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Hard Questions, Tough Answer with Yossi Alpher - April 16, 2012

Alpher186x140.jpgAlpher discusses the ceasefire in Syria, the "fly-in" of Palestinian supporters to Ben Gurion Airport on Sunday and ensuing commotion, and why Israel and the US can't agree on freeing Jonathan Pollard.

Q. The ceasefire in Syria that was negotiated by Kofi Annan appears to be partial at best and extremely tenuous. What's your prognosis?

A. The sooner the United Nations introduces observers into Syria (the first six were scheduled to arrive on Sunday), the better the chances that some sort of ceasefire can be said to exist. The current situation, in which casualties appear to have been reduced by about two-thirds but not eliminated, is clearly favoring the regime.

It is conceivable that both sides, the Assad regime and the opposition, see an advantage in acquiescing to a semi-ceasefire. International pressure, including by otherwise-supportive Russia, confronts President Bashar Assad with a broad consensus at the United Nations Security Council that he may not be able to ignore. As for the opposition, the regime's recent successes in battling it and taking back at least partial control over key cities and towns may give it pause. Yet a newly evolved status quo in which only 20 or 30 people are killed every day in Syria (some 1,100 have died since Annan proposed his ceasefire plan) while Assad claims to have bowed to international demands,  clearly serves the latter's interests.

Further, nothing is likely to prevent the 250 or so UN observers envisioned by the Security Council from eventually departing in frustration with regime restrictions, as did their predecessors from the Arab League a few months ago. Assad and his supporters appear to believe this would work in their favor because time is on their side and eventually the rest of the region and the world will back off and leave them alone.

Moreover a ceasefire, however tenuous, is the easy part of the Annan plan. It appears highly unlikely that the Assad regime will agree to open the serious dialogue with the opposition that most of the Arab world will seek in accordance with the Annan demands. After all, real democratic reform would lead to the removal of the minority Alawite regime and would likely endanger not just the Assad clique but Syria's two million Alawites as well. Additional Syrian minorities, like the Christians, Druze and some Kurds, also see their well-being as tied to that of the Alawites and fear that, as elsewhere in the Arab world, democratic reform would bring to power Islamist elements who they perceive to be hostile toward minorities. In short, to the extent the next phase in Syria, under Annan's plan, involves compromise, Assad will balk: for him and the Alawites, the current reality is a zero-sum game wherein genuine compromise is impossible.

Meanwhile, the Sunni Arab world led by the Saudis and Qataris is gearing up to support the Syrian opposition with funds and possibly weaponry--a dynamic that runs completely counter in the long term to ceasefire efforts. On the other hand, insofar as the international community, meaning the Security Council, has finally agreed to a plan for pacifying Syria and has begun to introduce its observers, this is a precedent that sets the stage for more escalated international intervention and involvement somewhere down the line, once it becomes clear that the current ceasefire has failed to resolve the Syrian revolution.

 
Q. A "fly-in" of Palestinian supporters to Ben Gurion Airport on Sunday ended with only around 40 pro-Palestinian activists actually arriving or being allowed to enter, but Israel getting another international black eye. Why the commotion?

A. Once again, as with the Mavi Marmari flotilla in May 2010, Israel sought to deal with an essentially political protest primarily by means of force--in this case, exercised mainly by the Israel Police, whose presence at Ben Gurion airport outnumbered arriving protesters by about ten to one. To be sure, there were among the protesters--those who arrived and those several hundred who were turned back by European airlines complying with Israeli demands--militants who deny Israel's right to exist and have no compunctions about the way they protest. Any country has the right to refuse them entry.

But there were also apparently a large number of peaceful supporters of a two-state solution who sought merely to attend a ceremony in Bethlehem. The message to them was that the occupation, by denying them access to Bethlehem, has something to hide. And there were dozens if not hundreds of completely innocent travelers refused entry to Israel on Sunday who were simply misidentified by overzealous security officials.

The overall impression of paranoia and overkill (Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon: "Thousands of anarchists were intent on a de-legitimization campaign. . . . We prevented violence, bad publicity and provocations") was reinforced by the letter handed to arriving protestors (along with flowers and mineral water) before their deportation. It suggested they begin by protesting violations of human rights in Syria and Darfur before leveling accusations at democratic Israel with its free press and thriving civil society.

On the face of it, this is a perfectly logical and accurate message. The flowers and water were a nice touch. The whole thing might have evinced a degree of credibility were the Netanyahu government to be actively pursuing a two-state solution instead of proliferating settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and were the Netanyahu coalition not energetically seeking ways to persecute Israeli human rights campaigners and their financial backers.

 
Q. Why can't Israel and the US agree on freeing Jonathan Pollard?

A. The issue of Pollard's release has resurfaced in connection with the Obama administration's intention of awarding the US Medal of Freedom to Israeli President Shimon Peres in June. Supporters of Pollard's release see this as an opportunity for Israel to secure a presidential pardon for the convicted spy, who has been in jail in the United States for 26 years. The administration has indicated that it has no intention to free Pollard.

The case for Pollard's release is compelling. He has been incarcerated longer for spying for Israel than Americans convicted of spying for less friendly countries like China and even of endangering American lives. He is ill. Petitions asking for his release on humanitarian grounds have been signed by the likes of Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, not to mention leaders of the American Jewish reform movement and, lately, Noam Shalit, father of Gilad who was recently ransomed from imprisonment in Gaza. Every Israeli prime minister since Yitzhak Rabin has sought Pollard's release, often as a US presidential gesture on the occasion of progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.

One factor compromising the integrity of many of the appeals for Pollard's release is that in Israel his cause has been taken up primarily by the hard right, some of whose positions Pollard has endorsed and which is, accordingly, likely to exploit a released Pollard (now an Israeli citizen) for political purposes. Another is the embarrassment of the Israeli intelligence community over the entire Pollard affair and its concern to maintain close collaborative relations with its US counterpart: no former heads of Israeli intelligence agencies have joined the appeals for Pollard's release, which is understood to be opposed by many in the American intelligence community and particularly by the Justice Department.

This in turn points to American Jewish fears over "dual loyalty" accusations as a factor limiting American Jewish readiness to become involved in the "free Pollard" campaign. But it points to another issue as well: at a time when a growing body of opinion in the United States sees the Netanyahu government in Israel and its neo-conservative supporters in America as factors in pushing US military involvement against Iran and avoiding a meaningful peace process aimed at producing a two-state solution, the Pollard issue inevitably gets wrapped up among some American security circles in accusations of gratuitous exploitation and even betrayal by Israel.

That the CIA's lack of confidence in Israeli intelligence-sharing has led it for years to gather its own intelligence on Israel, including by recruiting Israelis, while Israel is honor bound not to "reciprocate", is well known. That the FBI has been trying for several years to recruit Israeli intelligence sources is less well known. Then there is the wave of recent leaks by certain anonymous American intelligence veterans alleging breaches by Israel of its obligations as an ally of the US. The stories are largely apocryphal and even malicious, but they resonate in the very circles that insist on keeping Pollard in jail: that the Mossad masqueraded as CIA agents in a false flag operation recruiting Baluchi operatives against Iran; that Israel is developing airbases in Azerbaijan to attack Iran; etc.

Jonathan Pollard as a spy was no angel: he tried to sell classified US Naval Intelligence to other countries besides Israel; he took money for his services to Israel. To the best of my knowledge, Israel learned the lesson of the Pollard affair and since then has consistently avoided involvement in operations that in any way infringe on American intelligence sovereignty. It would be nice to believe that Pollard will soon be released and the resentments that nurture his ongoing incarceration dissipated. But it does not appear likely.