To return to the new Peace Now website click here.

Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - December 22, 2008

Q's re: Prospects of talking to Hamas, and likelihood of new conflict with Hezbollah?

The views of Yossi Alpher, Israeli Security Expert, do not necessarily reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or Peace Now.


Q. With the end of the ceasefire, open conflict with Hamas is now once again a reality. What, if any, are the prospects for talking to Hamas about some sort of political alternative?

A. A few days ago, as it was becoming clear that Hamas refused to renew the rickety six-month-old ceasefire, I had an extended conversation with Azzam Tamimi, a Palestinian associated with Hamas who resides in London, where he directs the Institute of Islamic Political Thought. Tamimi, who is known to have close ties to the Hamas leadership in Damascus, is about as "moderate" as a Palestinian can be while still being linked to Hamas. Alternatively, he might be considered Hamas' PR man in the West. Either way, if his views don't constitute a foundation for potential Hamas-Israel dialogue, then there is clearly little chance for a political horizon with Hamas.

Tamimi characterizes Hamas since its founding in 1987 as the equivalent of Fateh when it was founded in 1957. In Tamimi's view, Fateh positions have evolved dramatically since then to the point that today Fateh allows itself to be treated by Israel as an inferior partner in a relationship, with its peace strategy a failure. Hamas will not follow suit; like Fateh at its founding, Hamas believes that Israel has no right to exist and no legitimacy, and that all of Palestine must be Islamic.

But Hamas, according to Tamimi, is a political rather than a religious organization; it just happens to have been founded by people who are religious. In a similar vein, Tamimi does not agree with others in the Hamas leadership that Israel is illegitimate because it is located on holy Islamic (waqf) land; rather, he argues, it is unacceptable because it stole the land from its rightful owners.

Like others in Hamas, Tamimi distinguishes between two kinds of ceasefire; tahdia and hudna. The tahdia or "calm" that just ended can and should be renewed, he asserts, if Israel fulfills three conditions: ending the economic siege of the Gaza Strip, opening Rafah and other crossings, and extending the agreement to the West Bank. Meanwhile, Hamas will only respond militarily if Israel attacks it. [In practice, Hamas allowed other militant groups in Gaza to fire rockets and mortars at Israel for the past few days prior to declaring a renewed tahdia for at least 24 hours; Y.A.]
A long-term truce or hudna, one lasting 15 or 30 years, can only be agreed by Hamas if Israel accepts three conditions, as outlined by Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Moussa Abu-Marzouq in 1994: Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, dismantling of all settlements, and release of all Palestinian prisoners. According to Tamimi, Yassin developed this concept when approached by Israel in Gaza and asked how to end the wave of Palestinian suicide bombings that was triggered by the Baruch Goldstein massacre in Hebron.

Tamimi acknowledges that many Hamas leaders also insist on the right of return of all Palestinian refugees as an additional condition for a long-term truce; he himself does not, recognizing that Hamas cannot table a demand that effectively spells out Israel's demise. That fate, he emphasizes, has to be relegated to the status of "a dream, like Greater Israel". In this way, he states, Hamas can eventually agree to de facto but not de jure recognition of Israel. That moment would probably only come as a long-term, 15 to 30-year hudna approaches expiration. Assuming the hudna had proved beneficial for both sides, they could then talk about a long-term "two-entity situation".

As to the reasons for the collapse of the outgoing tahdia, Tamimi primarily blames the Egyptians--"the most dishonest brokers on the face of the earth". Egypt, he alleged, has played a deceptive role in its mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas, including regarding a prisoner release. Because of its problems with the Muslim Brotherhood [the parent organization of Hamas; Y.A.], Egypt refuses to work constructively with Hamas.

Tamimi believes that Hamas does not need a mediator and should talk directly with Israel, but acknowledges that his fellow Arab Islamists see this as a taboo that "they need to struggle to overcome". Meanwhile he points to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, any other European leader or US President-elect Barack Obama as alternative mediators, but only if they discard the Quartet's three unfair preconditions regarding recognition of Israel, abandoning violence and accepting all previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

Tamimi is equally critical of his movement's infamous charter with its anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial: "it contains terrible things" and should be jettisoned, he states. He claims that Hamas' program for fellow Palestinians involves no imposition of Islamic Shari'a and that Palestinians will be able to choose their way of life democratically.

Obviously, the gap between this London-based spokesman for Hamas and the realities of Hamas policies back home in the Middle East is considerable. But as Hamas survives and even prospers politically in Palestine despite the best efforts of its neighbors, we may at some time in the not too distant future have to weigh whether it makes sense to try to talk to people like him.

Q. On Israel's second dangerous front, facing Hezbollah in the north, reports concerning the possible supply to that organization of new and sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft missiles have in recent months provoked Israeli threats, while the Lebanese armed forces also continue to arm and Hezbollah appears poised to triumph in new elections. What is the likelihood of new conflict?

A. A number of recent developments in the security and political spheres in Lebanon are generating growing concern in Israel. They pose the strong possibility that Hezbollah will be increasingly integrated into the Lebanese national fabric, but without any guarantee that it will disarm and agree to play the Lebanese political game. This in turn implies that, within a few years, Israel could confront a united Lebanese-Hezbollah front, bringing the entire country and population of Lebanon into renewed conflict.
The Doha agreement of May 2008 laid out a blueprint for integrating Hezbollah politically. This was generally understood in the region (though not by the Bush administration, which praised the agreement) as capitulation to Hezbollah's demands by the moderate Lebanese government. Most Lebanese agree that national elections this coming May will aggrandize the political power of Hezbollah and its Christian allies, led by Michel Aoun, and that the next government could be dominated by them.

In parallel, both Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army are arming. Hezbollah continues to receive massive shipments of rockets via Syria, with indications that it may soon take possession of sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft missiles that could threaten Israel's intelligence over-flights. The Lebanese armed forces are due to receive some 66 US-made M-60s tanks from Jordan and, more surprisingly, ten MiG-29 combat aircraft from Russia, paid for primarily by Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese political establishment has launched a national dialogue to discuss Lebanon's future security doctrine. Some moderate Lebanese are advocating that that doctrine declare Israel the principal enemy and focus on deterring it. They believe that in this way they can co-opt Hezbollah politically while keeping the army out of politics and strengthening it sufficiently to render the militant Shi'ite organization unnecessary from a Lebanese security standpoint. When all these dynamics come together in a few years, it will be possible to demand effectively that Hezbollah disarm and devote itself strictly to politics.
From Israel's standpoint (and that of many Lebanese who fear Hezbollah), this Lebanese strategy--which is based, in the spirit of Doha, on accommodating rather than confronting Hezbollah--is liable to advance rather than neutralize Hezbollah's interests and those of its patron, Iran. Hezbollah could end up compromising both the army and the political structure rather than vice versa. This explains at least in part the threats issued last October by, among others, IDF Northern Command Commander Gadi Eisenkot, a major general, to the effect that in a future war Israel, if attacked by Hezbollah, will punish Lebanese civilian infrastructure in addition to attacking Hezbollah units: in a future war, it may no longer be possible or advisable for Israel to distinguish between Hezbollah and the broader Lebanese political and military backdrop.
Lebanese moderates involved in the national security dialogue argue that Israel has an interest in a strong and effective Lebanese army and should want to see Hezbollah integrated militarily and politically in Lebanon. True. But Israelis have to ask who is integrating whom in Lebanon, and why an anti-Israel military doctrine has to be invoked to rationalize integration. The anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon are clearly on the retreat politically, and their brave talk of integrating Hezbollah sounds like rationalization for a weak position.

These considerations in turn call into question the wisdom of the US (and now apparently Russia) arming the Lebanese armed forces, albeit slowly and reluctantly, particularly if the Lebanese insist that the official rationale for doing so is not to oppose militant Sunni and Shi'ite Islamists or to deter Syria but rather to fight a southern neighbor whose sole request from Lebanon is a quiet border. They also further justify the need for a US initiative to join and energize Syrian-Israeli peace talks in order to explore the possibility of cutting Hezbollah off from its weapons supplies via Syria as part of a Syria-Israel peace deal.