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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - April 13, 2009

Q. What is behind the growing tension between Egypt and Hezbollah...? Q. Jordan's King Abdullah will be visiting the White House -- what will he want?

Q. Egypt is accusing Hezbollah of planning attacks on targets in Egypt . Hezbollah leader Nasrallah replied last week that the movement he heads was trying to aid beleaguered Palestinians in Gaza . What is behind the growing tension between Egypt and Hezbollah and what are its broader ramifications?

A. Egypt is only now publicizing details of the arrest of 49 Hezbollah suspects last November. It claims a Hezbollah operative, Sami Shehab, entered Egypt under a false identity and set up and trained three teams whose objective was to launch attacks in Cairo and Sinai. A factory for manufacturing prefab parts of rockets for smuggling into Gaza was apparently set up in Sinai. Israel adds that some of the Hezbollah teams' targets in Sinai were Israeli, possibly aimed at revenging the assassination last year of Hezbollah military leader Imad Mughniyeh.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged in a dramatic address last Friday that Hezbollah had indeed infiltrated Egypt, but stated that there were only 20 operatives and their task was limited to "helping the hungry Palestinian brothers in Gaza". Nasrallah added, "I officially admit this crime. This is an accusation through which we get closer to Allah". The Egyptian press seized upon this as an admission of guilt by the Hezbollah leader. An unidentified official Egyptian source told the press that "Nasrallah's confession means that he wants to bring Egypt and the region into his party's political framework in order to achieve Iranian aims". The semi-official Egyptian press proceeded to call Nasrallah "Sheikh Monkey", "Dracula", "Iranian agent" and similar nasty names. But there was little or no comment for attribution from Egyptian officials, with the exception of a declaration by the attorney general that he was considering issuing a warrant for Nasrallah's arrest on charges of terrorism and incitement against Egypt .

The most striking aspect of this confrontation is the contrast between Egypt 's and Nasrallah's way of dealing with it. Egypt delayed publicizing Hezbollah's transgressions on its soil for half a year. When it did, it spoke to the public almost entirely through the media. Nasrallah, in contrast, responded immediately and publicly, with his usual self-assurance and rhetorical skills.

One persuasive explanation for Egypt 's behavior is that it chose the current timing to portray Iran 's designs on the moderate Sunni states in the most graphic terms possible in order to gain leverage over the Obama administration's diplomatic overtures toward Tehran , which concern it. Cairo is also upset that President Barack Obama chose to make Turkey rather than Egypt --once recognized as the undisputed leader of the Arab and even Muslim worlds--the venue for his first official venture into the Muslim world.

Yet Nasrallah's audacious performance from his hiding place in Lebanon and the Egyptian leadership's apparent refusal to confront him openly sent a strong signal as to the nature of the current Middle East dynamic: the radicals are on the offensive while the moderates are on the defensive. The radicals appear to be convinced, however mistakenly, that in seeking contact with them the United States has bowed to their will.

A second key aspect of this affair, one that gives Israel perverse satisfaction, is Egypt 's tacit admission--and Nasrallah's open acknowledgement--that Hezbollah, representing Iran , is indeed actively involved in smuggling weapons into Gaza from Egypt . Nasrallah went so far as to condemn Egypt for energetically closing down smuggling tunnels under the Sinai-Gaza border. Until recently, Egyptian officials brushed off Israeli complaints that Egypt was not doing enough to stop the cross-border smuggling by stating that most weapons were finding their way into Gaza from the sea or were smuggled and sold to Palestinians by wayward Israeli soldiers. One additional development that may have encouraged Egypt to acknowledge its smuggling problem was embarrassment over recent media revelations about Israeli attacks on Iranian arms convoys that were crossing Sudan toward Egypt for delivery to Hamas in Gaza .

In a larger sense, the revelations in Cairo also constituted an admission on Egypt's part that its strategy for dealing with Hamas in Gaza--make sure it remains Israel's problem, not Egypt's--had failed. As long as Iranian/Hezbollah arms shipments for Hamas in Gaza only made life difficult for Israel , Cairo broadly tolerated them. But with Hezbollah threatening Egypt 's own internal security and its arms shipments generating conflict just south of Egypt 's border with Sudan , Egypt clearly had no choice but to act.

Finally, Nasrallah's brazen acknowledgement that his agents were active on Egyptian soil constituted an intriguing electoral gamble. Lebanon goes to the polls in June; Hezbollah and its Christian allies hope to gain a majority in the elections or at least strengthen their minority share (which, according to last year's Doha accord, gives them a veto on crucial issues). Nasrallah obviously believes that his radical interventionist politics will attract votes in Lebanon . If he's right, this will be a worrisome sign for moderates everywhere in the Middle East .

Q. Speaking of moderates, next week one of their leaders, Jordan 's King Abdullah II, will be the first Arab leader to visit the Obama White House. What does Abdullah want from President Barack Obama?

A. Abdullah convened an intriguing meeting of Arab foreign ministers last Saturday in Amman to prepare for his visit and ensure that Obama understands that he represents a broad Arab consensus. The visit itself is in effect a continuation of an Abdullah-Obama conversation that took place in Amman last year when then-candidate Obama visited the region. The two leaders reportedly hit it off; it was then that Obama reportedly told the Jordanian monarch he would be the first Arab leader to visit him.

Abdullah's guests were Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa and the foreign ministers of Egypt , Saudi Arabia , the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon . The foreign minister of Qatar also attended: this might seem surprising given Doha 's recent coziness with the Middle East radical camp, but Qatar has made a virtue in recent years of maintaining an independent and at times maverick foreign policy. The gathering produced a two-page letter to Obama calling on him to pressure the new Netanyahu government to endorse the two-state solution and cease settlement-building, especially in Jerusalem .

The letter also reiterated the Arab commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which offers Israel comprehensive normalization with the entire Arab world in return for peace based on the 1967 borders, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and an agreed solution to the refugee issue. In their earlier meeting, Abdullah called upon Obama to endorse the API; he obviously wants Arab backing when he talks about it with the American president next week. This is particularly significant in view of threats in some Arab quarters, including Damascus and even Qatar , to declare the API null and void unless new peace momentum is generated.

The undeclared but perhaps most important topic on Abdullah's agenda for talks with Obama is Iran . Egypt 's accusations against Hezbollah clearly reflect the moderate Arabs' concern over Iran 's drive for regional hegemony. Jordan is particularly worried lest the prospective US withdrawal from Iraq end up by further enhancing Iran 's regional clout along its borders. The moderate Sunni Arab core may thus seek to present the API to Obama as a vehicle for galvanizing regional security vis-a-vis Iran --but only if Israel can be pressured by the American president on the Palestinian issue.

The broader regional context for the Obama-Abdullah meeting is not encouraging. The Arab world is in disarray, with non-Arab powers--Iran, Turkey, Israel and militant Muslim non-state actors like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban--seemingly far more dynamic and self-confident than the Arab state actors. Indeed, the latter are in disarray, with no fewer than five out of 22 Arab League members ( Iraq , Sudan , Lebanon , Palestine and Somalia , with Yemen teetering) not fully able to rule their own territory.

This, in moderate Arab and Israeli eyes, is the worrisome backdrop to Obama's initiatives to talk to Iran and withdraw from Iraq . This is where, Abdullah will undoubtedly tell the American president, he has to come up with integrated region-wide initiatives that deal with Iran diplomatically while also reassuring the Middle East moderates.