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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - January 3rd, 2012

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Alpher offers a limited year-in-review for 2011, and discusses the recent developments on the Palestinian scene and whether Arab League observers in Syria will make any difference there.

Q. Will you join the ranks of those summing up 2011 and predicting the course of events in the Middle East in 2012?

A. On a most limited basis. Precisely because we can sum up 2011 as having been characterized by a revolutionary situation throughout most of the Arab Middle East, we have to hedge our bets regarding 2012. After all, the revolutionary situation continues, meaning that it is virtually impossible to predict what is going to happen.

Cautiously, we can observe that political Islam is being empowered in Arab countries and that this process will probably continue. In one form or another, this is likely to affect the Palestinians as well. We can assume that the Netanyahu government's passive approach to events in the Arab neighborhood will also continue. Between Netanyahu's "keep your powder dry" attitude, Palestinian despair with the peace process, both sides' unwillingness to negotiate seriously, and the Obama administration's avoidance of any risk that might affect November's elections, there will be little or no peace process in 2012.

Violence? It could erupt on any of several fronts: Gaza-Israel, Lebanon/Syria-Israel, and Iran-Israel, all of them together or none at all.

The year 2011 was also characterized by growing right-wing reaction in Israel against peace-oriented and civil rights groups, and grass roots reaction against social injustice and religious extremism. Both trends will continue in 2012, though whether and how they interact will probably only become evident if elections are held--a possibility but not a certainty. PM Binyamin Netanyahu's skill at political maneuvering will likely continue to dominate Israeli politics.

Columnist Ari Shavit summed it all up nicely in Haaretz: "This was an amazing year. It began with an Arab spring, continued with an Israeli summer, and ended in a fanatic winter. . . In 11 months we went from hope for a French revolution in the Middle East, to hope for a social democratic revolution in Israel, to despair."

If, nevertheless, you are looking for a ray of light from Israel in 2012, the electric car revolution spearheaded by the Israeli start-up "Better Place" can provide it. In the coming year, Israel (followed closely by Denmark) will be the proving ground for the introduction of widespread electric motorized transportation based on replaceable batteries.

Q. The PLO appears to be softening its conditions for renewing negotiations, to the extent that an Israeli-Palestinian planning meeting is scheduled for this week in Amman. Meanwhile, Hamas is softening its conditions for reconciliation with Fateh. How do you assess these developments in terms of Israel's interests?

A. The past week provided a fascinating set of developments on the Palestinian scene. All are in a preliminary stage. All bear watching.

The PLO leadership apparently submitted a proposal to renew peace talks with Israel if Jerusalem would release, as a good will gesture, 100 prisoners who have been incarcerated since before the Oslo era. In so doing, the PLO appeared to be dropping its long-standing demand that Israel first cease all settlement construction. The new proposal made no mention of another constant Palestinian demand: that Israel agree in advance to a solution based on the 1967 lines. On the other hand, on Monday chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat reiterated both conditions, effectively indicating that any talks held now would qualify as preliminary contacts rather than actual negotiations.

The Netanyahu government, for its part, reportedly rejected the new Palestinian position and reiterated that it insists on renewing talks without any preconditions. Israel just released more than 500 additional prisoners, many of them Fateh-oriented, to complete its part in the Gilad Shalit swap. Netanyahu also apparently requested that the PLO commit to full-fledged high-level talks and not mere planning meetings. Nevertheless, both sides did agree to such a planning meeting, to be held between negotiators Erekat and Yitzhak Molcho in Amman on Tuesday of this week. Neither wanted to be accused by host King Abdullah II of spurning his invitation.

Both sides are maneuvering with the Quartet's January 26 deadline in mind. The Quartet has asked both to submit their positions regarding borders and security by then. Netanyahu refuses, insisting on presenting his position only in direct talks. The PLO, which has submitted its position, is anxious to avoid a situation in which the Quartet nevertheless blames it in addition to Israel. Hence the softening of Palestinian conditions, and this week's meeting.

Yet the meeting is not likely to constitute any sort of breakthrough. Both sides understand full well that there is virtually no chance of real peace talks moving forward in the months ahead--even if by some miracle they do convene. In any case, the Netanyahu coalition as constituted remains totally antithetical to a negotiated two-state solution, while the PLO is planning a new diplomatic campaign after January 26 to generate international pressure on Israel.

This explains at least part of the backdrop to the latest Hamas gestures, offered within the framework of Palestinian unity and reconciliation talks. It is in those talks, and not the peace process, where a new dynamic may indeed be emerging. Last week, Damascus-based Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal reportedly instructed the group's military wing to cease attacks on Israel. This corresponded with Mishaal's apparent acceptance of the PLO demand that Hamas commit from herein to adopt non-violent resistance tactics. It perhaps also reflected greater leadership confidence, based on recent opinion polling that indicates an upswing in Palestinian public trust in Hamas following the Shalit prisoner exchange deal.

Like the PLO negotiating ploy, there is plenty of ambiguity in the new Hamas move. Mishaal did not swear off armed resistance--just agreed to freeze it. His commitment has not stopped more militant Palestinian groups based in Gaza from firing rockets into Israel and planning attacks on Israel from Sinai. Hamas could presumably shut down these groups if it is determined to do so.

Nor is it entirely clear how the Gaza-based Hamas military leadership under Ahmed Jaabari, or even the Gazan political leadership, views the new directive from Damascus. Mishaal and the Damascus-based leadership are apparently in the process of moving their base from Damascus to Cairo and/or Qatar and are anxious to close ranks with the Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood--which has no military wing at all--and distance themselves from Syria's beleaguered ruler, Bashar Assad, and his ally, Iran. Some in Hamas are beginning to ask why the Damascus-based leadership does not simply move to Gaza now that the Egypt-Gaza border is open.

Despite all these constraints and reservations, the Mishaal statement should be seen as good news by Israel. Instead, it stands in marked contrast to a statement made last week by IDF Chief of Staff Beni Gantz, to the effect that "cracks have emerged" in the deterrence achieved by Israel's Operation Cast Lead exactly three years ago and another major Israeli military operation in Gaza "is not a matter of choice for Israel". This was not exactly a commitment to reinvade Gaza, but to most Middle East ears it came close, at a time when Hamas is clearly undertaking steps, however hesitant, toward revising its approach to Israel in order to improve its chances of reconciliation with Fateh and coexistence with Israel.

Q. Will the introduction of Arab League observers in Syria reduce the widespread carnage there or help usher out the Assad regime?

A. Almost certainly neither. President Bashar Assad appears to be successfully manipulating the observer presence, which is scheduled to last a month, in order to extend and expand the relative freedom of maneuver the Arab League and international community have given his regime to suppress the revolution.

The observers' movements are carefully controlled by Syrian intelligence, which steers the observers clear of atrocities. The observers' leader, a Sudanese general who himself has a record of human rights violations in Sudan, sounded an alarm in concerned Arab circles when he reported from the besieged city of Homs that he had not seen anything out of the ordinary. This and additional evidence has already led one Arab League advisory body to demand the observer mission be recalled.

Meanwhile, even as the two major Syrian opposition groups have finally proven capable of coordinating their strategies, there appears to be little or no likelihood of any international intervention beyond the problematic observer mission. Unlike Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, who was thoroughly isolated regionally and internationally when NATO confronted him, Assad enjoys the ongoing support of Iran and Russia and the friendly neutrality of the Shiite-dominated regime in neighboring Iraq. Turkey, which also shares a border with Syria and supports the Syrian opposition, is nevertheless carefully avoiding the involvement of its own military.

This Arab revolution could conceivably end differently from the others.