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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher- September 13, 2010

Questions answered cover: Strategic trends in the Jewish New Year, 5771; The passing of Major General (ret.) Yisrael Tal; Israel Foreign Ministry rejection of a visit by five European foreign ministers; Unusual high-level Israeli visits to Athens and Moscow.


Q. What strategic trends should we be watching for in the Middle East in the Jewish New Year, 5771?
 
A. There are a few long-term trends that are obviously worth continuing to follow. It's a safe bet they will maintain their momentum during the year ahead.
 
One is the gradual decline of the Arab state system, with Sudan, Somalia (a member of the Arab League, though not Arab), Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen listed as fragmented states, and Iraq threatening to be listed as a failed or fragmented state, depending on how things play out as the United States withdraws troops.
 
A major factor in this decline will continue to be intra-Islam fighting that pits extremists, the state structure and a liberal minority against one another. Against this backdrop, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will continue to decline as traditional leaders of the Arab world, with Egypt's presidential elections drawing particular attention. In contrast, the three non-Arab states of the Middle East, Iran, Turkey and Israel, will continue to dominate in diverse and often contradictory ways with, again, Islamism playing a pivotal role.
 
A second set of trends to pay attention to are those that, for whatever reason, are projected to play themselves out during the coming year. Washington and Jerusalem have both allocated a year for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, while many observers have predicted that 2011 will signal major confrontation over Iran's nuclear program. Judging by past experience, neither projection should be considered written in stone.
 
The Iran connection brings us to predictions or projections of war in the region. Here it's worth recalling that the outbreak of most major Middle East wars has surprised the experts and analysts: the Six-Day War (1967), Yom Kippur War (1973), Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that precipitated the First Gulf War (1991) are good examples. Thus, if experience is our guide, we are not likely to anticipate the outbreak of a new conflict in the coming year. Currently, predictions focus on Israel's northern borders with Lebanon and Syria and on an attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. In both cases, the very concentration of analytical and diplomatic interest in these theaters may help deter or prevent conflict.
 
But Hamas in Gaza could ignite another conflict with Israel if the Israeli-Palestinian peace process appears to be making significant progress. The situation along the Gaza border was already escalating this week as rocket attacks and infiltration attempts increased. And Iraq could be the focus of conflict, low-level and other, depending on the course of events inside the country and with neighbors Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria, all of whom are heavily involved in manipulating the country's future.
 
Q. Speaking of wars, Major General (ret.) Yisrael Tal died over the weekend at age 85. Why is his passing symbolic?
 
A. The father of the Merkava tank, "Talik" was considered a figure of global importance in the annals of armored warfare. Military historians place him on a level with Patton and Rommel, neither of whom ever orchestrated tank battles on the scope of Israel's armored victories on three fronts in 1967 and two fronts in 1973.
 
But the symbolism of Talik's passing should not be lost in a flurry of well-deserved eulogies. In looking at recent and likely fighting between Israel and its enemies, tank warfare is not what it used to be. Israel no longer faces coalitions of Arab states on its borders, massing thousands of tanks. Rather, it increasingly contemplates asymmetric warfare with non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah that deploy rockets rather than tanks. Even a war with Iran would not involve armored clashes.
 
Of course, while large-scale armored maneuvers and tank battles may be doubtful, they are still conceivable--with Syria, or with a renewed "eastern front" sparked by an aggressive, pro-Iranian Iraq. The Merkava Mark V will soon be unveiled, and Israel cannot afford not to prepare for all contingencies. But the more common vision is of Merkava tanks maneuvering through the alleyways of refugee camps in Jenin and Gaza and being pelted with rocks thrown by children. That is not what Talik had in mind.
 
Q. Why did the Israel Foreign Ministry reject a visit later this week by five European foreign ministers to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?
 
A. The official reason proffered by the Foreign Ministry is Yom Kippur; the ministers wanted to arrive on Thursday and the Day of Atonement begins the next evening. But it's instructive to speculate on the real reasons.
 
The five ministers, from France, Spain (the two organizers of the mission), the UK, Germany and Italy, were expected to exploit the timing of the visit--the day after one by Secretary of State Clinton that will be held in conjunction with the opening of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on Sept. 14-15--to pressure the Netanyahu government to extend the settlement freeze. The Israeli prime minister is already feeling plenty of pressure on this issue from Washington--President Barack Obama spoke of it explicitly over the weekend. On Sunday, Netanyahu allowed that he was prepared to compromise on limited construction in the settlement blocs. By calling this the "Olmert model" (i.e., the limited settlement-construction arrangement in force in 2008, when Olmert-Abbas negotiations made significant progress), Netanyahu hopes to recruit US support and weaken Palestinian opposition.
 
The European Union was conspicuously absent from the ceremonies inaugurating renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace talks ten days ago in Washington. While EU foreign and security chief Catherine Ashton apparently was invited (but reportedly preferred to visit China instead), the Europeans have seemingly been left out of this process. Thus the Israeli snub of a European visit at this juncture could conceivably be acceptable to Washington. Even though most of the countries in the European delegation (with the exception of Spain and possibly the UK) are considered to be relatively sympathetic to Israel, Europe in general is usually thought of as tilting toward the Palestinians.
 
Notably, the snub of a European delegation has not deterred Israel from petitioning the EU to upgrade commercial relations as a reward for renewal of the peace process. This merely underlines the perception that the EU, with its clumsy decision-making process, is considered able to "pay" but not to "play"--a source of endless frustration for European leaders.
 
Finally, and beyond all other explanations, considering the unpredictable and often outrageous behavior of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, his ministry's decision to reject the European foreign ministers can hardly come as a surprise.
 
Q. On the other hand, Israel's leaders recently made very unusual high-level visits to Athens and Moscow. Is there some special significance here?
 
A. Both visits--by PM Netanyahu to Greece in August and by Defense Minister Ehud Barak to Russia earlier this month--should be understood first and foremost against the backdrop of Israel's increasingly troubled relationship with Turkey. Greece and Russia both border on Turkey by land and/or by sea, and both have reason to be concerned over Ankara's emergence as a regional power and its energetic "zero problems" approach to dealing with any and all conflict issues not only on its borders but beyond, e.g., in Gaza. To the extent that Turkey is perceived to be increasingly accommodating to Iran, Syria and militant Islamist movements like Hezbollah and Hamas, Russia and especially Greece--the latter having traditionally tilted toward the Arabs--are presumably paying nearly as much attention as Israel.
 
Of course, neither country can easily replace Turkey as a trading partner for Israel, and certainly not as a military and intelligence partner. Nor does either offer the geographic proximity to potential military targets in Iran and Syria or the access to Iraqi Kurdistan that Turkey, until recently, was understood to provide. But on September 6, Barak signed an unprecedented military cooperation agreement with his Russian counterpart, Anatoly Serdyukov. And Netanyahu's visit to Athens, which was preceded in July by a visit to Israel by Greek PM George Papandreou, could conceivably help pave the way for Israeli gas exports to Europe, in close coordination with Cyprus, once Israel's newly-discovered Mediterranean gas fields are developed.
 
Obviously, Turkey is not the only issue at stake here, especially where Russia is concerned. For example, Israel seeks leverage with Moscow in order to minimize the latter's arms sales to Iran and Syria. And Israel and Russia already have a well-developed commercial and even security relationship: they exchange intelligence on terrorism and Russia has purchased Israeli unmanned aircraft. Still, an Israeli effort to upgrade relations with Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia would not come as a surprise right now.