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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - March 9, 2009

Iran's nuclear weapons capability? Prospects of Likud-Kadima unity gov't? Talking peace with Syria? Why did PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resign?

Q. On Sunday of this week, IDF Chief of Intelligence Amos Yadlin declared that Iran had crossed the technological threshold needed for making nuclear weapons. What is the significance of this announcement?

A. Combined with statements made about a week ago by the IAEA and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the effect that Iran now has sufficient fissile material to produce a bomb, Yadlin's declaration sounds an important alarm: Israeli and American efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear weapons program, which delayed that program for years, appear to have exhausted their usefulness. Now, unless the international community intervenes, it is up to Iran to decide if and when it wants nuclear weapons.

This means that time is short for all varieties of intervention: diplomatic, economic (sanctions) and military. It underlines the huge responsibility that is liable to fall on the shoulders of the incoming Israeli government and that has already fallen on the Obama administration.


Q. Apropos the next Israeli government, two weeks ago you discussed the possibility that Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu would form a unity government with Kadima and possibly Labor. Does that remain a realistic possibility?

A. With every passing day of coalition negotiations it is less likely, as Netanyahu's negotiating team enters into additional commitments with its partners from the right and religious parties. Contacts between Likud and Kadima have effectively ended, with Kadima leader Tzipi Livni insisting that Netanyahu would have to embrace the two-state solution as a precondition for renewing unity government talks. Contacts with Labor leader Ehud Barak continued until a few days ago. Netanyahu was prepared to invite Barak to remain minister of defense. Barak, facing heavy opposition within Labor to joining Netanyahu's right/religious coalition, proffered conditions Netanyahu could not accept concerning the latter's concessions to Yisrael Beitenu's Avigdor Lieberman.

As matters stand, Netanyahu hopes to complete the drafting of coalition guidelines and allocation of ministries by the end of this week and to establish a coalition of 61 or 65 (depending whether the most extreme settler party joins). Concerning the fate of key portfolios, he still must overcome opposition within his own Likud party, led by Sylvan Shalom who wants the Foreign Ministry portfolio Netanyahu has apparently agreed to give Lieberman.

There are also protests within Likud on the part of Dan Meridor and others regarding Netanyahu's acquiescence to Lieberman's demand to retain serving Minister of Justice Daniel Friedman. This was one of Barak's objections, too. Friedman is associated with attempts to radically reduce the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice and the authority of the attorney general. PM Ehud Olmert, who appointed Friedman (who has no party affiliation), and Lieberman both confront extensive police investigations into alleged criminal activities on their part, possibly to be followed soon by indictments. Some political and judicial circles see a connection between Olmert and Lieberman's legal problems and their advocacy of Friedman as minister of justice.

In general, Netanyahu stands accused of caving in to too many demands on the part of his prospective coalition partners. Some of his fellow Likudniks recall the alleged lack of capacity to stand his ground in negotiations that he exhibited in his previous term as prime minister (1996-99). For his part, Netanyahu is surely aware of the risk to Israel 's regional and international relations involved in Lieberman's appointment as foreign minister. His anticipated appointment to the Ministry of Defense of former IDF chief of staff Moshe Yaalon, a hawk lacking in any political experience, is also risky.

There is still a small chance that Netanyahu intends to exploit the threat of a narrow right-wing government to try once more to negotiate with Livni and possibly Barak. Alternatively, he himself will be so frightened by the right/religious coalition he is forming that he will have a change of heart. His meeting last week with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presumably drove home to him the gap between the Obama administration's expectations of Israel concerning the Palestinians and West Bank settlements and outposts and the little Netanyahu would be able to deliver without at least Livni by his side. The news of Iran 's nuclear progress could give Netanyahu the ideal rationale--if he still seeks one--for softening his conditions and bringing Livni and Barak into a centrist coalition. There are responsible figures within Netanyahu's own Likud party who are still calling upon him to change course, even if this means rotation of the premiership. . .

Q. Last week two senior Obama administration envoys visited Damascus , thereby possibly presaging a renewal of Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations under Washington 's aegis. From the Israeli standpoint, what's the strategic rationale behind talking peace with the Assad regime with its mafia-like image and negative regional record?

A. Once again, the primary rationale for both the United States and particularly Israel is the Iranian threat. This explains why the entire Israeli security community combined more than a year ago to urge outgoing PM Ehud Olmert to open a negotiating channel with Syria , and why it will urge Netanyahu--who pointedly emphasizes the Iranian threat as Israel 's main security challenge--to do so as well. In this sense, the visit to Damascus by US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and National Security Council Middle East staffer Daniel Shapiro was welcomed by Israel .

In the view of the Israeli security community, Iran's friends in the Levant region--Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas--constitute a key dimension of Tehran's capacity to deter Israel, or for that matter the US, from attacking its nuclear project or even from interfering it its attempts to expand its regional influence (e.g., in Lebanon, the Gulf or post-withdrawal Iraq) under cover of an over nuclear capability. As matters stand, Israel has to assume that any attack on Iran or its assets (by anyone) would provoke a major missile and rocket barrage against the entire territory of Israel from Iran , Syria , Lebanon and Gaza .

Hamas' rocket potential is limited, especially after the recent war in Gaza . And Iran 's capacity to deliver significant payloads to Israel by medium-range missile is also problematic, particularly in view of Israel 's capacity to intercept incoming medium-range missiles. But Syria has a large arsenal of short-range rockets and missiles, while Hezbollah has reportedly built up an Iran-supplied arsenal of some 40,000 rockets. Between them, Syria and Hezbollah's rockets and missiles could hit any target in Israel . Moreover, Hezbollah's political control over Lebanon has grown since the summer 2006 war and is likely to expand further if it and its allies win national elections this June. Accordingly, Israel already assumes that any new attacks against it by Hezbollah would provoke a war that engulfs all of Lebanon .

In order for Israel to retain freedom of military and diplomatic maneuver vis-a-vis Iran , it seeks to neutralize or at least weaken the deterrent threat posed by Iran 's allies and proxies on Israel 's borders. Both recent (and highly problematic) wars on Israel's borders--against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza this year--must be understood within the context of Israel's drive to prevent encirclement by Iran's allies with their rockets and missiles. This is also the context in which Israel is developing anti-rocket missiles that could eventually be effective against attack by Hezbollah and Hamas.

By far the biggest challenge is Syria , both as a military threat and as Iran 's link to its Hezbollah base in Lebanon and its Hamas ally in Gaza . Obviously, it makes far more sense to neutralize the Syrian challenge diplomatically than militarily. Throughout the decade of the 1990s, a succession of five Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak) engaged in peace negotiations with Syria , all but Shamir with the sincere desire to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for security arrangements and even a cold and problematic peace with Syria . Today the stakes are far higher: removing Syria from the Iranian military orbit and at least to some extent cutting off Hezbollah from its Iranian sources of direct military supply and training.

Incidentally, Hezbollah's rise to power in Lebanon may well mean that the old adage to the effect that peace with Syria will automatically mean peace with Lebanon is no longer true.


Q. Why did Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resign Saturday?

A. Fayyad declared that he wanted to ensure that his tenure as prime minister would not present an obstacle to the Hamas-Fateh unity government talks that resume in Cairo this week. Hamas does not recognize his appointment, made after the Islamist movement's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. But there are additional aspects to the resignation that make it particularly intriguing.

For one, Fayyad and President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) agreed that the resignation would not take effect until a new unity government is formed. The current deadline for crowning the Fateh-Hamas unity negotiations with success is the end of March, when the annual Arab League summit is scheduled to be held in Doha, Qatar . There are widespread efforts afoot in the Arab world to bring about a measure of reconciliation at Doha between two camps that were at loggerheads during the recent Gaza war: the pro-Hamas radicals Syria and Qatar (and non-Arab Iran ) on the one hand and moderates Egypt , Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the other. In this context, the significance of Palestinian unity talks extends far beyond the Israel-Palestine sphere.

And if unity government negotiations do not succeed by month's end or do not succeed at all? Fayyad will almost certainly be asked by Abbas to remain as prime minister in the West Bank .

Then too, the United States and other donor states unabashedly point to Fayyad--who is not a Fateh member and has little political backing--as the one Palestinian politician they trust to administer the billions of dollars designated for Gaza reconstruction. In this sense, Fayyad's resignation is somewhat tongue-in-cheek: he is almost certain to head any new technocrat government mandated by a unity agreement.

Finally, Fayyad's resignation may be an indication that in his and Abbas' estimation, the current unity government negotiations are likely to succeed. This in turn may reflect a readiness on the part of Abbas, whose Fateh movement is in disarray and whose personal status is weak, to make the necessary concessions to Hamas' demands with regard to early elections and other issues.