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Needed: A Rational Approach to Iran

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APN today released new policy language to address the changing political situation in Iran.

March 2010

An Iran armed with nuclear weapons represents an alarming scenario that neither the U.S. nor Israel, nor for that matter, the world, can afford to ignore, and one that the U.S. and the international community should be exerting all efforts to avoid. 

A nuclear-armed Iran represents an existential threat to Israel and is likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in the region. An unchecked Iran will likely continue to use support for terrorist groups to destabilize the region and threaten Israel and other vital U.S. interests, including in Iraq and Lebanon, and countering these activities will become more complicated and dangerous. Moreover, in the absence of an effective international strategy to deal with Iran, domestic pressure for Israel to take matters into its own hands will continue to grow.

A Rational US Policy
 
APN supports a US policy that deals soberly and rationally with the very serious challenges posed by Iran - a policy driven by clearly-understood and clearly-articulated goals that reflect vital US national security interests.  With respect to Iran, the goals of such a policy should be to induce the Iranian regime to:
 
  • abandon any pursuit of nuclear weapons and accept stringent international oversight of its nuclear energy program.
  • cease its support for terrorist groups in the Middle East and beyond.
  • cease activities that undermine - and ideally cooperate with - US efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
  • cease belligerent rhetoric about and aimed at Israel.
  • respect international norms of human rights and civil liberties inside Iran.
 
Achieving these goals requires a wise combination of engagement and multilateral pressure.  Such a policy must, by definition, be flexible and nimble, given the ongoing political turmoil in Iran and the imperative for coordinated and cooperative international efforts. 
 
Sanctions
 
A rational US policy is one that recognizes that smart, targeted sanctions can be a powerful tool for putting pressure on Iran, as part of a broader strategy that in a meaningful way uses both engagement and pressure - bilateral and multilateral - to induce Iran to alter its behavior.  To the extent that such sanctions make sense, they must target the Iranian regime, its security organs and its nuclear program.
 
Imposing "crippling" sanctions - sanctions that deliberately inflict suffering on the Iranian people by cutting off their access to fuel and paralyzing their economic life - is not rational.  Causing misery to the Iranian people in an effort to compel them to put pressure on their government is morally and ethically perilous, and the efficacy of such an approach is dubious.  It is far-fetched to think that a taxi driver who runs out of gas in the middle of Teheran will pound the steering wheel and curse the Iranian regime for his plight (and be moved to take action against it) - rather than curse the US and the international community.
 
Examples of cases where such sanctions have deliberately caused tremendous civilian suffering but failed to force a change in government policy include Iraq, Cuba, Gaza, Haiti and, in fact, Iran itself, where decades of US and international sanctions did little to weaken the Iranian regime in the eyes of its people.  The present leadership's loss of legitimacy stems not from frustration over the impacts of international sanctions, but from popular outrage over the regime's efforts to manipulate and subvert the domestic political process.  Indeed, under current circumstances there is a very real risk that the proposed "crippling" sanctions could spark a broad nationalist backlash, furnishing the government with a populist point around which to mobilize support, at the expense of the opposition.
 
For any new sanctions on Iran to be meaningful and potentially effective, the US needs strong international cooperation - something that will be directly undermined by the imposition of the proposed "crippling" US sanctions. 
 
Iran is not South Africa.  The unambiguous rationale for crippling economic sanctions against South Africa was to promote the interests and rights of disenfranchised black South Africans, who were already suffering from systematic and institutionalized discrimination at the hands of the Apartheid regime.  These sanctions had clear moral legitimacy in the eyes of South African anti-Apartheid activists and in the eyes of the world.  In contrast, both the justification for and the goal of "crippling sanctions" is the promotion of US foreign policy and national security goals, not support for the rights and interests of the Iranian people.  Such sanctions will not have the moral legitimacy that sanctions had in the South Africa context, and cannot be expected to have the same impact.
 
The US should also be moving quickly to impose sanctions on those people or companies that provide the Iranian regime with the technology necessary to censor and block internet access and other forms of electronic communications among Iranians and between Iranians and the outside world.  Such sanctions would signal real support for the Iranian people and could have a quick, significant impact.
 
Engagement
 
A rational US policy will couple smart pressure with determined, nimble engagement that reflects well-defined priorities and goals, consistent with vital US national security interests
 
Iran's Nuclear Program:  The key goal of US policy regarding Iran's nuclear program - reflecting US national security interests - is ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.  It is imperative that the US not allow itself to be distracted by other less urgent and less achievable demands.  US efforts should be clearly and resolutely focused on inducing Iran - through pressure and engagement - to agree to the proposed nuclear fuel swap and to accept and cooperate with greatly enhanced international oversight and monitoring of its nuclear program.
 
Support for Terrorism:  The US should work closely with allies inside and outside the region, in particular those countries that maintain strong ties with Iran, to convince Iran to cease support for terrorist and extremist groups.  There should be clear international consensus and a clear message, including from parties that Iran views as "friends," that the world has no patience with or tolerance for such reckless, destabilizing activities.
 
Iraq and Afghanistan: At present Iran's role in Afghanistan and Iraq is generally viewed as negative or, at best, potentially negative.  This need not be the case:  Iran and the US have a shared interest in seeing a stable Iraq and a stable Afghanistan, and Iran has levers of influence in both countries that the US does not.  The US should look for opportunities to engage Iran on both Afghanistan and Iraq - bilaterally or multilaterally - building on this confluence of interests. In doing so, the US has the opportunity to not only improve the situation on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to build some confidence and credibility in the US-Iran engagement effort - confidence and credibility that could bolster efforts to promote the other key national security goals on the US agenda with Iran.

Anti-Israel belligerence: Tensions in the region are high, in no small part due to concerns over Iran's nuclear program and Iran's belligerent statements aimed at Israel.  The US should make clear, and press other countries to make clear, that Iranian expressions of anti-Israel belligerence directly discredit the notion that Iran is serious about diplomatic engagement with the world or peacefully resolving the full range of issues on the Iran-US agenda.  Such rhetoric reflects an antiquated world-view and a kind of irresponsible populism that would be ridiculous if it were not so dangerous.  Similarly, the US should make clear that while the US understands Israel's right to signal its own military capabilities, both pre-emptive and second-strike, Israeli counter-threats and belligerent statements can unnecessarily and unhelpfully up the ante and increase tensions.
 
Human Rights and Civil Liberties:  Promoting human rights and civil liberties in Iran should be a core component of US engagement with Iran, including carefully calibrated public statements of support for the Iranian people - including those opposing the Iranian regime - and keeping a sustained focus on the human rights situation inside Iran.  The US should also be looking for ways to demonstrate tangible support for the Iranian people.  For example, the US should change the policy that almost completely bars Americans from providing funds or goods to Iranians, including for hospitals, orphanages, and schools.  This policy appears to be predicated on the belief that alleviating the suffering of Iranian citizens indirectly helps the regime.  Such a belief is both mistaken and self-defeating.  The US could send a powerful positive signal to the Iranian people by beginning the process of de-criminalizing such charitable giving to legitimate causes in Iran and establishing responsible mechanisms to permit such funding.  If such funding is able to get through, it would send a signal that Americans care about the Iranian people; if such funding were blocked by the Iranian regime, the Iranian people would know that it is their own government that is responsible for the loss of assistance.
 
Regime Change & the Military Option
 
A rational US policy is one that does not cast aside clearly-defined US national security-focused goals in favor of the ill-conceived, nebulous approach that seeks regime change in Iran, either through proxies or military action.   
 
Regime change rhetoric and a regime change-focused policy undermine the chances of advancing key US national security objectives, removing any incentive for Iran to alter its behavior.  A regime-change policy would likely encourage Iran to redouble its efforts in the nuclear arena and to undertake even more destabilizing activities in the region.  It would also neutralize the "leverage" represented by international sanctions, in effect closing the door to any possible diplomatic solution, and telling the Iranian regime that there is no benefit to changing its behavior, since its very existence is now under attack. 
 
While the military option should not be taken off the table, it must be recognized as the least desirable and by no means inevitable option of last resort - with "last resort" not being synonymous with "having lost patience,"  "getting frustrated," or "facing extraordinary pressure from domestic constituencies."  Military action is far less likely to achieve any of the key US goals regarding Iran - including stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons - than resolute, determined US and international engagement and pressure.  Military action would likely have serious consequences for a range of US national security interests, including regional stability, the security of US personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the security of Israel.  It would also likely result in a "rally-round-the-flag" phenomenon, in effect strengthening the Iranian regime and undercutting legitimate domestic opposition.
 
The US must avoid and unambiguously reject casual rhetoric or threats, by any nation, about first-strike options or pre-emptive military action against Iran.  Likewise, deadlines and benchmarks should be viewed as tools of diplomacy, not rigid constraints on US engagement.  The US must not simply "go through the motions" of exhausting all non-military options in order to build a case for war.  Rather, the US - in coordination with the international community - must resolutely explore and exploit non-military options in order to achieve well-articulated, well-understood US national security goals with respect to Iran , rejecting the analysis that views military action - and the armed conflagration and regional instability that would likely result - as inevitable, or even desirable.
 
The US and the "Green Movement"
 
A rational US policy is one that recognizes that US support for the Iranian people can exist side-by-side with US engagement with the Iranian regime.  The US must take into account a complicated reality, characterized by several key considerations: (a) Iran is undergoing a period of serious domestic political turmoil,  (b) it is as-yet unclear how strong the opposition to the current regime actually is or how effective it will be over the long term in impacting the behavior and politics of the Iranian regime; (c) for the foreseeable future the current regime will likely remain in power, (d) there is no evidence that the opposition in Iran, if it succeeded in changing the current political status quo, would not continue on the same course with regards to Iran's nuclear program, and (e) vital US national security goals related to Iran cannot be put on hold until the Iranian domestic political situation sorts itself out. 
 
Any US strategy that is predicated on the belief that the Iranian domestic opposition movement will act as an arm of US foreign policy (as was the mistaken expectation in Iraq) would represent a dangerous misreading of the Iranian domestic political scene, where the domestic opposition does not view itself as a pro-West or pro-US movement, and its grievances with the Iranian regime are in no way connected to the regime's nuclear program.  Such a policy is not only unlikely to succeed, but is likely to backfire, discrediting Iranian domestic opposition forces and providing the Iranian regime additional pretexts to crack down on them.
 
US foreign policy is not and is never a zero-sum game.  The argument that the US must make a choice - engage the Iranian regime or support the Iranian people - is specious.  Throughout the world the US maintains constructive diplomatic relations with governments while at the same time sharply criticizing the conduct of those governments with respect to the rights of their citizens, and maintaining a range of programs aimed at helping those populations.