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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alper - January 10, 2011

Alpher responds to questions about the possible Knesset committee to investigate the funding sources of left-wing NGOs like Peace Now; former Mossad head Meir Dagan's series of extremely conservative estimates regarding Iran's nuclear program; unusual escalation in Israeli military activity in the West Bank last week.


Q. Why is the Knesset set to appoint a committee to investigate the funding sources of left-wing NGOs like Peace Now?

A. This is yet another reflection of the reactionary right-wing influences unleashed by the Netanyahu government. This time the parallel to the McCarthy-McCarran era is particularly apt: the Knesset itself is being asked to investigate elements branded as disloyal for ostensibly giving information (frequently obtained from the IDF and publicly available) to Israel's "enemies" like the Goldstone commission.

Before looking at the inspiration behind this initiative, it should be noted that last week's Knesset vote approving it was preliminary. Hopefully, the international, American Jewish and domestic Israeli reaction will have the same effect on PM Netanyahu as did the reaction to previous and equally outrageous moves by members of his coalition: persuading him effectively to shelve the initiative. Even Prof. Gerald Steinberg, president and founder of NGO Monitor and the original instigator of the witch-hunt against Israeli human rights groups and their funders, took his distance from this move.

I would list six elements or characteristics of contemporary Israeli society as the primary catalysts for these activities on the part of Netanyahu's right-wing coalition. Here it is important to note that previous right-wing governments, including under Netanyahu, did not for the most part take these initiatives; indeed, Israel's most progressive basic laws defending individual freedoms were legislated under the Shamir government some three decades ago. So we have to focus on current factors more than on political ideology.

The most critical element is fear. The Israeli right wing fears the growing capacity and intent of the international community to punish Israel for the occupation and eventually to impose a solution. I have heard this assessment directly from some of the people involved in creating a witch-hunt atmosphere against the left and in scapegoating it for "collaboration" with the international community.

There may be a certain consolation here for the rest of us in seeing the pro-settler right wing in effect "circle the wagons" in a nasty last-ditch defense of its assets, meaning mainly the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the settlements. This is particularly relevant insofar as this reactionary direction merely invites more international pressure and isolation. But that pressure also nurtures and reinforces the international campaign or campaigns to de-legitimize Israel, some dimensions of which really are dangerous. And meanwhile, Israeli society is becoming more sharply and dangerously divided.

A second critical element is the effective merging, particularly in this government, of three political streams that display dangerous anti-democratic characteristics. One is those extremist settlers and some orthodox supporters who apparently prefer a Jewish state to a democratic state. A second is the Shas ultra-orthodox movement that ultimately has little use not only for democracy but for many institutions of the state itself. Yet a third is reactionary elements from among the massive Russian immigration of the past two decades, whose leader, Yisrael Beitenu party head Avigdor Lieberman, is increasingly reminiscent in his behavior of autocrats Vladimir Putin of Russia and Aleksandr Lukashenko of Byelorussia--among the few foreign leaders who are prepared to host him.

Not accidentally, the two sponsors of the latest McCarthyite bill targeting NGOs are from the Likud's settler wing and Yisrael Beitenu party. One reason Netanyahu agreed to get the Likud behind this bill is his transparent fear of being outflanked politically by the dynamic and totally unprincipled Lieberman.

A third element is the occupation and its ills. Quite simply, the longer the occupation lasts, the more violent and aggressive Israeli society becomes. This ties in with a fourth element: broad public disappointment with the violent outcome of unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, as expressed in major and highly problematic military campaigns in 2006 and 2009. More than any other factor, this is what produced the current right-wing majority in the Knesset in the 2009 elections.

Essentially, large portions of the public are saying, we tried withdrawing without conditions, and all we got was terrorist and rocket attacks. When we retaliated, not only could we not win unequivocally, but the entire international community is breathing down our necks unfairly, singling us out for "war crimes" that are the inevitable outcome of fighting militant Islamists, as the US and Europe know well from Iraq and Afghanistan. So let's zero in on those Israelis who, by associating themselves financially with American and European institutions, "collaborate" with this campaign to vilify us, and to hell with human rights or even the truth as exposed by these Israelis.

Fifth, there is a leadership vacuum across the Israeli political spectrum. Consequently, no powerful political voices of opposition are heard. The preliminary vote to investigate human rights-oriented NGOs passed in the Knesset by 41 to 15. Why was the majority of the 120-strong Knesset afraid even to vote? Note that right-wingers with strong ideological underpinnings in the Revisionist movement that created the Likud--people like Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin and ministers Dan Meridor and Benny Begin--opposed the initiative. All except Netanyahu, who places his coalition above all values.

Finally, there is the world's extraordinary preoccupation with the Israel-Arab conflict. This has a striking financial dimension. Yediot Aharonot columnist Nahum Barnea wrote last week that "the [Knesset] neo-right faction comprises members from a host of parties, from Kadima to the National Union. They are a local Tea Party, united in their hatred of foreigners, their populism and their blindness toward the world." But Barnea added a word of caution: "Even someone like me, who believes that as long as Israel is an occupier the activities of the human rights groups are a vital necessity, feels uncomfortable in reading the list of foreign countries that contribute money to [human rights] NGOs. Too much foreign money is being invested in Israel's domestic politics, money to the left, money to the right, money for Netanyahu's public relations, money to settlers, money to their rivals."


Q. When Mossad head Meir Dagan stepped aside last week, he issued a series of extremely conservative estimates regarding Iran's nuclear program and cautioned against Israel seeing that program as a casus belli. Is this the same man who has been sabotaging the Iranian nuclear project so successfully for the past eight years?

A. Precisely because Israel and others have succeeded in slowing down the Iranian nuclear weapons project, Dagan could comfortably assess last week that even if no further action were taken against Iran, it would not have a deliverable weapon before 2015. This method of prevention, incidentally, is the explanation behind Israel's oft-criticized practice over the past 15 years of presenting deadlines for Iran to go nuclear, then delaying the deadlines. By the same token, it would be unfortunate if Dayan's remarks now caused the international community to lower its guard concerning Iran.

Dagan is also very cautious about the circumstances under which, eventually, Israel could consider using a military option against Iran: only if Israel itself is attacked, "or when the sword is on its neck, literally cutting the flesh." Basically, Dagan is saying that the Israeli arsenal of non-military means of delaying and sabotaging the Iranian program is far from exhausted. A military attack on Iran is liable merely to strengthen the regime while the Israeli rear pays a significant price in losses. Hence, he concludes, military action should ultimately be considered, if at all, only in partnership with others.


Q. Last week witnessed an unusual escalation in Israeli military activity in the West Bank. What caused it and what could this lead to?

A. There were several rare incidents at checkpoints, one apparently involving IDF troops killing a terrorist and at least one a case of confusion or mistaken identity. Basically, these incidents will never cease until the occupation ends, though even that is not necessarily a guarantee of peace and quiet: there were shooting incidents with Gaza last week, too, including one in which Israeli mortar fire mistakenly targeted IDF troops, killing one.

But alongside human error, the really serious incident was more complicated and troublesome. The Palestinian Authority released six Hamas militants who had been arrested earlier by PA security forces and held for attacks perpetrated in late August-early September 2010 in which several settlers were killed. The IDF responded to the release by penetrating Palestinian cities and itself apprehending five of the attackers. A sixth was targeted in his home in Hebron, but the raid went awry, with Israeli soldiers ending up killing his father by mistake.

Beyond the seemingly endless tragedy of innocent Palestinian civilians caught up in Israel's efforts to protect the settlers, the circumstances surrounding the PA's release of the six militants are worthy of notice. This sort of "revolving door" attitude toward incarcerated militants and terrorists on the part of PA security forces was supposed to be a thing of the past--Yasser Arafat's day. Growing cooperation between Israeli and PA forces, which has led to the removal of many IDF checkpoints and roadblocks and helped open up the West Bank to free movement and commerce, is based to a large extent on the improved performance and reputation of these American- and European-trained and financed Palestinian security forces.

Israeli speculation concerning the unusual and provocative release centered on two explanations. One is linked to Fateh-Hamas relations and the seemingly endless efforts to effect reconciliation between the two movements. The six were released after PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) received unusual condolence phone calls regarding the death of his brother, from Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Damascus and Gaza PM Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas. Conceivably, then, Abu Mazen ordered the release as a good will gesture to Hamas.

Alternatively, or perhaps in tandem, Abu Mazen may have intended the release as a signal to Israel that security cooperation would not go on forever while Israel continues to build settlements and the Netanyahu government refuses even to look at written peace proposals presented by Palestinian negotiators. After all, the PA is holding dozens if not hundreds of Hamas activists whose offense is against the PA, not Israel, and whose release would not generate friction in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Either way, we have to hope that the release of the six Hamas militants was an exception. If it becomes the new rule--for whatever reason--the consequences for the security situation could be disastrous.