This week's questions:
It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?
...In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?
How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?
It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?
...In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?
How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?
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Q. It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?
A. An Arab League monitoring committee last week voted to approve these proximity talks, limiting them to four months and conditioning direct talks after that on a comprehensive Israeli settlement freeze. The four-month limit was then endorsed by the PLO. This provides Palestinian President and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) with the regional and local backing he needs to forego his earlier conditions, such as extension of the settlement freeze to Jerusalem, and agree to proximity talks.
The timing is also auspicious: US peace envoy George Mitchell just returned to the region, to be followed on March 8 by Vice President Joe Biden, the highest Obama administration official to visit Israel thus far. This offers high-level American "cover" for Abbas as well.
Interestingly, Biden's visit, like many by American officials in recent months, is seen primarily as a vehicle for ensuring close US-Israeli coordination regarding Iran, not the peace process. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman John Kerry said as much on his recent visit to Israel, wherein he intimated that the US is keeping up a steady stream of high-level security visits to ensure that Israel follows the current economic sanctions script and does not take any independent military initiative regarding Iran's nuclear program.
But PM Binyamin Netanyahu knows the two issues are linked. Indeed, he told a Likud caucus several months ago that Israel's need for American cooperation on Iran required that Jerusalem be forthcoming and make concessions on the Palestinian issue.
So is all of this "coming together"--a concerted effort against Iran and an Israeli-Palestinian peace process? At least for the coming months, the prognosis is more positive regarding Iran than Israel-Palestine. True, Mitchell is likely to be a hands-on proximity facilitator, will forcefully present his own ideas, and can use the threat to point to one party or the other as being responsible for failure as an incentive toward progress. On the other hand, with the inauguration of proximity talks rather than, once again, direct negotiations, the process will seemingly have regressed considerably. Surely no one--neither the US nor Israel nor the PLO--can take credit for a step forward in the peace process when a 17-year tradition of direct talks has gone by the wayside.
Then too, proximity talks will begin in the shadow of growing tensions in Hebron, at the Temple Mount and at points along the security fence, that have led to predictions of a third intifada. Certainly, if the talks are used by the Palestinian side merely to insist on a complete and permanent settlement-construction freeze, as the Arab League decision implies, then they are likely to end after four months in stalemate.
Netanyahu, for his part, may be persuaded by Mitchell to offer Abbas alternative confidence-building measures other than expanding and extending the settlement-construction freeze. One possibility is the transfer of additional West Bank land currently under full Israeli control (area C, all told some 60 percent of the land) or Israeli security control (area B) to greater Palestinian control and usage. If this happens, Abbas will be hard put to maintain his current unyielding position. Alternatively or in parallel, Mitchell may seek to devote the proximity talks to agreement in principle on the parameters of "borders first", an option frequently discussed.
Yet it is extremely unlikely that Netanyahu and Abbas can agree on borders, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Moreover, the more extreme factions in Netanyahu's coalition will be very unhappy with any territorial move at all. Their anticipated protest points to the domestic political conflict Netanyahu faces if, against the gut feeling of most observers, he actually proves to be a peace-oriented prime minister.
Q. Apropos proximity talks, during 2008 Turkey did a reasonably good job of mediating between Syria and Israel through this mechanism. Last week you discussed growing Syria-Israel tensions and miscommunications. In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?
A. In general, Israel should be interested in patching up its relations with Turkey regardless of the Syria issue. Four issue areas appear to be responsible for the ongoing frigid diplomatic relationship.
Before looking at them, it's significant to note that, following a recent successful visit to Turkey by Defense Minister Ehud Barak where he met primarily with the largely secular Turkish security establishment, bilateral security links are in much better shape than the overall relationship. On the other hand, the moderate Islamist government's growing crackdown on elements of the military suspected of treasonous intentions--a crackdown seemingly only partially grounded in hard facts--is increasingly neutralizing the Turkish army's political influence, which was once considered a key underpinning of the regime's positive approach toward Israel.
The first issue area of interest is regional. Israel has traditionally looked to Turkey as part of the Middle East non-Arab periphery that shares Israeli concerns over Arab nationalist aims and incursions. But Arab nationalism of the Nasser variety is a factor of the past, replaced either by lack of direction in the Arab world or by Islam. Further, Turkey's Islamist government has embarked on a dynamic foreign policy of solving conflicts on and around all its borders and is successfully exploiting its Islamist credentials to do this. Israel has been hard put to adjust to this radical change in Turkey's orientation.
The outcome of this disconnect was seemingly inevitable. When Ankara's (fruitful and productive) attempt to facilitate Israeli-Syrian proximity talks collapsed after Israel invaded Gaza in December 2008 (to punish a Hamas movement that Turkey also wanted to reconcile with Israel), Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan turned against Israel.
A second issue area is perceptual: how far, Israelis ask, is the ruling AK Party in Turkey going to go in creating tacit alliances with other, more extreme Islamists like Iran and Hamas, and with radical though secular neighbors like Syria? Are these moves merely an attempt to complement Turkey's essentially western orientation of the past 80 years or, rather, a genuine reaction to the perception of western (read: EU) rejection? The answer to this question could be critical not only for Israel.
A third issue is rhetorical and symbolic. Erdogan's attacks appear at times to deny Israel's right to self-defense and to pander to racist and religious currents among the Turkish public. Israeli officials find it much easier to talk with virtually everyone else in the Turkish establishment, especially when Turkish officials are moved to apologize for their prime minister's temper. On the other hand, Israel has recently contributed its own share of totally unnecessary slights to Turkish dignity.
Finally, there is Israel's growing concern for the Turkish Jewish community, which is feeling the brunt of those racist and religious currents.
All these considerations leave Israel with a series of policy choices. The Netanyahu government should make them wisely:
Q. How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?
A. It is fascinating to read "learned" treatises on the various Iraqi political parties and analyses of the election, in the press of virtually every Arab country. Fascinating, because with the partial exception of Lebanon, none of these countries has a similarly democratic process even in its collective memory.
This begs a number of questions of broad strategic import. First, can democracy really be transplanted by a foreign power, to Iraq or anywhere else? Second, how compatible is representative democracy with Islamic and Arab culture and with Iraq's religiously and ethnically heterogeneous population? And third, if the elections do succeed in producing a stable and democratic Iraq, will this have the "democratic domino effect" on the rest of the Arab world that the Bush administration neo-conservatives intended?
Of course, a successful election ushering in a successful democracy in Iraq is by no means a foregone conclusion. Hence, alongside the undoubted interest there is Arab concern, particularly regarding the extent to which the election outcome facilitates Iranian hegemonic inroads into Iraq by means of links to pro-Iranian Shi'ite parties and candidates. Virtually every other country bordering Iraq, with the possible exception of Syria, has an interest in blocking Iranian influence there. Saudi Arabia has reportedly spent huge sums to support Sunni and moderate Shi'ite candidates; the Saudis and other Gulf emirates have also exploited their control over satellite and Iraqi TV channels to advance their candidates. But Iran has, since 2003, made the biggest effort.
In a worst-case scenario, the elections could play a role in factionalization, regionalization and a general deterioration in the cohesion of the Iraqi state as we know it. This, too, would have far-reaching consequences for Iraq's neighbors. Hence the outcome is of intense interest to the entire Middle East.
Q. It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?
A. An Arab League monitoring committee last week voted to approve these proximity talks, limiting them to four months and conditioning direct talks after that on a comprehensive Israeli settlement freeze. The four-month limit was then endorsed by the PLO. This provides Palestinian President and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) with the regional and local backing he needs to forego his earlier conditions, such as extension of the settlement freeze to Jerusalem, and agree to proximity talks.
The timing is also auspicious: US peace envoy George Mitchell just returned to the region, to be followed on March 8 by Vice President Joe Biden, the highest Obama administration official to visit Israel thus far. This offers high-level American "cover" for Abbas as well.
Interestingly, Biden's visit, like many by American officials in recent months, is seen primarily as a vehicle for ensuring close US-Israeli coordination regarding Iran, not the peace process. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman John Kerry said as much on his recent visit to Israel, wherein he intimated that the US is keeping up a steady stream of high-level security visits to ensure that Israel follows the current economic sanctions script and does not take any independent military initiative regarding Iran's nuclear program.
But PM Binyamin Netanyahu knows the two issues are linked. Indeed, he told a Likud caucus several months ago that Israel's need for American cooperation on Iran required that Jerusalem be forthcoming and make concessions on the Palestinian issue.
So is all of this "coming together"--a concerted effort against Iran and an Israeli-Palestinian peace process? At least for the coming months, the prognosis is more positive regarding Iran than Israel-Palestine. True, Mitchell is likely to be a hands-on proximity facilitator, will forcefully present his own ideas, and can use the threat to point to one party or the other as being responsible for failure as an incentive toward progress. On the other hand, with the inauguration of proximity talks rather than, once again, direct negotiations, the process will seemingly have regressed considerably. Surely no one--neither the US nor Israel nor the PLO--can take credit for a step forward in the peace process when a 17-year tradition of direct talks has gone by the wayside.
Then too, proximity talks will begin in the shadow of growing tensions in Hebron, at the Temple Mount and at points along the security fence, that have led to predictions of a third intifada. Certainly, if the talks are used by the Palestinian side merely to insist on a complete and permanent settlement-construction freeze, as the Arab League decision implies, then they are likely to end after four months in stalemate.
Netanyahu, for his part, may be persuaded by Mitchell to offer Abbas alternative confidence-building measures other than expanding and extending the settlement-construction freeze. One possibility is the transfer of additional West Bank land currently under full Israeli control (area C, all told some 60 percent of the land) or Israeli security control (area B) to greater Palestinian control and usage. If this happens, Abbas will be hard put to maintain his current unyielding position. Alternatively or in parallel, Mitchell may seek to devote the proximity talks to agreement in principle on the parameters of "borders first", an option frequently discussed.
Yet it is extremely unlikely that Netanyahu and Abbas can agree on borders, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Moreover, the more extreme factions in Netanyahu's coalition will be very unhappy with any territorial move at all. Their anticipated protest points to the domestic political conflict Netanyahu faces if, against the gut feeling of most observers, he actually proves to be a peace-oriented prime minister.
Q. Apropos proximity talks, during 2008 Turkey did a reasonably good job of mediating between Syria and Israel through this mechanism. Last week you discussed growing Syria-Israel tensions and miscommunications. In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?
A. In general, Israel should be interested in patching up its relations with Turkey regardless of the Syria issue. Four issue areas appear to be responsible for the ongoing frigid diplomatic relationship.
Before looking at them, it's significant to note that, following a recent successful visit to Turkey by Defense Minister Ehud Barak where he met primarily with the largely secular Turkish security establishment, bilateral security links are in much better shape than the overall relationship. On the other hand, the moderate Islamist government's growing crackdown on elements of the military suspected of treasonous intentions--a crackdown seemingly only partially grounded in hard facts--is increasingly neutralizing the Turkish army's political influence, which was once considered a key underpinning of the regime's positive approach toward Israel.
The first issue area of interest is regional. Israel has traditionally looked to Turkey as part of the Middle East non-Arab periphery that shares Israeli concerns over Arab nationalist aims and incursions. But Arab nationalism of the Nasser variety is a factor of the past, replaced either by lack of direction in the Arab world or by Islam. Further, Turkey's Islamist government has embarked on a dynamic foreign policy of solving conflicts on and around all its borders and is successfully exploiting its Islamist credentials to do this. Israel has been hard put to adjust to this radical change in Turkey's orientation.
The outcome of this disconnect was seemingly inevitable. When Ankara's (fruitful and productive) attempt to facilitate Israeli-Syrian proximity talks collapsed after Israel invaded Gaza in December 2008 (to punish a Hamas movement that Turkey also wanted to reconcile with Israel), Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan turned against Israel.
A second issue area is perceptual: how far, Israelis ask, is the ruling AK Party in Turkey going to go in creating tacit alliances with other, more extreme Islamists like Iran and Hamas, and with radical though secular neighbors like Syria? Are these moves merely an attempt to complement Turkey's essentially western orientation of the past 80 years or, rather, a genuine reaction to the perception of western (read: EU) rejection? The answer to this question could be critical not only for Israel.
A third issue is rhetorical and symbolic. Erdogan's attacks appear at times to deny Israel's right to self-defense and to pander to racist and religious currents among the Turkish public. Israeli officials find it much easier to talk with virtually everyone else in the Turkish establishment, especially when Turkish officials are moved to apologize for their prime minister's temper. On the other hand, Israel has recently contributed its own share of totally unnecessary slights to Turkish dignity.
Finally, there is Israel's growing concern for the Turkish Jewish community, which is feeling the brunt of those racist and religious currents.
All these considerations leave Israel with a series of policy choices. The Netanyahu government should make them wisely:
- Recognize that the periphery days are over, AK Party policies enjoy widespread Turkish support, and Turkey is too big and too central for Israel to reverse those policies--beyond exercising marginal influence on issues like the Armenian genocide in the US Congress.
- Keep Turkey as neutral as possible by exploiting any new opportunities to use Turkish good offices for mediation--for example, once again with Syria.
- Next time around, avoid launching unilateral initiatives like the invasion of Gaza without at least taking into account their potential effect on Turkey's position.
- Protest genuine insults by Erdogan and
others when necessary. Most Turks, who are extremely sensitive to their
own national honor, understand this.
Q. How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?
A. It is fascinating to read "learned" treatises on the various Iraqi political parties and analyses of the election, in the press of virtually every Arab country. Fascinating, because with the partial exception of Lebanon, none of these countries has a similarly democratic process even in its collective memory.
This begs a number of questions of broad strategic import. First, can democracy really be transplanted by a foreign power, to Iraq or anywhere else? Second, how compatible is representative democracy with Islamic and Arab culture and with Iraq's religiously and ethnically heterogeneous population? And third, if the elections do succeed in producing a stable and democratic Iraq, will this have the "democratic domino effect" on the rest of the Arab world that the Bush administration neo-conservatives intended?
Of course, a successful election ushering in a successful democracy in Iraq is by no means a foregone conclusion. Hence, alongside the undoubted interest there is Arab concern, particularly regarding the extent to which the election outcome facilitates Iranian hegemonic inroads into Iraq by means of links to pro-Iranian Shi'ite parties and candidates. Virtually every other country bordering Iraq, with the possible exception of Syria, has an interest in blocking Iranian influence there. Saudi Arabia has reportedly spent huge sums to support Sunni and moderate Shi'ite candidates; the Saudis and other Gulf emirates have also exploited their control over satellite and Iraqi TV channels to advance their candidates. But Iran has, since 2003, made the biggest effort.
In a worst-case scenario, the elections could play a role in factionalization, regionalization and a general deterioration in the cohesion of the Iraqi state as we know it. This, too, would have far-reaching consequences for Iraq's neighbors. Hence the outcome is of intense interest to the entire Middle East.