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Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - November 16, 2009

Alpher answers questions about proposed Palestinian plans to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state, Shaul Mofaz's plan for a provisional Palestinian state, and the fifth anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death.

Q. The past week witnessed the unveiling of a new Palestinian initiative by Saeb Erekat and other Fateh leaders, to unilaterally declare a state within the 1967 borders with UN Security Council approval. What's useful and what's harmful about it?
 
A. This initiative emerged as a consequence of the current stalemate and total absence of negotiations. In this sense, its genesis is negative. But when we get down to particulars, we encounter a more mixed picture.
 
First, we'll assume for the sake of argument that the Security Council approves the Palestinian idea of declaring a state in all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. That, of course, is an uncertain proposition at best, considering that the state would not meet basic international legal criteria such as control over its own territory and that the US could exercise its veto.
 
Erekat's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) threat is not new, by the way. Yasser Arafat made the same threat just 10 years ago during Binyamin Netanyahu's first stint as prime minister. Now, as then, this is probably more a ploy to extract concessions from Israel than a genuine new Palestinian departure--although Erekat has reportedly gone so far as to ask EU ambassadors to endorse a proposal to the Security Council. Note that just a few weeks ago, Erekat was waving the "one state" threat. In this sense, his latest plan is already an improvement insofar as it is premised on a two-state solution.
 
The UDI plan offers Israel both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that it would be harder for Palestinians to demand that Israel repatriate 1948 refugees when they have a state of their own in which some of those refugees already live and others could be absorbed. Then too, Israel would presumably no longer be asked to negotiate with the PLO--or it could refuse to do so--on the grounds that it should be talking to the leadership of the new state. The latter, by definition, would represent that state and not the Palestinian diaspora, thereby presumably moderating its positions.
 
But this points to another problem: who is that new national leadership? Does the Palestinian Authority ask for recognition as a state? Would the PLO (Israel's negotiating partner under the Oslo accords) be happy with that arrangement? And of course, the fact a state is declared doesn't necessarily help Gaza/Hamas and the West Bank/Fateh get back together. Indeed, a state was already declared once, by the Palestinian National Council back in 1988, for whatever that's worth.
 
But assuming the Palestinians iron out all these wrinkles, Israel would definitely face new obstacles. A state recognized as encompassing the 1967 borders would include, for example, the Wailing Wall, all Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem and the settlement blocs. Israel and the Palestinians have already negotiated over these and related issues and even reached tentative agreements, e.g., the Wailing Wall and all the Jerusalem Jewish neighborhoods beyond the green line would belong to Israel, as well as the settlement blocs in return for land swaps. Palestinian UDI theoretically erases all these tentative agreements and gives the Palestinian state complete control over the Temple Mount, a heavily disputed site holy to both Jews and Muslims.
 
Conceivably, an Israeli government could react to UDI by rejecting the new fait accompli and refusing to negotiate, while it maintains full control over these assets and argues that the new state is illegitimate. Yet this in turn might focus the international debate on the occupation of the new state's territory rather than a peace process. Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu has already announced that he would view UDI as a unilateral cancellation of the Oslo interim accords that forbid changes in status without mutual agreement. Israel could theoretically respond by cancelling the diverse services--cellular, internet, water, electricity, import-export, etc.--that it currently supplies to the PA. The outcome would surely be a new international and possibly humanitarian crisis.
 
Of course, just conceivably this sort of crisis could show us all the way to a two-state solution. Yet it would be a dangerous gamble.
 
 
Q. Another initiative unveiled last week, by Shaul Mofaz, calls for a provisional Palestinian state in 60 percent of the West Bank and international guarantees regarding the issues that remain open. How do you assess its relevancy?
 
A. Unlike Palestinian UDI, the Mofaz plan purports to be negotiated from the start with the PLO rather than confronting it with a fait accompli. Shaul Mofaz, former IDF chief of staff and minister of defense under Ariel Sharon, appears to have concocted his plan both to take advantage of the current diplomatic vacuum and as part of an effort to boost his candidacy to replace Tzipi Livni as head of the Kadima party. But he seems to have forgotten to consult the Palestinians over it. More precisely, he expects Washington to agree to compel the Palestinians to accept it.
 
Mofaz would offer the PLO an additional 20 percent or so of the West Bank without removing any settlements, thereby ostensibly giving the PA greater territorial contiguity and allowing it to declare a state. The rest would still have to be negotiated, though Israel would take unilateral steps to encourage settlers beyond the security fence to leave. To allay Palestinian fears that "the rest" would in fact never be negotiated, international guarantees would be provided. To allay the fears of some Israelis that Mahmoud Abbas and the PLO are in no shape to constitute a Palestinian negotiating partner, Mofaz offers to talk to Hamas. When asked what preconditions he would insist on before talking to Hamas, he alternately asserts that they have to accept his plan, that they have to first rule the entire PA, or that they have to accept the Quartet's three conditions regarding an end to violence, recognition of Oslo and recognition of Israel.
 
No Palestinian is likely to accept Mofaz's plan; certainly not Hamas. But this doesn't appear to bother him. Indeed, he's laughing all the way to the opinion polls, where a majority of Israelis appears to like his seemingly meaningless plan (57 percent in an Haaretz poll published last Friday), if only because the government of the day has no plan at all.
 
Well, not totally meaningless. By accepting a two-state solution and implicitly recognizing that negotiations over the other 40 percent of the West Bank will take place, thereby leading to the removal of more settlements, Mofaz is moving to the left, and that's good news. Moreover, his idea of progressing in territorial stages toward a solution dovetails with plans floated by President Shimon Peres and others that rely on roadmap phase II, which calls for a provisional Palestinian state. Finally, all this is not that far away from the Fayyad plan of laying the foundations for a state in the course of the next two years and then, if negotiations fail, going to the UN. And the Fayyad plan is the only one actually being carried out right now.
 
 
Q. Last week also marked the fifth anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death. How would you sum up the fortunes of Israelis and Palestinians since then?
 
A. It's a very mixed bag. On the plus side Arafat, who never really forsook violence as a means of achieving his political ends, was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas, who is very clear about condemning Palestinian violence. Arafat also came across to many of us who had contacts with him as a pathological liar, hence not a viable peace partner, whereas Abbas is seen as generally honest and reliable. In this sense, Israel got a more credible negotiating partner.
 
On the other hand, Arafat projected a degree of charismatic leadership and authority that Abbas does not have. Consequently, some Israelis still have doubts about Abbas' capacity to reach a final status agreement and deliver on it. Moreover, it is arguable that, were Arafat still around, Hamas would not have taken control over the Gaza Strip, thereby splitting the Palestinian polity to the detriment of all who seek a solution.
 
What Arafat and Abbas had in common is their origins as 1948 refugees (Arafat from Gaza and Jerusalem; Abbas from Safed). This explains the loyalty displayed consistently by both to the right of return issue, one of the most difficult for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve. Both tried to negotiate this and additional final status issues with Israel and, not surpisingly, both failed. When Abbas departs the scene, a younger generation of Palestinian leaders will almost certainly take over, possibly reflecting substantive policy differences with the founding fathers regarding issues like the right of return and conceivably rendering it easier to negotiate a comprehensive end of claims agreement.