of engaging Hamas and the desirability of reaching a ceasefire is occurring in Israel...

3/5/08

ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION AND HAMAS

See excerpts HERE, or follow the links below to the original sources

ISRAELI SECURITY BRASS WEIGH IN

See excerpts HERE, or follow the links below to the original sources

COMMENTARY

See excerpts HERE, or follow the links below to the original sources

 

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Israeli public opinion and Hamas
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>Jerusalem Post 3/5/08:  Channel 10: 73% dissatisfied with gov't attempts to stop Kassam fire

73 percent of Israelis are "dissatisfied" with the government's conduct in trying to stop the Kassam fire, a Channel 10 survey showed Wednesday.  44% of those surveyed said they supported a wide scale operation in Gaza,  20% favored pinpoint operations against terror cells and 21% said they would back negotiations with Hamas.

>Ha'aretz 2/27/08: Poll: Most Israelis back direct talks with Hamas on Shalit

Sixty-four percent of Israelis say the government must hold direct talks with the Hamas government in Gaza toward a cease-fire and the release of captive soldier Gilad Shalit. Less than one-third (28 percent) still opposes such talks.  The figures were obtained in a Haaretz-Dialog poll conducted Tuesday under the supervision of Professor Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University.  According to the findings, Israelis are fed up with seven years of Qassam rockets falling on Sderot and the communities near Gaza, as well as the fact that Shalit has been held captive for more than a year and a half.  An increasing number of public figures, including senior officers in the Israel Defense Forces' reserves, have expressed similar positions on talks with Hamas.  It now appears that this opinion is gaining traction in the wider public, which until recently vehemently rejected such negotiations.  The survey also showed that Likud voters are much more moderate than their Knesset representatives. About half (48 percent) support talks with Hamas. In Kadima, 55 percent are for talks, while among Labor voters, the number jumps to 72 percent.

> Maagar Mohot Survey Institute Telephone poll for Israel Radio's "Its all Talk" Program (3/5/08) 

Results are from a representative sample of 550 adult Israelis (including Arab Israelis).  Statistical error +/- 4.5 percentage points.

What do you prefer the Government of Israel do: reach a cease fire deal with Hamas or continue the war against it?

Total: Deal 36% War 54% Other replies 10%
Kadima voters: Deal 31% War 54% Other 15%
Likud voters: Deal; 21% War 77% Other 2%
Labor voters: Deal 50% War 29% Other 21%

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ISRAEL'S SECURITY BRASS WEIGH IN
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1.  EFRAIM HALEVY, former head of the Mossad, former head of Israel's National Security Council

>Mother Jones 2/19/08: Interview with Former Israeli intelligence chief Efraim Halevy

It's fair to call Efraim Halevy--who served three Israeli prime ministers as chief of the Mossad, Israel's national intelligence service--a hawk. He negotiated a covert peace deal with Jordan that preceded the countries' public treaty in 1994. Nine years later, he resigned as head of Israel's National Security Council over policy differences with then-prime minister Ariel Sharon. And when he left the Mossad, Halevy received the prestigious CIA Director's Award from then-director George Tenet for his assistance to the U.S. intelligence service--the exact details of which Halevy cannot disclose. 

This month, St. Martin's Press published a paperback edition of Halevy's riveting 2006 memoir of his 35 years in the Mossad, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad. I interviewed Halevy by phone and email about his career, details of covert channels in his book, and his recent public call for both the Bush administration and Israel to talk with the Palestinian militant group, Hamas.

Mother Jones: Mr. Halevy, in your memoir you make clear your belief that Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States, have not fully come to terms with the national security threats posed by Islamic militancy and terrorism. Yet you've also said it would be a grave mistake for the West to treat all Islamist terrorist groups the same way, and argued that Israel should have some sort of process for talking with Hamas. If the West, led by Washington, continues to shun Hamas as an illegitimate terrorist group, do you see a risk that the group could take on a more nihilistic type of violence, a la al Qaeda?

Efraim Halevy: Hamas is not al Qaeda and, indeed, al Qaeda has condemned them time and time again. Hamas may from time to time have tactical, temporary contact with al Qaeda, but in essence they are deadly adversaries. The same goes for Iran. Hamas receives funds, support, equipment, and training from Iran, but is not subservient to Tehran. A serious effort to dialogue indirectly with them could ultimately drive a wedge between them.

MJ: Why do you think Israel and Washington should talk with Hamas?

EH: Hamas has, unfortunately, demonstrated that they are more credible and effective as a political force inside Palestinian society than Fatah, the movement founded by [former Palestinian Authority president] Yassir Arafat, which is now more than ever discredited as weak, enormously corrupt and politically inept.
[Hamas has] pulled off three "feats" in recent years in conditions of great adversity. They won the general elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006; they preempted a Fatah design to wrest control of Gaza from them in 2007; and they broke out of a virtual siege that Israel imposed upon them in January 2008. In each case, they affected a strategic surprise upon all other players in the region and upon the United States, and in each case, no effective counter strategy mounted by the US and Israel proved effective.

Security in the West Bank is assured not by the fledgling and ineffective security forces of Abu Mazen now undergoing training once again by American-led instructors. It is the nightly incursions of the Israeli Defense Forces into the West Bank, their superior intelligence, together with that of the Israel Security Agency that does the job.

Current strategy in the West Bank to forge a credible Palestinian security capacity is floundering; indeed, several of the deaths of Israelis at the hands of West Bank terrorists were perpetrated by none other than members of the units under the command of Abu Mazen.

It makes sense to approach a possible initial understanding including Hamas--but not exclusively Hamas--at a time when they are still asking for one. No side will gain from a flare up leading to Israel re-entering the Gaza strip in strength to undo the ill-fated unilateral disengagement of 2005.

MJ: Should Hamas be required to recognize Israel's right to exist before Israel would talk with it?

EH: Israel has been successful in inflicting very serious losses upon Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank and this has certainly had an effect on Hamas, who are now trying to get a "cease fire." But this has not cowed them into submission and into accepting the three-point diktat that the international community has presented to them: to recognize Israel's right to exist; to honor all previous commitments of the Palestinian Authority; and to prevent all acts of violence against Israel and Israelis. The last two conditions are, without doubt, sine qua non. The first demands an a priori renunciation of ideology before contact is made. Such a demand has never been made before either to an Arab state or to the Palestinian Liberation Organization/Fatah. There is logic in the Hamas' position that ideological "conversion" is the endgame and not the first move in a negotiation.

MJ: How should such talks be conducted?

EH: Hamas shuns direct contact and negotiations with Israel and this actually meets Israel's reciprocal attitude to them. The same is true of the United States. But Hamas is eager to "engage" the two indirectly and reach a verifiable cease fire, and understands that could lead to more "down the road."
Such a strategy of indirect proximity engagement, whilst covering our flanks, offers the prospects of lowering the temperature in the region, easing constraints, and opening up real possibilities of social and economic progress. This is a policy that could be tested, and is warranted by the abject failure of the present Palestinian Authority rump leadership in the West Bank led by the aging, tired and sad Abu Mazen [Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas], and his able prime minister Salaam Fayyad, a great economist and banker but a man who does not pretend to overstay his time.

MJ: Regarding your mention of "indirect proximity talks." Structurally, how does that work? Is it conducted by a third party, like Egypt or Turkey? Who would be a trusted broker?

EH: Proximity talks can sometime be done through third parties who are states or individuals--third party emissaries who are not states. It can be done by personalities acceptable to both sides.

MJ: How do we know this is not already taking place?

EH: I don't know whether it's occurring or not. If it's occurring, I applaud it.

MJ: Do you envisage that new leadership in Washington next year could reject the path taken by Bush of refusing to deal with Hamas and make a big change towards the approach you recommend?

EH: I have no idea. I don't want to second guess, and I don't know who the leadership will be. It would be politically incorrect to start surmising what the new leadership would do a year from now. A year in life of the Middle East is a millennium.

MJ: Again and again, Israel and Washington too have tried to engineer which Palestinians would come to power, to whom they would speak or recognize, etc. Is this itself problematic? Should the West step back from trying to manipulate internal Palestinian politics?

EH: Yes, for two reasons. First, is the sovereign right of Palestinians to decide who their leadership should be. I think that is the basis of democracy. More than that, it is the best possible way in my opinion for a country or society to determine how it wants to be governed and how it wants to be lead. And second, so far it must be admitted that attempts to do this [manipulate internal Palestinian politics] have not succeeded. After all, in the final analysis, it would not be possible to create and fashion a leadership from without.
MJ: It's not just Washington and Israel, but Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas who is asking those countries not to deal with Hamas, but rather strengthen him. So do you think it's more of the same phenomenon if the West then picks Hamas as the more legitimate representation of the Palestinians?

EH: I don't think one or the other are the sole representation. But I think that the way things are at the moment, the two of them have a major role in the leadership of the Palestinian people, and to exclude one and to magnify the other artificially will not lead to a productive outcome.
I don't know whether it is Abu Mazen who is pushing Washington and Israel not to deal with Hamas, or Abu Mazen who is acquiescing to them, or some combination of both. I don't know who the stronger element in this policy is.

There is a triangle of forces: Israel, the Abu Mazen-led group in Ramallah, and the [Bush] administration. They have become mutually interdependent on this policy and one cannot rule without the other two. That's the way it is at the moment.

MJ: You are not optimistic that the current administration will change course?

EH: It appears by all indications that neither Israel nor the United States are prepared to contemplate such a test of alternative strategy. Therefore, what we seem to be in for is a period where Israel will continue to negotiate the details of a permanent settlement to the dispute with a rump Palestinian leadership that has already indicated it will not run for re-election in the upcoming elections in 2009.

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2.  AMI AYALON - former head of the Shin Bet and former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy

>Ha'aretz 3/3/08: Ami Ayalon to call for cease-fire talks with Hamas

Minister Ami Ayalon is planning to propose that Israel initiate indirect negotiations with Hamas, with Egyptian mediation, to bring about a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip. Ayalon, a minister without portfolio and a leading figure in the Labor Party, will raise the idea during a meeting of the security-political cabinet on Wednesday.

Behind closed doors, Ayalon has emphasized that "if we are talking with Hamas about [captive IDF soldier] Gilad Shalit, then why should we not talk about a cease-fire?"  Ayalon has expressed this view in talks with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. All three are opposed, at this stage, to any negotiations with Hamas over a cease-fire, insisting that Hamas would only use the hiatus in the fighting to reorganize its forces and acquire more arms, in anticipation of another round of hostilities.

Ayalon also intends to make other recommendations in the meeting on Wednesday. For example, he supports striking buildings from which Qassam rockets are fired. He is also of the opinion that Israel should reach a new understandings concerning the Gaza border crossings, along with Egypt and the international community.   "The Egyptians can mediate and this can restore calm," Ayalon has said. "Even without a cease-fire they will acquire arms. After all, how did they acquire the Grad rockets?"

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3.  YAAKOV PERI, former head of the Shin Bet

>Ha'aretz 2/24/08:  Sderot mayor denies calling for cease-fire talks with Hamas

".Former Shin Bet chief Yaakov Peri told Israel Radio on Saturday that the government should pursue direct talks with Hamas so as to expedite a prisoner swap for abducted soldier Gilad Shalit."

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4.  Major-Gen. (Res.) GIORA EILAND, former head of Israel's National Security Council and former Head of the IDF's Operations Directorate and the Planning and Policy Directorate

>New York Times 2/17/08: For Israel, Gaza Offers a Range of Risky Choices

Excerpt:  "...A former national security adviser, Giora Eiland, wants to use the threat of harsh military and economic sanctions not to defeat Hamas, but to persuade it to stop the rocket fire -- or else. Mr. Eiland proposes a deal: cease-fire, prisoner exchange, normal fuel and electricity supplies, and a reopened, monitored Egyptian border. If Hamas refuses, he proposes a very hard stick: the bombing of Gaza's ministries, police stations and infrastructure; a halt in the supply of goods, fuel and electricity; and the economic separation of Gaza from the West Bank..."

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5.  SHAUL MOFAZ, former Chief of Staff of the IDF, current Minister of Transportation

>Ha'aretz 12/19/07: Mofaz: Israel should mull indirect talks with Hamas over Qassams

Israel should not rule out indirect negotiations with Hamas in an effort to halt Qassam rocket fire at southern Israel, Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz told Army Radio on Wednesday.  'Mediation is something we can think about but one thing needs to be clear,' Mofaz told Army Radio. 'This subject is the responsibility of Hamas and the terror groups and as long as these firings and terror from inside the strip won't stop we must continue this policy and not stop for even one hour.'  Mofaz was reacting to what the radio said was an invitation by Gaza's Hamas ruler, Ismail Haniyeh, to launch talks.  'Israel will not stop its air strikes against the group and other militants that are involved in the incessant rocket fire from the Gaza Strip,' Mofaz said. Cabinet minister Ami Ayalon also said Israel should not rule out speaking to 'anyone' in order to stop rocket attacks from Gaza, but urged caution to ensure a ceasefire would not lead to a strengthening of Hamas."

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6.  VARIOUS

>Jerusalem Post 2/24/08: Hamas's illegitimacy

Politicians, ex-intelligence chiefs and men of letters are among the swelling - if still relatively marginal - chorus of those advocating direct contacts with Hamas as an antidote to the daily Kassam attacks on Sderot and its western Negev surroundings. Only an accommodation with those who hold sway in Gaza, they argue, can restore a modicum of serenity to the suffering south.

Former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) head Ya'acov Peri promotes direct talks with Hamas if possible to expedite a deal for the release of kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit, as does Transportation Minister and former IDF chief of General Staff Shaul Mofaz. Some of Israel's leading literati published an open letter, in conjunction with the Geneva Initiative, demanding give and take with Hamas. The signatories included A.B. Yehoshua, Amos Oz, David Grossman, Eyal Meged, Eli Amir, Meir Shalev and Yehoshua Sobol. Some in Labor, Kadima and much of Meretz subscribe to this counsel.

The latest public figure to have apparently joined this chorus was the mayor of embattled Sderot itself, Eli Moyal, a Likud member. Having previously backed an IDF offensive to try to dismantle the Kassam and other terrorist infrastructure in the Strip, the despairing Moyal was reported to have changed course and advocated diplomatic contacts with Gaza's Islamist leadership.

In an interview with the Guardian at the weekend, Moyal was quoted as having declared: "I would say to Hamas let's have a cease-fire, let's stop the rockets for the next 10 years and we will see what happens." Moyal added: "If we don't talk, we go deeper and deeper into war.For me as a person the most important thing is life and I am ready to do everything for that. I am ready to talk to the devil." Moyal yesterday "clarified" to The Jerusalem Post that while he personally would do anything, including talk to Hamas, to help safeguard his town, he does not believe the government should do so.

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7.  Colonel (Res.) SHAUL ARIELI, former military commander in the Gaza Strip
Colonel (Res.) YUVAL DVIER, former military commander in the Gaza Strip
Former Senior Mossad Official/former senior Shin Bet official/former Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry REUVEN MERHAV

- Interview on "Non-Stop Radio" (local Tel Aviv radio station) with Colonel (Res.) Shaul Arieli, 2/28/08
(Hebrew-language only, translation by Americans for Peace Now.  From the website of the Council on Peace and Security,

".we have to think in terms of a comprehensive package and as much as it may sound now distant and strange, we also have to think in varying time frames.  In the long term, we have to speed up negotiations with the Palestinians and to try to rehabilitates the Palestinian society and economy in Judea and Samaria to try to create a better alternative.  In the medium term, we must not continue to avoid the possibility of a cease-fire with Hamas because the argument that such a ceasefire will serve Hamas to re-arm and continue the smuggling through Philadelphi today sounds ridiculous given what has happened.  On the other hand.this is exactly the time that Israel needs in order to complete the "Iron Dome," in order to complete the defenses and perhaps also to execute the commitments of the Annapolis declaration and to reach some kind of a political arrangement within a year.  And that's why there is not only a downside in a ceasefire - and I'm saying through a third party - Israel could actually enjoy these benefits."

- Interview on Israeli Knesset Television (the equivalent of C-SPAN), with Colonel (Res.) Yuval Dvier 2/12/08
(Hebrew-language only, translation by Americans for Peace Now.  From the website of the Council on Peace and Security,

".in my opinion, the solution that Israel has to strive for, at any price, is a change in the realm of civilian life in the Gaza Strip, which means beginning with a political agreement that will give us some breathing space and ending with changes that will emerge subsequently in the Gaza Strip. [this includes] Talking with Hamas and reaching a ceasefire.  Hamas, they won the elections.  Israeli welcomed these elections.  It has to live with the consequences.  There's no way around it.I can tell you, we have spoken with much tougher enemies than Hamas.  So what?  Didn't we get out of its safe and sound at the end of the day?  We have to talk [with] Hamas.  We have to reach point where there is a political agreement on a ceasefire or some other possibility to create arrangements that will change the realm of civilian life there [in Gaza]."

- Interview on Israeli Knesset Television (the equivalent of C-SPAN), with Reuven Merhav 2/13/08
(Hebrew-language only, translation by Americans for Peace Now.  From the website of the Council on Peace and Security,

[In the context of a "mock Cabinet meeting," with Merhav playing the role of Foreign Minister] ".Israel had in the past and still has today all sorts of non-belligerence or ceasefire arrangements short of a peace accord.  At the end of the road, there will not be any other choice but to strive for a political arrangement that will normalize the Gaza Strip."

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COMMENTARY
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>Ma'ariv 2/29/08: Break the Taboo and Talk (by correspondent Amit Cohen)
(Hebrew print edition, translation by Israel News Today)

This is considered the greatest taboo today.  Talks with Hamas means recognition--even if partial--of the terror organization responsible for the most severe terror attacks that Israel has known.  Hamas's unwillingness to recognize Israel and to try to reach a final status arrangement also makes the question almost theoretical.

But within Hamas, particularly among those who are defined as the "moderate camp" headed by Ismail Haniya, there are people who are willing to engage in pragmatic talks with Israel.  There are no aspirations or pretensions here to a peace agreement or conciliation.  Only a long-term hudna, for pragmatic considerations, as proposed by Sheikh Yassin back in 1996.  Hamas knows that they will sacrifice the rocket fire in exchange for establishing their rule in Gaza.

Israel's logic in going for such a deal with Hamas is self-evident.  Gaza finally has a clear boss, which can instate order there.  Senior Hamas figures say that in return for opening the crossings to the Gaza Strip, and mainly the Karni crossing that serves for bringing in goods, they are capable of "persuading" the other organizations to stop the rocket fire.  As far as determination is concerned, Hamas has proved in recent months that it is willing to clash with other organizations, even Islamic Jihad.

Support has been voiced for this position by former National Security Council director Giora Eiland, who said that Israel should start to talk to Hamas and reach a de-facto agreement with it.  Former defense minister Amir Peretz also said that if a proposal to talk with Hamas members were to reach him, he would not immediately rule it out.

On the other hand, the consensus in the political and military establishments overwhelmingly rejects any contact with Hamas.  Israeli officials understand that normalizing relations with Hamas in Gaza would prevent any shred of hope, even the slimmest, for the collapse of the Islamic regime there.  Such a step would eliminate Abu Mazen, Fatah and perhaps the entire political-secular stream among the Palestinians.

Another fear is of an even greater military buildup of Hamas in Gaza. Such a process was undergone by Hizbullah after 1996, following the Grapes of Wrath understandings, and Israel would not like to see Hamas become strengthened in a similar fashion.  A cease-fire would also help build Hamas's strength in Judea and Samaria, which would assist them in taking control of the West Bank and acting against Israel.

Beyond the immediate considerations, in the long term too, Israel has no chance with Hamas.  The best example of this is the veteran prisoners, those who are released from prison after many years.  It is true that they come out of prison "softened" with regard to terror attacks.  They feel that they have done their share, and many of them have no intention of returning to military activity.  Many of them speak fluent Hebrew and are quite familiar with Jewish and Israeli history.  But among these released Hamas prisoners, who are ostensibly softened, nothing has changed with regard to their ideology, which remains extreme and uncompromising.  They believe fervently, as only a devoutly religious person can believe, that Israel is a temporary matter.  They say openly that Hamas will never recognize Israel.  That there will never be peace with a Jewish-Zionist state.  But a hudna is a different story, and that may be possible to achieve.

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>Ma'ariv 3/5/07: Talk Now (Op-ed by Avraham Tirosh, associated with the national religious movement, typically hawkish views)
(Hebrew print edition, translation by Israel News Today)

The coming days will show whether the IDF activity in the Gaza Strip has achieved anything. In other words, will there be any decrease in the rocket fire, either because the other side has "learned a lesson" from Operation Hot Winter, as Israel would like to believe, or because of Hamas's interests. The larger goals were certainly not achieved by this activity, and cannot actually be achieved by such a limited operation.

Hamas's firepower and weaponry were not destroyed. Their activation now depends solely on the will and considerations of the organization-not only has Hamas's hold on the Gaza Strip not been weakened by the Israeli operation, it has actually been strengthened. Anyone who was counting on the fact that the massive attacks would lead to an uprising against Hamas, perhaps to the point of toppling it, was dreaming, even if these were officials in Jerusalem. These attacks increased support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, the IDF offensive also broadened Hamas's influence to the West Bank, where it enjoyed the benefit of solidarity, which was expressed in a general strike that was staged at its instructions, and a mini-Intifada, which is liable to develop further under its instigation. Hamas scored points in the West Bank versus its rival, the Palestinian Authority, which was pushed into a corner and was forced to announce that it was stopping the talks with Israel. One might wonder what this means regarding Hamas's chances of taking control of the West Bank in the future.

It is no wonder, then, that Hamas is celebrating a victory, despite the destruction and the losses it suffered. It has greater staying power than we do, and it too, like Hizbullah, does not need a real victory in order to celebrate. It does not count its fatalities, it counts rockets that hit Israel, and it measures the support for  itself in Gaza and the West Bank versus the stress and hysteria in Sderot and Ashkelon.

This "victory" also helps it lower the flames, as it appears at the time of writing these lines yesterday, and may later help in achieving a cease-fire agreement. Does it already ensure quiet without an agreement at the present stage? This is very doubtful. The fire, even though at a decreased rate, continued yesterday and will continue even if Hamas instructs its men to hold their fire. There will always be people who will not accept its authority and will continue to fire. Will Israel restrain itself and not respond? Perhaps up to a certain limit. And if and when it responds, the sides may be caught up again in a lethal maelstrom of fire-response-fire on a large scale.

So what is the solution? One solution, which is my opinion is completely wrong and also foolish and dangerous, is to reoccupy the Gaza Strip and clean it up. I hope that even those who favor this solution-in the political and security establishment and the IDF-do not think for a moment that the army should return to permanent control and presence in the Gaza Strip. If so, what good have they done? For the minute we leave there, everything will return to its previous state.

The other, more realistic solution, although not without its own problems, is a dialogue and agreement with Hamas for a long-term cease-fire.

What is known as an "ongoing temporary arrangement." Hamas's consent to this, from its own considerations, would be a real achievement for Operation Hot Winter. There are indications that it consents.

Such an agreement may not hold up, and even if it does, it is reasonable to assume that Hamas will take advantage of this respite to build up its military strength. But Israel can also complete its defense system against Kassam rockets in this time. Indeed, it would be a limited achievement, a poor man's joy, based on the discouraging assumption that we are fated to a permanent exchange of fire with Hamas in the south, and the goal is only to obtain protection against its fire. But this is still better than nothing.

It is certainly better than a large-scale ground operation, which will both cost many casualties and has very low chances of achieving the goal of toppling Hamas, which people are trying to pin on it. We have already learned in Lebanon, the hard way, that we cannot enthrone anyone by means of our bayonets.

To talk now, before we get entangled and sink into the mud-that is the way.

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>Ha'aretz 3/4/08: Talk to Hamas (by Nehemia Strasler)

In the winter of 1991, Saddam Hussein bombed Tel Aviv. For a month and a half, long-range missiles landed on the city. People panicked and many fled to Jerusalem, while the leaders issued pompous statements about the terrible blow the Iraqi dictator was about to receive.

But nothing happened. We did nothing.

In February-March 1996, buses exploded in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and dozens of people were killed in suicide bombings in the streets and restaurants. People who went to the grocery store did not know if they would return. Those who went to a restaurant or disco were seen as risking their lives.

Shimon Peres, who was then prime minister, realized that the suicide attacks would destroy him politically but could do nothing to prevent them. Sure enough, Benjamin Netanyahu won the elections.

In 2001-2003, terror struck in the heart of Israel again. The suicide bombings emptied the shopping centers, tourism halted, businesspeople went bankrupt and received no compensation. The economy plunged into a deep recession amid rising unemployment. Even then we did not enter an all-out war in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

So it is wrong to argue that the state has abandoned Sderot and the western Negev. If this is abandonment, then Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were abandoned as well. The truth is more prosaic: Power has limitations. The Israel Defense Forces cannot solve everything.

Netanyahu may say there is a simple solution - "to move from attrition to the offensive" - but the reality is more complicated. The IDF acted on the outskirts of Gaza's densely populated territory and two soldiers were killed. Had the army pushed deeper, the number of fatalities would have risen sharply.

International pressure would have risen as well. The United Nations has already condemned us, Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian arbitrator, canceled his visit to Israel, and scenes from the beginning of the second intifada in October 2000 returned to the West Bank. The Qassam and Grad rockets continued falling even when the IDF was inside Gaza, and yesterday Hamas hastened to declare victory.

Another irritating lie in the Israeli discourse insists that it is appropriate to make Gazans' lives a living hell, so that they will put pressure on their leaders and end the firing of rockets. This thesis was behind the first Lebanon war, but that fallacy didn't work either, even when hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were forced to flee to the north.

That was also the thesis behind the Second Lebanon War. But despite the Lebanese population's extreme suffering, it didn't work then either. It is certainly not working in Gaza. There things are horrifically bad. Poverty is awful, the number of fatalities is huge, the hospitals are collapsing from too many wounded, unemployment has reached the extraordinary level of 60 percent, and most of the population subsists on food provided by United Nations organizations.

People in such a difficult situation have nothing left but their self-respect. In these days "all of Gaza has become Hamas," a former Fatah security officer who is far from being a Hamas supporter, told Haaretz. Al Jazeera is broadcasting to every home the horror pictures of the deaths of dozens of children and women.

In this situation, hatred triumphs and the only hope is the desire to take revenge. The rocket launchers are thus the heroes who gain the people's sympathy, and support for Hamas is not getting any smaller - it's growing.

So there is no escape but to talk to Hamas. We cannot choose our enemies. We embraced Yasser Arafat after saying for dozens of years (in the words of Yitzhak Rabin) that "we'll meet the PLO only on the battlefield."

Indeed, signing an agreement with Hamas is risky. An agreement could weaken Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whom Israel sees as a fitting partner. But it also harbors hope. We could make a cease-fire arrangement consisting of stopping the rocket fire in exchange for stopping the assassinations. We could agree on a prisoner exchange and bring Gilad Shalit home.

We could even alleviate the economic siege in an agreement that would prevent transferring weapons and explosives via the Rafah crossing. All this is attainable, and is many times preferable to continuing the bloodbath, which would only raise the walls of hatred and revenge higher.

Once we didn't want to talk to the PLO and Arafat. Then we humiliated Abbas and didn't want to give him any achievement during the disengagement. Now we don't want to talk to Hamas. So the struggle will continue - until a catastrophe occurs, on their side or ours. Only then will the leaders be forced to sit down and talk around the negotiating table.

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>Ha'aretz 3/2/08: The very last moment

A moment before the conflagration breaks out, standing on the edge of an abyss from which those who fall do not return, the call comes: Stop! Will the government have the courage to stop before calamity hits?

Those who sowed this wind of ongoing, not-necessarily-targeted strikes, of locking the gates and suffocating Gaza on all sides, are now reaping the whirlwind. A cabinet meeting no longer need be called today to decide, nor an inner-cabinet meeting Wednesday. The extensive ground operation is already rolling, so it can be told in the streets of Ashkelon. It has already exacted a heavy price on both sides.

The decision on war was made without realizing it, and the cabinet still does not know that this was the decision, exactly as happened in the summer of 2006. This war, too, will end in bitter disappointment. The losses on the Palestinian side, mostly innocent civilians, will only increase solidarity and the willingness to sacrifice. Hamas rule will not be weakened; it certainly will not fall. The same is true for its status in the West Bank.

The rug will be pulled out from under Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his colleagues, and the last of their strength will seep away.

But Sderot and the surrounding towns will see no succor: Qassams will not stop falling and Grads will not stop flying. And when we withdraw one day - because after all, we will not want to be permanently swallowed up in the Gaza bitterness - the situation will return to the status quo ante, and all those urging us ahead now will ask, like wise men after the fact, what did this war have to do with you - with you and with not them?

This is precisely the time to say infuriating things - for if not now, when? There is no choice but to talk to Hamas, indirectly or directly, and without preconditions. On the agenda: a cessation of hostilities and a total, long-term halt.

It is uncomfortable and even ostensibly unreasonable to negotiate with those who do not recognize your existence. But the act of negotiating itself is a kind of recognition, and only it will lead the parties to a temporary calm. Lacking a cure, time is also a palliative. Meanwhile, the living will remain alive, because we cannot bring back the dead.

Hamas will take advantage of the break in hostilities to grow stronger, arm and train - that is the usual, eternal argument against a cease-fire. History shows that Israel has more than once agreed on temporary cease-fires that have held. Moreover, who says Hamas uses time more efficiently than we do? Why does time have to work against us? Are we so poor in ideas and initiatives that our enemies will necessarily have the upper hand as time passes? Is our strength and understanding so worrisomely and despairingly limited? If that is the situation, then evil has truly been determined against us.

And perhaps, with a hiatus in the hostilities, we may finally learn to develop the defense system against rockets and missiles - at least this.

If the escalation continues for another day or two - if it drags on and defiles us - it will not be able to be stopped. It will roll along on its own. This is the moment to stop; the last moment.

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Council on Foreign Relations: "Siegman: No Peace Possible Between Israel and Palestinians without Hamas"

Interviewee: Henry Siegman, Director, United States/Middle East Project

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

March 7, 2008

Henry Siegman, an expert on Middle East negotiations, says that no peace will be possible between Israel and Palestinians unless Hamas is brought into the process. "The notion that the Israeli government leaders and our own government have that it is possible to exclude Hamas from peace talks and have a successful result from those talks is a fantasy," he says. "It's not going to happen." Because of President Bush's refusal to deal with Hamas, he says, it is unlikely that any progress can be made until there is a new president in the White House.

There's a bit of a lull right now in the fighting between Hamas and Israel, which has led to over one hundred Palestinians dead and a few Israelis in the past couple of weeks. Can you see a diplomatic way of getting a cease-fire that would permit peace talks to continue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority under Fatah leader, President Mahmoud Abbas?

I don't see talks between Israelis and Palestinians leading anywhere without finding a way of bringing Hamas-who constitute the government of roughly half the Palestinian people-into that process. You can't make peace with half the population and remain at war with the other half. The notion that the Israeli government leaders and our own government have that it is possible to exclude Hamas from peace talks and have a successful result from those talks is a fantasy. It's not going to happen.

The question is, is it possible to persuade the United States and Israel's government to allow Hamas to participate in this process?

The obvious question is would Hamas participate even if it is allowed?

Well, let's go back in time a bit. After a Palestinian unity government was established in early 2007 as a result of the Mecca agreement, worked out by Saudi mediation, and even before that, when there were talks between Hamas and Fatah about the possibility of forming such a government, Hamas made it clear that even though they themselves would not sit in on those discussions, they had no objections to such discussions proceeding or to Abbas, as the president of the Palestinian Authority and also the president of Fatah, conducting those negotiations. So there was no obstacle to the peace process going forward, particularly since Hamas committed itself to putting an agreement, if one was reached with Israel, to a public referendum. Also Hamas committed itself to abiding by the outcome of that referendum. The notion that you can't have peace talks while Hamas is in the government is simply not true.

Do you buy into this view that is in a new Vanity Fair article that the United States planned, in cooperation with Fatah, to cause a coup in Gaza and throw out Hamas, and that backfired, leading to the current split between Fatah and Hamas?

One does not need an investigative article to make that point to know it is true. The U.S. government made no secret whatsoever from the beginning that it intended to arm Abbas's security forces, appoint an American general to be in charge of that program, and provide finances for training, equipment, and the arming of these people. They said publicly the purpose of this project would be for these people to have a showdown with Hamas and to oust them from the government. So, this was never a secret. This was always in the public domain.

I never saw that- that they were so blatant to say they wanted Fatah to oust Hamas.

Yes, they were precisely that blatant. What happened next is that under the direction of Mohammed Dahlan, who was Abbas's national security adviser, the Fatah militias in Gaza were instructed to attack Hamas forces and to create a sufficient level of anarchy that would allow Abbas's security forces to come in and to say they have to restore order and take over the government in Gaza. This never was a secret. In any event, the Vanity Fair article pretty much nails down the story.

When was this decision taken?

The decision, according to the article, was taken immediately after the election in January 2006. As the Vanity Fair story tells it, the State Department people and the White House were in a state of total shock when the election results came in.

Hamas was overwhelmingly elected and Fatah was ousted. Incidentally, at this time, Hamas itself was still observing a self-declared cease-fire. They were not sending in missiles or engaging in violence against Israel. I mention this because a lot of people are under the impression that this decision to overthrow Hamas is somehow related to Hamas' violence. That is simply not true. At the time this decision was taken, there was a cease-fire that Hamas had observed for a year and a half.

So given the current situation, a resumption of talks between Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would result in really nothing, right?

It would result in nothing for essentially two reasons. First, both Israeli officials and American officials are not aware of what it is that Abbas can agree to. They see him as a moderate and he is a moderate in that he opposed the violence of the second intifada [uprising] in 2000, and always argued that this was not the way that Palestinians will achieve their national goal. But it is precisely because he has argued against violence that he is not in a position-particularly when he is at odds with Hamas-to make any kind of significant compromises in the Palestinian position. There is no way that Israelis will be able to get his agreement of what they consider to be their minimal red lines. That is one reason why without Hamas's participation there is no way that Israel and Abbas could reach agreement on the refugee issue, on the Jerusalem issue, and certainly not on the settlement and border issues, which comprise all of the major permanent-status issues.

The second reason is, as we have just seen in the past week or two, Hamas retains the capacity to blow up the negotiations at any point by simply engaging in violence. And if Hamas sees that there is a process going on that is intended to exclude them, to marginalize them, and ultimately to oust them, they are not going to allow the process to proceed.

The Bush administration will be out of office in ten months. The Israeli government is extremely weak because of a shaky coalition government. Both the U.S. and the Israeli governments won't deal with Hamas. How do you get over this? Do you wait until there is a new president?

There is no choice but to wait for a new president because on this precise issue of dealing with Hamas, without a resolution, no peace process can succeed. President Bush is not going to change his mind. At least that is what I am told by people who are in touch with him or talk to him about it. He is absolutely convinced that Hamas is part of the "Axis of Evil." He believes these are people who are essentially in the mold of al-Qaeda, that they support the globalist, jihadist ambition to take over the whole world and establish a caliphate, and so on.

Those convictions of Bush's are completely divorced from reality. The fact of the matter is that Hamas and al-Qaeda are totally at odds, and have been from the very beginning. Al-Qaeda doesn't believe in national liberation movements. They believe only in a religious return under a caliphate to the Islamic territories. The idea of a Palestinian nationalism, or any other, they reject completely. Al-Qaeda has no sympathy for Hamas and Hamas has publicly on several occasions repudiated and rejected the statements and prescriptions made by al-Qaeda's leaders for the Palestinian movement.

What about the Israelis? The Israelis know Hamas pretty well. When Hamas was in opposition to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], the Israeli government had no great love for the PLO. Do you get any sense that the Israelis would like to deal with Hamas even though Hamas says it will never recognize the existence of the state of Israel?

Well, there was a poll recorded last week in Haaretz that showed a majority of Israelis want their government to reach out to Hamas because they understand that you can't deal with the problem without Hamas participation. Now there are some well-informed people who tell me that Olmert and others in his government were ready to deal with Hamas, were prepared to respond to Hamas's offer for a truce and to use the truce to allow a reestablishment of a unity government that would include Hamas and Fatah. But the opposition from Washington, from the White House, is so unyielding that they haven't been able to act on that.

Have you been following any of the American political campaigns? Have any of the candidates shown any interest in going beyond what the stated American policy is right now?

None of the candidates have said anything on the subject except the very bland, general statements that they are totally committed to the security of Israel. What their real positions are, if they have the responsibility in office to deal with the problem, I simply don't know.

Some of the advisers to these people, if they remain influential advisers once they get into office, have views that are far less rigid, certainly quite different, than those held by Bush and his people. There will have to be a change in position eventually that not only allows but encourages Israeli leadership to bring Hamas into the process and to deal with the violence coming out of Gaza not militarily but diplomatically. But we're going to have to wait until the next administration.

Do you think the Egyptians could work out a truce right now? The Egyptians are right now engaged in talking to Hamas about trying to work out a truce, acting as surrogate negotiators with Israel.

The Egyptians have played that role for some time now-with not very impressive results-since Gilad Shalit, the [Israeli] soldier who was kidnapped by some militant groups in Gaza a year and a half ago. They have tried to formulate a package that would enable the parties to agree on a truce and to have an exchange of prisoners. So far, they simply have not been able to deliver. Whether they will be able to do so going forward is difficult to say, particularly since the situation has become even more complicated because there has been added to the mix the issue of the border between Egypt and Gaza . Israelis would like to see it resealed exactly the way it was before. That is something that is very difficult for Egypt to agree to since the Egyptians would then be seen as an accomplice in the Israeli effort to essentially strangle the population of Gaza. It is impossible at this point to cut a deal that doesn't address that issue as well.

Israelis have said more recently that Hamas has been using missiles made in Iran to hit Ashkelon. Do you think that Iran is really involved now in helping out Hamas?

Hamas and Iran are not natural partners. Hamas are Sunnis. Unlike the Hezbollah, who are Shiites and are natural partners with the Iranians, Hamas is not. Nevertheless, they are fighting, as they see it, for their survival. In those circumstances they will accept assistance from whoever will give it to them. The fact that they are Shiites will not prevent accepting their help. However, there is not evidence, as far as I know, that they have accepted that help on terms that make them subservient to Iran. When Iran tried to organize a meeting to protest the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace conference last November, Hamas refused to attend, forcing the Iranians to cancel their plans.

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