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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher: July 29, 2013

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This week, Alpher discusses Netanyahu's motives for agreeing to release terrorists from Israeli jails as an entry ticket to two-state solution negotiations in Washington, why Netanyahu agreed to release terrorist murderers rather than accept what appear to be alternative Palestinian preconditions: the 1967 lines or a settlement freeze, what the first substantial area of disagreement will be about, how significant is it that the European Union "balanced" its directives regarding settlements by declaring the Hezbollah military wing a terrorist organization, whether Washington is justified in refusing to view the army takeover as a coup that requires cutting off aid and Israel's election of two chief rabbis.

Q. How do you understand Netanyahu's motives for agreeing to release terrorists from Israeli jails as an entry ticket to two-state solution negotiations in Washington?

A. PM Netanyahu is an extremely skilful politician who regularly either conceals his real intentions or acts (successfully from his standpoint) on the basis of very short-term considerations in the absence of any more lasting values. So answering this question is an exercise in speculation based essentially on years of Netanyahu-watching.

For one, he appears genuinely to fear Israel's international isolation, as evidenced in phenomena ranging from a global "BDS" boycott campaign to the European Union's exquisitely-timed decisions regarding the settlements two weeks ago. He presumably recognizes that the EU moves were coordinated with US Secretary of State John Kerry in a kind of "good guy, bad guy" division of labor that can be repeated in future if Kerry needs pressure to be applied to Israel. Netanyahu understands that agreeing to renewed peace talks and releasing prisoners buys Israel at least a temporarily improved image. Whether he is calculating that only a genuine two-state solution will stop the erosion in Israel's international status is questionable. As the late Yosef Burg, a moderate national religious minister in his day, used to stay, he'll "double-cross that bridge when he gets to it."

Netanyahu has let it be known in recent months that he is aware of the demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state that is posed by ongoing occupation of the West Bank. Has he joined a long list of right-revisionist politicians who wake up after years to the damage they have been doing? How resolute is he in this new recognition of the demographic threat? How far will he offer concessions in order to find a solution?

Or is he just playing for time, hoping the Palestinians will pull the chestnuts out of the fire and torpedo the negotiations in a way that causes Washington to exonerate Netanyahu and leave him with his pro-settler coalition and his settlements? Certainly, his demand to strengthen the referendum option regarding Israeli concessions in Jerusalem is understood as a sop to coalition extremists: they can stay in the coalition at least until and unless agreement is reached, while reassuring themselves and their constituents that it is the people, not the coalition, who will decide.

If Netanyahu is truly intent on reaching a two-state agreement, why not just ditch the Jewish Home party now, bring in Labor, and radically improve his negotiating flexibility and his credibility in Palestinian and international eyes (and in the eyes of skeptics like me)? Or does the referendum initiative really mean that an Israeli government--any Israeli government--is no longer capable of ending the occupation on its own?

Q. Why did Netanyahu end up agreeing to release terrorist murderers rather than accept what appear to be alternative Palestinian preconditions: the 1967 lines or a settlement freeze?

A. Considering how agonizing Sunday's Cabinet decision regarding release of "pre-Oslo" terrorists was for many ministers and the public at-large, this is a valid question that contributes to our understanding of Netanyahu's possible motives.

Of course, it's possible that the "choice" was dictated to him by the Palestinian side: "we'll back off on the 1967 lines and a settlement freeze, but not on prisoners." That makes sense, because a prisoner release, even if divided into four bi-monthly mini-releases, is finite and final, whereas a settlement freeze can be thawed overnight and negotiations ostensibly based on the 1967 lines can fail. Besides, US Secretary of State John Kerry appears to have offered the Palestinians American assurances concerning the 1967 borders and settlement expansion that ostensibly satisfy them.

But the prisoner-release option makes a kind of sense for Netanyahu, too. He can turn periodic prisoner releases into a negotiating "carrot": if negotiations flag or no new progress is registered, he can delay or cancel release no. 2, 3, or 4. In contrast, accepting the 1967 lines as the point of departure for border negotiations commits Netanyahu to a major concession with lasting consequences. And as to a settlement freeze, it appears that some months ago Netanyahu agreed to put construction in East Jerusalem on hold and lower the profile of construction in the West Bank.

How long he can commit his pro-settler coalition to this informal semi-freeze is an open question. Certainly, he can be expected to violate it occasionally, either as a sop to the settlers or in response to a Palestinian provocation. And if he wants to "challenge" the Palestinians from the outset, he can launch his own new settlement provocation in Jerusalem any day now.

Q. So talks begin formally in Washington on Monday. What will the first crisis of substance be about?

A. Knowing the positions of the two sides, and assuming they both accept Kerry's request that they begin by discussing borders and security, three immediate areas of disagreement come to mind.

The first issue area concerns the question whether the two sides discuss borders first, as the Palestinians want, or security first, as Netanyahu insists? Ostensibly, they can discuss the two issues simultaneously. But each side will have its priority and this will breed tension.

Second, regarding borders, the Palestinians can be expected to reiterate their demand that the 1967 lines constitute the point of departure for negotiations. They will cite the 2000 Camp David talks and the 2008 negotiations, in which current Israeli chief negotiator Tzipi Livni was involved, as confirmation and binding precedent for this approach. Netanyahu will look for a way to bypass this issue.

Third, Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital. Netanyahu has thus far rejected the very idea of discussing any territorial concession whatsoever in East Jerusalem to make room for a Palestinian capital. If he insists on keeping it off the agenda, or launches new construction of Jewish neighborhoods there, the talks could collapse.

Q. The European Union "balanced" its directives regarding settlements by declaring the Hezbollah military wing a terrorist organization. How significant is this?

A. Hezbollah is not divided in any formal or organizational way into terrorist and political wings, so this will be a problematic decision to enforce. Obviously, because Hezbollah is represented in the Lebanese parliament and in Lebanese governments, a more precise and logical decision to criminalize the entire organization would have had far-reaching destabilizing consequences for European relations with Lebanon itself; hence the compromise decision in Brussels.

The timing of the EU decision presumably does have something to do with balance vis-a-vis Israel and the settlements decisions. But it also reflects a convincing body of evidence that Hezbollah has engaged in planning terrorism against Israelis in Cyprus and perpetrated an actual bloody act of terrorism against Israelis in Bulgaria--both EU member states. Hezbollah's decision a few months ago to join the fighting in Syria on the side of Iran and the Assad regime presumably also contributed to the decision.

But the significance of the EU move goes beyond Hezbollah. The month of July witnessed a dramatic series of additional setbacks for extremist Arab Islam in general. The Muslim Brotherhood was swept from power in Egypt by the army, which is now in the process of criminalizing the Brethren and their leaders. Hamas in Gaza has been identified by the Egyptian army as having collaborated with the Brotherhood and with Salafi terrorists in Sinai; hence Gaza is under siege along its Egyptian border, Gazan fishermen have been banned from Egyptian waters, and the Strip faces a serious political and economic dilemma. Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has discredited it politically in Lebanon and catalyzed extremist Sunni opposition there. And in Tunisia the secular opposition, enraged by assassinations of two of its leaders, has adopted an aggressive attitude toward Ennahda, the Tunisian version of the Brotherhood, which shares power with secular parties.

Q. Speaking of events in Egypt, is Washington justified in refusing to view the army takeover as a coup that requires cutting off aid?

A. If you address this in terms of "does it look like a coup, walk like a coup, etc.", then you may have to define it as a coup and cut aid. The Obama administration is obviously hard put to define what happened in Cairo a month ago as an event that still allows it to continue funneling financial aid to Egypt and, on a broader level, enables it to maintain even a minor degree of influence over events in this all-important country.

Here is an alternative way of addressing the events in Egypt since January 2011 that could get the administration off the hook. Those events can and should be described as a revolutionary continuum that is still in progress. A military coup a month ago? In fact, there have been two army takeovers, several abortive elections, a "coup" by a Muslim Brotherhood president usurping judicial and constitutional powers, various attempts at constitutional and judicial change, etc. So there have in fact been a number of coups or attempted coups by diverse Egyptian actors, and there will probably be more. But there is one ongoing revolutionary continuum that fully justifies Washington staying in the game.

Q. Last week Israel elected two chief rabbis, Ashkenazi and Sephardic. Any comments?

A. The chief rabbinate is almost certainly the most backward and corrupt institution in the country. It perpetuates the ethnic divide between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, while the rest of the country is intermarrying. It forbids women to run for office. It keeps out the Conservative and Reform movements and even the National Orthodox who together, far and away, represent most Jews in the world. Now it has gone and elected two sons of former chief rabbis, Yitzhak Yosef and David Lau. Nepotism.

The late distinguished ultra-orthodox philosopher and scholar Yishayahu Leibowitz once famously called the chief rabbinate "the country's mistress". Today that designation sounds too nice. There will always be mistresses here and there. The institution of the chief rabbinate in Israel, which was originally created by British Mandatory authorities, not Yishuv or Israeli leaders, should be abolished.