Q. Is the Arafat era over? What will happen after Arafat? Q. What does the Palestinian leadership situation mean for Sharon and his disengagement plan? How does it interact with Sharon's surprisingly comfortable Knesset victory over disengagement last week?
The views of Yossi Alpher, Israeli Security Expert, do not necessarily
reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or
Peace Now.
Q. Is the Arafat era over? What will happen after Arafat?
A. These are the two questions that have focused the attention of the political and intelligence establishment, as
well as the media, in Israel and much of the Middle East for several days. Despite a distinct inclination, to some
extent reflecting wishful thinking, on the part of many Palestinians, Israelis and others, to answer "yes" to the
first question and "anything would be better" to the second, the answer to both at the time of writing on Monday
November 1 should be "we don't know".
Until we hear from Arafat's French doctors about the precise nature of his illness it is impossible to predict
whether he will return to Palestine and whether he will again function at anything approaching full capacity-which
for Arafat has always meant 24/7, 365 days a year. For the time being, at least, those who aspire to replace him
through a quasi-legal succession, particularly PLO Central Committee Secretary General Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)
and Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), are demonstrating complete deference to his ongoing leadership status and
making no visible effort to usurp his authority. That Arafat took with him to Paris his entire office staff as well
as an entourage of dozens of hangers-on appears to bespeak his own intention to run Palestinian affairs from Paris,
or at least the intention of those who surround him day-by-day. The waiting period to determine whether the Arafat
era is ending or not could take anything from a few days to a few weeks.
Assuming Arafat does not continue to rule, all the learned assessments about what awaits us in the post-Arafat era
appear to be little more than the same wishful thinking, with an added healthy dose of pure speculation. The real
spectrum of possible outcomes to the current crisis runs all the way from an orderly takeover by leading figures of
the Fatah old guard like Abbas and Qurei to a coup or series of coup attempts by Hamas (in Gaza, where it is
strongest) and/or by various irregular Fatah factions in the West Bank. In between are a thousand permutations,
including rule by regional "warlords" and partial or total anarchy bordering on a Somalia-like situation.
The "constitutional" option-interim rule by Palestinian National Assembly Speaker al-Fatuh followed by presidential
elections within 60 days, all as stipulated by the Palestinian Basic Law-already appears to have been bypassed on
the grounds that al-Fatuh is a grey and ineffective figure. Nor is there evidence of an intention to prepare new
presidential elections (as opposed to local elections, which are indeed being prepared), even as a contingency
plan. In this sense, the more veteran PLO institutions appear to be functioning more strongly than the new and
fragile Palestinian Authority.
Over the years I have asked dozens of Palestinian politicians, security figures and other public persons what would
happen after Arafat leaves the scene. Every answer I received was different, and for good reason. There is no
precedent for replacing the leader of Palestine; there have only been two, Haj Amin al Husseini and Arafat, and
some 20 leaderless years passed before the latter "succeeded" the former in the public and international eye. Other
less-than-democratic Arab countries like Egypt, Syria and Jordan have all demonstrated a capacity for orderly
succession upon the death of the ruler, but there is no such history in Palestine, which never enjoyed even limited
self-rule until 1994. The situation facing us in the event of Arafat's departure can be termed "revolutionary", in
the sense that it will unleash a host of new power dynamics that are virtually impossible to anticipate, much less
to prepare for.
The past few days of speculation have provided an interesting lesson in the limitations of the Israeli media and,
worse, the security establishment. Almost to a man and a woman, they hastened to pronounce Arafat dead and gone, a
victim of leukemia or at a minimum, too enfeebled ever to rule again. They may turn out to be right, but there
appears to be some possibility that they are wrong. In recent years they have frequently been wrong about
Arafat-indeed, about the Palestinians in general.
Q. What does the Palestinian leadership situation mean for Sharon and his disengagement plan? How does it
interact with Sharon's surprisingly comfortable Knesset victory over disengagement last week?
A. For the time being the Sharon government is adopting a wait-and-see posture, and ostensibly is calculating its
activities vis-à-vis the Palestinians on the basis of two healthy principles: avoid favoring or endorsing any
particular moderate Palestinian political figure lest this be exploited by that person's detractors as an Israeli
"kiss of death"; and reduce aggressive military activity to a minimum to avoid giving an excuse to Palestinian
extremists to take action in a power vacuum.
The first principle should be relatively easy to maintain, insofar as Sharon's entire strategy reflects his desire
to avoid negotiating with any Palestinian partner-hence to avoid endorsing one-lest he find himself on the slippery
slope of serious territorial concessions. This explains his failure during the summer of 2003 to provide Abu Mazen
with the minimal concessions concerning prisoner release and a ceasefire that might have enabled the short-term
Palestinian prime minister to succeed and consolidate his power. The second principle may be harder: Sharon's two
governments have a suspicious record over the past four years of initiating preemptive targeted assassinations just
when a degree of ceasefire or stability appears to have been achieved.
Against this backdrop, Sharon's expression (in the Oct. 31 Cabinet meeting) of a hope that roadmap talks could be
renewed in future with a new and moderate Palestinian leadership was dictated by considerations of realpolitik, not
wishful thinking.
On the other hand, Sharon's decision to allow Arafat's departure and guarantee his return appears to reflect sound
calculations regarding the need for Israel to avoid any blame or responsibility for Arafat's fate.
Assuming that Arafat's illness and possible disappearance from the scene are ushering in a period of instability
and maneuvering on the Palestinian scene-a probable but not certain scenario-Sharon may gain support for unilateral
disengagement on the left, but lose it on the right. The left, which prefers renewed negotiations to unilateral
measures, will in the short term not be able to point to a Palestinian negotiating partner, hence will welcome
disengagement as the only conceivably constructive option. The right, on the other hand, will argue that, under
these circumstances, chaos and anarchy in Gaza are guaranteed both before and after disengagement, thereby
rendering it an even riskier option.
To the extent that, in the course of the coming months, there emerges a stable and moderate Palestinian regime-a
scenario that is no more probable than its alternatives, anarchy, instability and extremist rule-then disengagement
skeptics on the left and a few on the right will argue that "there is someone to talk to", and that the
disengagement plan should serve as the first item on the agenda of renewed Israeli-Palestinian talks rather than
being invoked unilaterally. Their position would be strengthened by the emergence of an administration in
Washington that is more dedicated than its predecessor to at least stabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian
situation.
At the domestic Israeli level, Sharon's parliamentary victory last week regarding disengagement appears to have
ended, at least for the near future, any likely move to force a referendum or even to depose him in favor of
Binyamin Netanyahu, who was discredited by last week's political maneuvering. There are more parliamentary hurdles
for the disengagement plan to negotiate in the coming days, but these now appear to be doable.
Yet Sharon's coalition is continuing to shrink with the anticipated near departure of the remainder of the NRP, and
his chances of bringing Labor into the government are not, or not yet, promising. Still, there is strong sentiment
within Labor to provide Sharon with a near total safety net. The possible exception is the budget, which could
become even more problematic if Netanyahu makes good on his current threat to resign unless a referendum is held.
All in all, the legislative course of disengagement appears to be relatively smooth for the coming weeks, thanks to
support on the left and perhaps second thoughts on the part of a few Likud rebels. But Sharon still confronts
serious obstacles in his efforts to pass the budget and/or bring Labor into his government.
Sharon came through last week's political trials looking very much the tough, steady and determined leader. His
detractors on the Israeli political right blinked first, while his Palestinian enemy appeared to be entering a
leaderless era. Whether in the long term these developments are good for disengagement and, more important, for the
cause of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and eventual peace, remains completely uncertain.
For the past four years we have consistently confronted a situation in which none of the three relevant
leaders-Sharon, Arafat and Bush-had a realistic strategy for peace or even for stabilizing the situation. Depending
on Arafat's fate and the direction of the next American president, it is now at least conceivable that this
paradigm will soon change radically, and that a reluctant Sharon will confront a determined US administration and a
serious and moderate Palestinian leader. This, along with the implementation of disengagement, is the best scenario
we can hope for in the coming months.