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Obama Premises for Re-Starting Permanent Status Talks?

For some time there has been a debate over whether President Obama will, or should, release his own ideas about the content of an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement (PSA).  Now, as there appears to be a renewed push underway to launch Israeli-Palestinian permanent status talks, there is again discussion of whether it is time for President Obama to lay down some clear US ideas about those talks.

Interestingly, the Obama Administration has already gone a good way in this direction.  The fact is, with little fanfare and nobody really noticing, the Obama Administration has - in speeches and other statements of President Obama and his top officials - been gradually laying out some clear premises upon which it believes any permanent status talks will be based.  While these statements fall short of directly stating US expectations for the content of a PSA, they very clearly communicate US policy on some of the key permanent status issues, and it is no great leap to infer from them some clear US expectations about the shape and content of a PSA.

Transforming these discrete policy utterances into a cohesive set of premises about peace could arguably be very helpful in energizing President Obama's Middle East peace effort, reasserting US leadership and confidence in the Middle East policy arena.  Doing so could also reassure Israelis and Palestinians - as well as key allies in the region whom the US needs help from in launching talks - that the US recognizes and validates their core concerns.  Moreover, were the US to release a formal policy statement of some kind, along the lines discussed below, it would be very difficult for Israel or the Palestinians to attack the content, since it genuinely includes nothing that has not already been said.

So what are we talking about?  Drawing from various statements delivered by President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and White House Spokesman Gibbs from September 2009 to the present, one can cobble together the following framework statement for re-starting final status talks (this is just one arrangement of quotes - others are possible.  No words have been changed in any of the quotes).  

The United States is committed to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.  That includes a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that results in two states, Israel and Palestine, in which both the Israeli people and the Palestinian people can live in peace and security and realize their aspirations for a better life for their children (link).

Negotiations:  The time has come to re-launch negotiations, without preconditions, that address the permanent status issues:  security for Israelis and Palestinians, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem (link).

Security:  The U.S. commitment to Israel's security is and will remain unshakeable.  It can best be achieved through comprehensive peace in the region, including a two-state solution with a Palestinian state living side by side in peace with Israel (link).

Jerusalem: The United States recognizes that Jerusalem is a deeply important issue for Israelis and Palestinians, and for Jews, Muslims, and Christians (link).   We believe that through good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem, and safeguards its status for people around the world (link). Neither party should engage in efforts or take actions that could unilaterally pre-empt, or appear to pre-empt, negotiations (link).  The United States opposes new Israeli construction in East Jerusalem (link).  The U.S. objects to Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing, including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes (link).

Settlements:  Continued settlement activity is inconsistent with Israel's commitment under the Roadmap. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued settlement expansion and we urge that it stop (link).

Borders/land swaps:  Through good-faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements (link).  The goal is clear: a Jewish state of Israel with true security for all Israelis; a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967 (link).

As noted earlier, it is no great leap to infer from the foregoing some clear US expectations about the shape and content of a permanent status agreement.  For anyone familiar with the content of the Camp David negotiations, the Taba talks, or the Geneva Accord, these points all seem obvious - but that does not detract from the importance of a US position that references them, even inferentially.

A first inference is that the Obama Administration supports the establishment of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.  The Obama Administration has emphasized that it believes an agreement is possible that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem.  The core aspiration of the Palestinians in Jerusalem is clear: a capital in East Jerusalem.  The core aspiration of Israel is less clear - politically, any talk of sharing or dividing Jerusalem is politically divisive, but since Camp David (where the Israeli side accepted the idea of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem), no Israeli can seriously claim that holding on to every inch of East Jerusalem is a core Israeli aspiration.  The US statements opposing Israeli settlement construction and home demolitions in East Jerusalem bolster this inference.

A second inference is that the Obama Administration believes that borders, and border negotiations, should be based on the 1967 lines.  The Obama Administration has not directly recognized the 1967 border as the starting point for negotiations, but it has done so implicitly by referencing the Palestinian aspiration for "an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines with agreed swaps" and the US goal of an agreement "that ends the occupation that began in 1967."

A third inference is that, consistent with what has been established in past negotiations, the Obama Administration assumes that Israel will keep some West Bank territory beyond the 1967 border, and that the Palestinians will be compensated through mutually agreed-on land swaps.  In contrast to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has neither explicitly nor implicitly accepted the Israeli position that certain settlement "blocs" are not up for negotiations.  However, by referencing the Palestinian aspiration for a state based on the 1967 line "with agreed swaps" alongside the Israeli aspiration for "recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements," the implication is that the US expects a PSA to include mutually agreed-upon land swaps that will address Israeli core equities (some settlements) and Palestinian core equities (contiguity, one-to-one ratio).  Moreover, the US reference to the goal of "a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory" would seem to rule out US support for Israeli plans to try to retain settlements located deep inside the West Bank (through "fingers").   Similarly, the reference to a PSA "that ends the occupation that began in 1967" would seem to rule out US support for Israeli efforts to retain control of the Jordan Valley.

A fourth and final inference (and perhaps a weaker one) is that the Obama Administration does not accept the Israeli demand that Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, but does agree to Israel's right to define itself however it wishes.  The formula invoked by the Obama Administration references "the Israeli goal of a Jewish state."  It notably does not say "the Israeli goal of Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state."