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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher- September 20, 2010

Q. PM Binyamin Netanyahu has placed the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state at the center of his negotiating position. What are the ramifications of this demand for the future of negotiations?

Q. US peace envoy George Mitchell went straight to Damascus from the Sharm al-Sheikh and Jerusalem talks of Sept. 14-15 between Israelis and Palestinians, amidst rumors that a major effort would now be made to renew Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Why now?


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Q. PM Binyamin Netanyahu has placed the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state at the center of his negotiating position. What are the ramifications of this demand for the future of negotiations?

A. Netanyahu first broached the "Jewish state" demand in his Bar Ilan speech of June 2009. He has since clarified that this is a condition for ending the conflict--not a precondition for opening negotiations. This is an important distinction, because it poses recognition of a Jewish state, which it is safe to assume the PLO under Mahmoud Abbas will not agree to, alongside core Palestinian demands for ending the conflict that are likely to remain unacceptable to virtually any Israeli government: acceptance of the right of return of 1948 refugees and full Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

There are a number of alternative formulations for the Jewish state demand, such as state of the Jewish people, Jewish national homeland, nation-state for the Jewish people, etc. The politicians using these terms do not usually appear aware of the fine distinctions, in political science terms, among them. One way or another, the Israeli prime minister is trying to introduce an additional core issue to final status negotiations, one not mentioned in the Oslo accords of 1993, which stipulated that borders and settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and security would constitute the agenda.

One generous interpretation of Netanyahu's Jewish state demand is that, by creating a certain symmetry of core demands, he could actually make it easier to end the conflict. Rather than Israel confronting unacceptable Palestinian demands, both sides will ostensibly be more able to climb down from their extreme positions.

Another, less complimentary tactical explanation is that Netanyahu simply wants to ensure the failure of the talks by introducing an unacceptable Israeli position--a "deal breaker"--selling it to a willing Israeli public, getting qualified American support for it and digging in on it even before negotiations begin in earnest. After all, Israel never asked Egypt or Jordan to recognize it as a Jewish state, nor should any self-respecting country need to ask its neighbors to recognize its ethnic or national identity. (FM Avigdor Lieberman complicated matters further on Sunday by stating that Palestinian rejection of the "Jewish state" would require "disloyal" Arab citizens of Israel to become Palestinian citizens.)

Both these tactical explanations ignore the strategic underpinnings of the Jewish state demand. These, I would argue, can be found in the history of Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations over the past decade.

At Camp David in July 2000, the Israeli delegation led by PM Ehud Barak presented a "Jewish state" position, but made little fuss over it. After all, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 1947, which created the State of Israel, called for the establishment of "Arab and Jewish states" in Mandatory Palestine, and Israel incorporated the term "Jewish state" in its declaration of independence. Hence it was logical that the subject would come up in negotiations over the establishment of the Arab state mentioned in 181. The PLO, incidentally, accepted 181 more than 20 years ago.

More relevant to the evolution of Israeli thinking at Camp David was the Israeli reaction to Palestinian positions stated there and thereafter. On the most sensitive Jerusalem issue, the Temple Mount, the Israeli negotiators confronted statements by Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas to the effect that "there never was a [Jewish] temple on the Temple Mount". This assertion constituted a 180 degree reversal of traditional Islamic historiography, which was proud to place the Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock on the ruins of the First and Second Temples, thereby reflecting the Muslim claim that Islam superseded Judaism. Whether or not this is what the PLO leadership intended, the Palestinian position presented at Camp David was understood by the Israelis as a sweeping Palestinian rejection of the Jewish people's historic ties to the Holy Land.

On the refugee issue, the Israelis at Camp David confronted a Palestinian readiness to compromise on the number of 1948 refugees returning, but an insistence that Israel award Palestinians the psychological satisfaction of recognizing the "principle" that all 1948 refugees and their descendants enjoy the right of return. This, in turn, was understood by the Israelis as Palestinian insistence that the terms of a peace treaty record that the State of Israel was in effect "born in sin". If all refugees have the right to return, this is because their expulsion was illegal and a crime against humanity. Future generations of Palestinians would be educated accordingly--hardly a constructive way to "end the conflict".

Arguably, these two issues could still be renegotiated constructively. The Geneva Accords of 2003 and even the Clinton parameters of late 2000 might point the way toward successful compromises. But the skeptics found yet further grounds for their doubts in the abortive Olmert-Abbas negotiations of 2008. According to Abbas' own testimony in a May 2009 Washington Post interview, Olmert made a far-reaching offer for shared five-nation consortium control (with a majority of three Muslim Arab states) over the Temple Mount and even "accepted" the right of return. Yet Abbas turned down Olmert's offer.

I would argue that Netanyahu's insistence of recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in some ways constitutes an understandable reaction to the Palestinian positions reflected in the failure of negotiations in 2000 and again in 2008. (It also in some ways reflects Israel's ongoing search for a Middle East identity--a topic worthy of separate treatment.) Yet at the tactical level, Netanyahu's brandishing of this demand so provocatively and long before negotiations have even begun to approach a conclusion, has generated little Arab understanding and much Arab negativism about the negotiations.

Here, typically, is what Jordanian commentator Urayb ar-Rintawi had to say about the Israeli demand on Sept. 16: "Having been established over six decades ago based on the banishment of the Palestinians and their expulsion from history, Israel wants to expel us from 'history' today once more: From the contemporary and old history of Palestine. It wants us to willingly and happily adopt the historical Zionist narrative. It wants us to recognize the 'Law of Return' that transforms Palestine into a 'reserve homeland' for every Jewish person or possible Jewish project in the world, after we drop 'the right of return' for six million refugees scattered in Palestine and the Arab world."

Add to this that Arab Islam in general does not recognize Jews as a people, only a religion, and you have here a fairly accurate explanation of why Palestinians reject the "Jewish state". Yet even this quote implies that the introduction of the demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state might conceivably facilitate some sort of tradeoff concerning the right of return issue.


Q. US peace envoy George Mitchell went straight to Damascus from the Sharm al-Sheikh and Jerusalem talks of Sept. 14-15 between Israelis and Palestinians, amidst rumors that a major effort would now be made to renew Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Why now?

A. The past week has indeed witnessed a flurry of activity pointing toward renewed negotiations. Before meeting with Mitchell and Fred Hof, his aide specializing in Syria-Israel, Syrian President Bashar Assad called for both Turkey and France to mediate between Syria and Israel. The Turkish foreign minister expressed a willingness to try again. And a Kuwaiti paper, al-Jarida, alleged on September 15 that Assad and Netanyahu had been exchanging messages via an American mediator and that Netanyahu believes it possible to reach a framework agreement within a year, to be implemented over a period of 10-15 years. The importance of the al-Jarida item probably lies less in its speculative substance than in the inference that some sort of indirect contacts between Israel and Syria are already taking place.

Assad has been calling for renewed peace talks for some five years now. They were renewed briefly and indirectly with Turkish mediation in 2008. Mitchell and Hof have been working on this file for a year and a half, but at a low profile compared with their efforts on the Palestinian track. Last May, I was told by several sources in the State Department that the main obstacle to progress was the refusal of Netanyahu and his close coalition associates from the political right to commit to negotiations with Syria.

Apparently, the advent of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has triggered some sort of new momentum on the Israel-Syria track. The simplest explanation is that the US, encouraged by its success with Israel and Palestine, is simply redoubling its efforts with Israel and Syria. Conceivably, too, the US, Israel and the PLO all want to commit Damascus now to negotiations so that it cannot or will not sabotage the Israeli-Palestinian track, since Iran and Palestinian opponents of the process (Hamas, left-wing Palestinian groups) are Syria's friends. Perhaps, too, Netanyahu has changed his mind because he wants to follow the lead of prime ministers Rabin, Peres and Barak and hold negotiations simultaneously on two fronts in the hope of playing one off against the other, ostensibly thereby improving Israel's tactical negotiating position vis-a-vis both.

It's a bit early to speculate. After all, official Israeli-Syrian negotiations have not yet been reconvened. Indeed, Syrian officials played down Mitchell's visit, insisting it was devoted to briefing Damascus regarding the Israeli-Palestinian track and asking it not to interfere.